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Theoretical orientations in Greek foreign policy after 1990

The concept of foreign policy is a certain state of affairs and issues which should become real. Therefore, it expresses values and interests of society, which are realized through relations of the state with international community. These values and interests exist in the form of fundamental and strategic objectives¹. The concepts as the general action plans are disclosed. Only foreign policy doctrines are available. They contain internally consistent and hierarchical system of objectives, where specific objectives serve fundamental ones. The doctrine is concretized by the foreign policy programs, which refer to trends, areas and methods of foreign policy in details². Moreover, in this article foreign policy is treated as a dynamic process of creating and implementing national interests and political objectives in a polycentric and poliarchic international environment³.

If in a given society, the main political forces agree on the most important foreign policy objectives, it is possible to meet one concept of foreign policy. This concept can be expressed in different doctrines and programs. The situation is different when there are several concepts in foreign policy in a state. Then, there is a dispute about fundamental objectives and orientations of foreign policy⁴.

Starting to discuss the concepts of Greek foreign policy after 1990, the author is eager to adopt a bipolar division of concepts. Four basic divisions,

¹ R. Zięba, *Uwarunkowania polityki zagranicznej państwa*, [w:] R. Zięba (red.), *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa*, Toruń 2005, s. 27.

² *Ibidem*, s. 27.

³ T. Łoś-Nowak, *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Teorie-systemy-uczestnicy*, Wrocław 2006, s. 263.

⁴ R. Zięba, *Uwarunkowania...*, *op. cit.*, s. 28.

which are presented below, can be expressed as two opposite ideological poles. The first one is based on European and Western tradition. The other one derives from nationalist and ethnocentric background.

Europeanization and nationalist populism

The Europeanization contains a lot of definitions that are built on the basis of concepts such as Westernization, globalization or even Americanization. It involves adaptation to European norm and practices. It is more than just a process of integration and has three important dimensions: the increase and expansion of institutionalization at the European Union level, the relevant adjustment at the level of the member states as well as other similar adjustment in non-member states⁵.

Scholars dealing with the idea of Europeanization concentrate on certain aspects, which can be analysed and underline the complexity of Europeanization concept. Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias indicate the following dimensions of this concept:

- institutional adaptation within government;
- transformation in the structural power of domestic actors;
- adjustment of domestic macroeconomic regime;
- new dynamic with the domestic party system;
- pressure to redefine national identity;
- a strategic tool in the pursuit of foreign policy interests⁶.

Moreover, it is worth noting that Johan Olsen identifies five different uses of the concept of Europeanization, such as:

- changes to external territorial boundaries;
- development of institutions of governance at the European Union level;
- penetration of national and sub-national levels of governance;
- exporting forms of political governance and organisation that are peculiar to the EU beyond its own territory;
- a political project aiming at the unified and politically stronger Europe⁷.

⁵ S. Stavridis, *The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy: A literature review*, Discussion Paper – Hellenic Observatory, London 2003, s. 4.

⁶ K. Featherstone, G. Kazamias, *Introduction: Southern Europe and the Process of „Europeanisation”*, [w:] K. Featherstone, G. Kazamias (red.), *Europeanisation and the Southern Periphery*, London 2001, s. 15–16.

⁷ J. Olsen, *The Many Faces of Europeanisation*, ARENA Working Paper nr 02/02, 2002, s. 24, dostępny w Internecie: http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2002/wp02_2.htm (pobrano: 10.05.2012).

According to Spyros Economides, Europeanization is an idea which tries to explain the impact which European Union membership has on member states. He affirms this influence is not limited. The conclusion is that European Union membership has such a significant impact on member states that it may change the structure, shape or dynamics of internal politics. Spyros Economides believes that the effect of European Union membership is so important that national policy preferences are no longer a question only of domestic politics but are strongly influenced by a European level of policy making. Through EU membership, states' preferences, and the way they create and implement their policies, converge into a European "agenda" and EU member states adapt to a European method of conducting policy⁸.

Although the concept of Europeanization should not be confused with the idea of European integration. In fact, there is an essential difference and they are not the identical phenomena. The influence of the European Union on a member state is often treated as Europeanization. This term first appeared in the 1990s in order to describe a process different from European harmonization and integration, both concepts which pay attention to the internal adjustment of states to European Union obligations. Therefore, Europeanization acknowledges the two-way process of policy change between the European Union and domestic environments in contrast to terms such as European integration which describe the one-way impact of the Union on member states. According to Stella Ladi, Europeanization can be defined as a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making or as the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance⁹. Europeanization refers to processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of European Union public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies¹⁰.

