PL EN


Journal
2013 | 21 | 2(82) | 31-49
Article title

The Relation of Instantiation

Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
It is argued that instantiation, i.e. the relation between particular objects and properties (conceived as universals or tropes) is indeed an ontologically robust relation. The relation of instantiation is required to explain the difference between a state of affairs of, for example, a being F, and the mereological fusion [a + F]. If instantiation is a true relation, then Bradley’s Regress ensues. It is argued, nevertheless, that the regress cannot be taken as a reason to reject the existence of instantiation or to reject the existence of properties as entities numerically different from particular objects to which the properties should be related. All the nominalist alternatives suffer from similar regresses. Bradley’s Regress should, therefore, be addressed head-on. After dismissing all the applicable ways in which an infinite regress may be deemed vicious, it is argued that Bradley’s Regress is – in a sense – harmless.
Journal
Year
Volume
21
Issue
Pages
31-49
Physical description
Contributors
  • Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Av. Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul – Santiago C. P. 7820436, Chile, jose.tomas.alvarado@gmail.com
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-9676da30-84d5-40d3-a513-7f6613020146
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.