ANTI-REALISM ABOUT FICTIONAL NAMES AT WORK: A NEW THEORY FOR METAFICTIONAL SENTENCES

• Authors: Rouillé Louis
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this article, I contribute to ongoing debates about the status of fictional names. The main debate in the philosophy of language focuses on whether fictional names should be thought of as non-referring terms (this is anti-realism) or referring terms (this is realism). This debate corresponds to a debate in metaphysics about the ontological status of fictional characters: the anti-realist claim that fictional characters do not exist while the realist say that they do exist in some sense. Although anti-realism is pre-theoretically intuitive, it has been challenged by a powerful argument in favour of realism based on so-called “metafictional” uses of fictional terms. This argument puts a lot of pressure on the anti-realist, for they have to come up with a theory of metafictional sentences which is in keeping with the anti-realist central tenet. I show that the existing antirealist account of metafictional statements is wrong-headed. I thus propose a new one. In doing so, I hope to free the anti-realist from the realist pressure. However, I do not offer any argument against realism. Consequently, I merely claim that anti-realism be a live option. My modest proposal will, perhaps, make anti-realism more attractive than it is today among philosophers of language.

Keywords

EN

ANTI-REALISM; FICTION; FREE LOGIC; METAFICTIONAL STATEMENTS

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 28
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 223 – 252

Contributors

author

Rouillé Louis

• Institut Jean Nicod, UMR 8129 Pavillon Jardin Ecole Normale Supérieure 29, rue d’Ulm F-75230 Paris cedex 05, France

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28110