Stella Ladi distinguishes specific mechanisms of Europeanization and pays special attention to soft mechanisms, which include imitation, diffusion and presentation of internal expectations and beliefs. "Soft" mechanisms of Europeanization are to be difficult to observe and to demonstrate but they remain

⁸ S. Economides, *Karamanlis and the Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy*, [w:] K. Svolopoulos, K. Botsiou, E. Hatzivassiliou (red.), *Konstantinos Karamanlis in the Twentieth Century*, Athens 2008, s. 165.

⁹ S. Ladi, *The Role of Experts in Greek Foreign Policy*, *Etudes Helleniques/ Hellenic Studies*, nr 15/1, 2007, s. 68–69.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, s. 69.

important for the understanding of policy areas where even though European Union regulation is low, convergence of policy styles and policy decisions can be seen. This “soft” mechanism thus is described as framing domestic beliefs and expectations. The European Union aim in this respect would be to prepare the ground for institutional change by altering the cognitive input of domestic actors also in areas where institutional requirements do not exist¹¹.

“Soft” mechanisms linked with Europeanisation are put into practice by the activation of networks such as *epistemic communities*, advocacy coalitions and policy transfer networks. These may be defined as networks of specialists with a common view about cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise and common political values about the type of policies which should be applied. The common feature of these formations is that possessors of knowledge are able to take part in networks which seek to influence policy learning and to provoke policy change. In conclusion, knowledge seems to be the significant resource of the actors involved and the discussion of the relationship between knowledge, power and public policy seems old and diverse¹².

The question that should be answered is – how does the idea of Europeanization can be applied in the field of foreign policy. In Spyros Economides’ opinion, the most frequently used way of describing how Europeanization “exists” in foreign policy is to fall back on two important categorisations. In a “top-down” form of Europeanization, the impact of the European Union which is felt in the domestic field is also likely to be felt in the arena of foreign-policy making. By being exposed to and participating in all the processes and mechanisms of the European Union foreign policy-making apparatus, states start to behave in a Europeanized manner. This is reflected both in the content of state policies and the manner in which their foreign policy is implemented¹³.

The other categorization of how Europeanization works in foreign policy is referred to as the “bottom-up” approach. In this orientation there is a policy of the member states which are being “uploaded” to the European policy-making level rather than being “down-loaded” from that level. Consequently, there are two main ways in which this bottom-up approach can function in the context of foreign policy. In this first case, a state could simply use the resources and international standing of the European Union to better achieve its foreign policy interests. As a member of the European Union, a state can call on the influence of the sum of the parts of the European Union to achieve its national interests. In essence

¹¹ *Ibidem*, s. 69.

¹² *Ibidem*, s. 70.

¹³ S. Economides, *Karamanlis...*, *op. cit.*, s. 166.

it can benefit from the power of the European Union to achieve certain goals which can or cannot be shared by all other European Union partners. This way of Europeanization is one in which a state uses the European Union as an “amplifier” of national preferences and policies. Perhaps a more convincing understanding of the bottom-up approach is one which is referred to as “projection”. Here states want to support the European Union in general and of the member states more specifically. However, it is argued that instead of simply projecting their national interests on to the European Union foreign policy agenda, states want to make their interests the interests of their partners and the European Union in general¹⁴. It is worth noting that Europeanization in foreign policy can be treated also as the abandonment, overcoming or surpassing of past national foreign policy priorities¹⁵. When it comes to Greece membership in the European Community, it has to be said that in the 1970s the first discussion divided scholars and politicians into either pro-accession or anti-accession camps on the question of seeking this membership. This debate might be summarized as “Karamanlis versus Papandreou”. Konstandinos Karamanlis’ famous slogan was “Greece belongs to West”, to which Andreas Papandreou would retort “Greece belongs to the Greeks”. The pro-European Community camp saw an integrating Western Europe as a greenhouse of democracies that would contribute to Greece’s economic advancement and to the consolidation of post-1974 democratic institutions. The anti-European Community camp declared that the European Community was no more than an appendage of American capitalism contributing to and feeding on dependency relationships of the Centre-Periphery variety¹⁶.

