Fenomenologia jako horyzont normatywności
PHENOMENOLOGY AS THE HORIZON OF NORMATIVITY
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My aim is to put together Husserl’s main ideas on the phenomenological method, to show the phases of its development as the consciousness’ reflection about itself. The condition of possibility of such reflection is that there be a point of view which guarantees access to the intentional domain, and also that the subject be able to enquire into the ways its intentional experiences are connected to the world. This condition, it is argued here, should be considered to be a regulative idea. Phenomenological reduction, which enables phenomenological reflection, is really an unending process, a series of reductions that lead to evidence. Looking for evidence is the source of the dynamic of consciousness; this primary curiosity, this striving to fulfill intentions lies at the bottom of all its interests and purposes. Cartesian clara and distincta perceptio motivates the positing of each object as real or unreal, possible, probable, or dubious. The search for evidence is, therefore, the character of consciousness as such; striving for evidence makes life of the mind rational, i.e., oriented toward truth and objectivity. Phenomenology, seen as reviving the norms of cognizing and acting, makes it possible to think of the unity of philosophy, science, and life, and is still worth being treated as a cure for today’s irrationality and subjectivity.
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