2016 | 25 | 63-78
Article title

Determinants of complexity of sovereign debt negotiation

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The situation on all kinds of financial markets is determined by their increasing complexity. Negotiation of sovereign debt is also a complex endeavor. Its complexity results both from structural characteristics – number of actors, problems of coordination, communication, cooperation and conflict and from cognitive limitations. The survey of literature on sovereign debt management shows that no research has been done on complexity of sovereign debt management, and sovereign debt negotiation in particular. The aim of the paper is to provide initial framework concepts of complexity of sovereign debt restructuring negotiation referring to a universal collection of characteristics of negotiation. A model of debt restructuring negotiation is elaborated and a set of its complexity- related characteristics is proposed.
Physical description
  • Department of International Economic Relations. Faculty of Economics and International Relations. Cracow University of Economics
  • Department of Management Process. Faculty of Management. Cracow University of Economics
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