European Union/European Community membership of Greece has significant impact on Greek state and society. It is possible to observe the impact of this membership on national interests, orientations and policy-making in Greece after joining the European Community in 1981. Undoubtedly, Greece stands as a unique case among the member state of the European Community/ /European Union in practically every respect. According to Stelios Stavridis, the following facts confirm the special case of Greece in European integration:

- a peripheral country¹⁷ (geographically, with no common borders with other EC/EU states until 2007);

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, s. 167–168.

¹⁵ S. Stavridis, *The Europeanisation...*, *op. cit.*, s. 8.

¹⁶ T.A. Couloumbis, *Greek Foreign Policy Since 1974: Theory and Praxis*, *Etudes Helleniques / Hellenic Studies*, t. 5, nr 2, 1997, s. 30.

¹⁷ For details, see M.F. Tayfur, *Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy. The cases of Greece and Spain*, Burlington 2003.

- situated in a turbulent region;
- under an external threat (Turkey), thus spending 7 per cent of Gross Domestic Product on military expenditure;
- a different historical and political development pattern;
- a Christian Orthodox religion and culture;
- economically weak;
- European Community accession remained a controversial issue for some time.

Furthermore, Greece is the European Union member state which, by virtue of its classical cultural heritage, feels that is entitled more than anyone else to the name “European” because the name Europe is a Greek one¹⁸.

Foreign policy and security issues have always been important for Greece’s application and membership of the European Communities / European Union due to specific circumstances such as turbulent and threatening neighbourhoods. It should be noticed that the European Union has functioned as a modernizing factor in terms of foreign policy of Greece. It has caused the further development of democracy, the creation of institutional conditions for the consolidation of civil society, and the creation of new rights for Greeks. George Kalpadakis and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos underline that Greece’s participation in the European integration brought about the following changes linked with civil society: better transparency in existing institutions, the rise of local collective actors such as inter-municipal enterprises in order to gain funds and technical assistance from the European Union. In addition to this, the traditional “vertically” organized patron-client system was weakened due to the changing institutional relations between the state, the civil society and the European institutions. The European Union exacted decentralization by providing political and economic incentives for autonomous activities, independent from the state¹⁹.

What is more, the European Union also created a legal framework with institutions for the protection of citizens’ rights: the European Parliament, the European Ombudsman and the European Court of Justice constitute authorities which promote citizens’ rights²⁰. European Union membership has had a significant impact on development of Greek society and influenced Greek

¹⁸ S. Stavridis, *The Europeanisation...*, *op. cit.*, s. 10–11.

¹⁹ G. Kalpadakis, D.A. Sotiropoulos, *Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europeanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy*, *Etudes Helleniques / Hellenic Studies*, t. 15, nr 1, 2007, s. 45–46.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, s. 46.

foreign policy. It is possible to refer to the administrative changes that took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs structure and the “socialization effect” of European Union membership that can be seen in a better integration and cooperation with other member states²¹. The traditional and nationalist contributions such as those of the Orthodox Church and public opinion have been limited because of the less politicized diplomatic service. Greece has strengthened its international position in the region and gained new instruments to affect neighbouring states.

The important question that still remains unanswered therefore is whether the Europeanization process has been completed in Greece. This issue seems to be quite complicated, especially in the light of economic crisis that Greece has experienced since 2009. Economic collapse divided Greeks into two groups. One of them supports European Union guidelines what means strict restrictions and compliance with conditions imposed by the European institutions. The second group, that expresses the views of majority of Greek society, advocates for European Union withdrawal and against any economic plans and reforms.

The foreign policy discourse adopted in Greece may be described in terms of an ideological contrast between “Europeanization” and “nationalist populism”. This discourse has prevailed in Greek politics, particularly external policy, at least since the early 1980s. In order to analyse the concept of nationalist populism, the author wants to refer to the historical roots of nationalist populism as well as the dualism noticeable in political culture of Greece.

