Rules, norms, and analytical philosophical discourse
This article strives to provide an original conceptual framework that should open a way to clarification of general philosophical debates on rules and norms. It makes a clear distinction between rules (and norms) understood as social facts grounded on specific relationships between social subjects and rules (norms) understood as linguistic entities. Norms are taken as specific social rules and divided into three different types: social constitutive norms, particular constitutive norms, and institutional norms. Attention is also devoted to relation between normality and normativity, to the role of permissions and to specific features of technological ‘rules’. In the last part of the article the outlined conceptual apparatus is employed for analysis of two passages from Wittgenstein’s Investigations.
Oddelení logiky, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
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