Nikiforos Diamandouros’ study about modern Greek political culture presents a useful distinction between a “reformist” and an “underdog” strand in Greek foreign policy. Coming from the middle classes of the late nineteenth-century Greek Diaspora, the “reformist” culture favours gradual changes which civil society may initiate. Foreign policy is also liberated from the state-centred, introverted and fearful discourses intrinsic to the worldview of the “nationalists”, and invested with concepts rooted in the Enlightenment such as rationality, democratization, and human rights²². On the other hand, there is a term “underdog culture”, which was used for the first time by social psychologist Harry C. Triandis in 1972 in order to name, observed by him, trend of Greek society to sympathize with weaker groups²³. This culture is described as introverted, pre-capitalist, xenophobic, authoritarian, egalitarian and defensive with tendencies

²¹ S. Stavridis, *The Europeanisation...*, *op. cit.*, s. 19.

²² G. Kalpadakis, D.A. Sotiropoulos, *Europeanism...*, *op. cit.*, s. 47.

²³ I. D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation – Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece*, Hampshire 2007, s. 6–7.

to think in a conspiracy way²⁴. This culture also favours “clientelistic networks” – some political and economic links between a patron (influential politician) and social group, which supports him in exchange of support and patronage²⁵. It is worth noting that clientelistic networks existed as a mean of political domination in nineteenth and majority of twentieth centuries.

The leading ideology in Greece throughout the 1980s until 1995 was “nationalist populism”. Populism, based on the inclusion of the masses into active politics through their direct rapport with charismatic leader, reduced the space for the creation of a strong civil society. Not necessarily identical to nationalism but belonging to the underdog culture, nationalist populism led many citizens into believing that the Greek nation is nationally superior but historically unfortunate, perpetually betrayed, always right but always disaffected by Western “foreigners” who hate it and do their best towards its exclusion²⁶. Nationalist populism opted for a specific nationalist foreign policy based on anti-Americanism and a state-centric issue of national solidarity²⁷. According to Stephanos Constantinides nationalism is a very strong current influencing the formulation of Greek external policy. Nationalism may coincide with the neo-Orthodox vision in some points. However, overall it does not reject a European orientation²⁸. The idea of “nationalist populism” was mainly used in foreign policy by PASOK and its charismatic leader Andreas Papandreou to 1995.

Multilateralism and unilateralism

Another dualism in theoretical orientations of Greek foreign policy consists of multilateralism and unilateralism. Multilateralism in foreign policy means conducting this policy in cooperation with other states and international organizations and with mutually accepted interests²⁹. According to Theodore A. Coulombis, the multilateralists over-emphasized good prospects for the creation of a new global order that would be the product of the convergence of ideologies and the mutuality of interests of major powers. In multilateralists view, states could be stronger and would be in a position to legitimize international interventions against aggressive leaders and to serve collective humanitarian

²⁴ *Ibidem*, s. 7.

²⁵ A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, *Systemy polityczne współczesnego świata*, Gdańsk 2001, s. 66–67.

²⁶ G. Kalpadakis, D.A. Sotiropoulos, *Europeanism...*, *op. cit.*, s. 48.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, s. 59.

²⁸ S. Constantinides, *Greek Foreign Policy Since 1974. Theory and Praxis*, *Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies*, t. 5, nr 2, 1997, s. 10.

²⁹ R. Zięba, *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie*, Warszawa 2008, s. 56.

assistance in crucial situations such as Rwanda, Bosnia or Burundi. The multilateralists recommend to the government of Greece to adopt a policy that would exploit the leverage provided by political-diplomatic-economic factors while integrating / harmonizing its objectives with those of multilateral institutions such as the European Union, the WEU and NATO³⁰.

For the multilateralists Greece belongs to the area of stability but it borders with territories of instability and conflict. According to multilateralists, the biggest error that Greek politicians could make, would be to engage the country in nationalist and irredentist problems in its region. Theodore A. Couloumbis underlines that the dominant multilateralist paradigm relies upon conservation through a synthesis of adequate military preparation, European integration and prudence³¹.

On the other hand, there is the revisionist or unilateralist school of thought that appeared after 1990, together with the end of the Cold War. Unilateralists treat themselves and their policy as activist, energetic, counteroffensive, preemptive, ethnocentric and patriotic in orientation. They also claim an exclusive hold on the values and practices of "realism"³². According to Takis Michas, this ethnic nationalism is based on the following components:

- a genealogical myth of origin according to which the contemporary Greeks are descended from the magnificent Hellenes of classical antiquity. According to this concept – especially in its more folkish and populist variants – there exists an unbroken cultural continuity "through the ages" between classical antiquity and modern Greece. A direct cultural line connects Homeric times with the Greek present;
- the importance of Greek language which is treated as a bridge between ancient and modern Greece,
- the Orthodox religion as embodied in the institution of the Greek Orthodox Church. National identity became identical with the ethnic identity in which religion, and in particular the Eastern Orthodox one, became a basic element. The Orthodox Church has been an instrument of the state in promoting the cultural homogenization of the country, as was the case also in other Balkan and Eastern European states³³.

For unilateralists Greek state faces dangers from all directions and any appeasements only can deteriorate this situation. According to them, the threat from Turkey is clearly territorial, the dangers from the North (especially from

³⁰ T. A. Couloumbis, *Greek Foreign...*, *op. cit.*, s. 54.

³¹ *Ibidem*, s. 56.

³² *Ibidem*, s. 57.

³³ T. Michas, *Unholy Alliance. Greece and Milosevic's Serbia*, Texas 2002, s. 10.

the Republic of Macedonia, called FYROM³⁴) are irredentist, while the challenge from the West is cultural, threatening Greece with the loss of linguistic, traditional and religious identity. The unilateralists demand revival and awakening of modern Greeks from the sleep of consumerism, hedonism, cynicism and corruption. They call for a heroic mobilization of the disoriented masses in order to give battle and save a small nation. They perceive the global system as anarchic, dangerous, conflictful, amoral as well as unjust: an arena in which the strong survive and the weak disappear. Some of them recommend what they call the “Israelization” of Greece. They strongly admire Israel for its military bravery, its special relationship with the United States of America, its ability to employ forces pre-emptively, and to negotiate mainly from a position of strength³⁵.

The unilateralists frequently argue that membership of Greece in the European Union has been overestimated, fearing that it creates illusions of security among nations and cultivates pressures for unilateral disarmament. The unilateralists heavily criticize the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. Consequently, they counselled policy-makers to reinforce military capabilities, employ the craft of frequent and shifting alliances, as well as take advantage of tactical opportunities to reverse past losses³⁶.

East – West. Realism – Transnationalism

There have been in Greece, even in nineteenth century, two basic ideological and political currents which had an important influence in the vision the Greeks have of the place of their country in the world. The first current linked with the Enlightenment maintains that Greece belongs to Western Europe. It treats modern Greeks as the legitimate descendants of the ancient Hellenes and as the heirs to the classical Greek culture, rejecting Byzantium as a medieval period. The second current considers Greece as Eastern country. The roots of neohellenism should thus be found in Byzantium and consequently Greece has to resist Western influence³⁷.

The above-mentioned conflict was supposed to come to an end when Greece joined the European Communities in 1981. However, there is always a strong group of intellectuals, known as the neo-Orthodox, who still express this anti-Western orientation, favouring a non-Western Greece with a romantic vision:

³⁴ The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

³⁵ T. A. Couloumbis, *Greek Foreign...*, *op. cit.*, s. 57–58.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, s. 54.

³⁷ S. Constantinides, *Greek Foreign...*, *op. cit.*, s. 8.

“organic communities”, “anti-rationalism”, a return to the roots and to the lost paradise of traditional values³⁸.

Furthermore, there are two major school of thought regarding the study of international relations in Greece: realist and transnationalist. According to Stephanos Constantinides, even if we consider that the two major school mentioned – realism and transnationalism – are not well assimilated within the Greek realities and that Greek scholars cannot always articulate their theoretical discourse, we should not deny some influence from these schools in the study of international relations and Greek foreign policy. It should be noted that treating the realists as “anti-Europeanists” and “nationalist”, for example, would be to forget that nationalism in Greece in Enlightenment was the consequence of European and Western influence. On the other hand, describing the transnationalists as opponents of the nation-state and the fervent supporters of Europe would be to link them with the ideology of a multinational state developed strangely enough by those who opposed the West and Europe and regarded Byzantium and even the Ottoman Empire as a model for Hellenism³⁹.

As a result, there must be an awareness of the manipulation of these concepts. We must remember that reality is always more complex than such constructs may propose.

Undoubtedly, presentation of all concepts above leads to the following conclusion. There are two main opposite orientations in Greece after 1990: the first one associated with the Europeanism, the West, open and modern Greece as a member of European and transatlantic structures, and the second one which seeks to preserve Greece as a uniform state, closed for other, especially western nations, slightly xenophobic with strong demagogic Orthodox Church trying to determine true Greekness. This situation could be found in many states. Nevertheless, this division is based not only on political conditions, but also historical and geographical ones in Greece.

Analysis of Greece’s foreign policy after 1990 shows a permanent connections of the above-mentioned orientations and concepts by the governments in Athens, responsible for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Generally, with the exception of a short interval of unilateralist and nationalist thinking in period 1990-1995, Greek governments have kept themselves mainly in a steady course of multilateralism, what can be described as a dominant paradigm of

³⁸ *Ibidem*, s. 9.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, s. 11.

Greek foreign policy⁴⁰. Following the death of Andreas Papandreou and the rise to power of Constantinos Simitis in 1996, the main orientation in Greek foreign policy swung in the direction of multilateralism paradigm. Greece improves relations with its neighbours and promote its stabilizing role in the region. Prime Minister Simitis made then a significant policy shift over Turkey by making Greece the main protagonist in supporting Ankara's European orientation. Earlier, the return of the right-wing New Democracy to power with Mitsotakis in 1990 and also the collapse of the international system because of the end of Cold War, changed the theoretical orientation of Greek foreign policy and based it on nationalism and realism. It was caused mainly by the disputes over the Macedonian issue. The return to unilateralist and nationalist policy took place again in 2009 after the outbreak of economic crisis and dependency of Greece from the European Union assistance and financial international institutions.

On the other hand, according to Stephanos Constantinides, to say that the Greek foreign policy was first under the influence of national populism until 1996, and Europeanism thereafter is a kind of Manichean thinking, because, according to him, neither before 1996 the so called nationalist populism was the single concept that guided the Greek foreign policy, nor the so called Europeanism displaced, after 1996, the national populism⁴¹.

To sum up, it seems that it is evident that there is a dialectical relationship between theoretical concepts and the praxis of Greek foreign policy. The theoretical and ideological visions in many cases proved their influence in the implementation of foreign policy in Greece. In some cases, on the other hand, it is not really sure if these theoretical and ideological visions influenced praxis or if this praxis influenced more theoretical and ideological orientations.

⁴⁰ T. A. Couloumbis, *Greek Foreign...*, *op. cit.*, s. 56.

⁴¹ S. Constantinides, *Globalization and Greek Foreign Policy*, *Etudes Helleniques / Hellenic Studies*, t. 16, nr 1, 2008, s. 60–61.

Streszczenie

Nurty ideologiczne i koncepcje w greckiej polityce zagranicznej po 1990 roku

Artykuł jest poświęcony nurtom ideologicznym i koncepcjom w greckiej polityce zagranicznej po 1990 roku. Autor przyjmuje cztery podziały koncepcji polityki zagranicznej, ujęte w kategoriach dwóch biegunów ideologicznych. Pierwsza część artykułu dotyczy europeizacji i narodowego populizmu w polityce zagranicznej Grecji. Przedmiotem kolejnej części jest przedstawienie nurtu multilateralizmu i unilateralizmu. Autor przedstawia także „wschodnią” i „zachodnią” szkołę ideologiczno-polityczną odnosząc się jednocześnie do nurtu realizmu i transnacionalizmu. Autor, prezentując wnioski, próbuje ukazać rolę przedstawionych powyżej nurtów ideologicznych w procesie formułowania i realizowania polityki zagranicznej w Grecji.

Summary

Theoretical orientations in Greek foreign policy after 1990

The article concerns theoretical orientations in Greek foreign policy after 1990. The author presents four basic divisions of foreign policy concepts that are expressed as two opposite ideological poles. The first part of article deals with the Europeanization and nationalist populism in foreign policy of Greece. The subject of another part is presentation of the multilateralist and unilateralist school of thought. Finally, the author presents Western and Eastern current in Greek foreign policy in reference to realist and transnationalist school of thought. Origins. By presenting conclusions, the author tries to indicate the role of the above-mentioned theoretical orientations in the process of creating and conducting of foreign policy in Greece.

MIĘDZYNARODOWE STOSUNKI GOSPODARCZE