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2011 | 2 | 60-84

Article title

Zbrojny konflikt rosyjsko-gruziński (2008) w świetle prawa międzynarodowego

Authors

Title variants

EN
THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN ARMED CONFLICT IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

EN
Since the early 1990s Georgia has attempted to regain control of its separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia while Russia adopted the divide et impera policy. The content of armistice agreements (1992, 1994) reflects Georgia’s military defeats. On the former Soviet Union territory, peacekeeping forces are tolerated by Moscow only when composed of Russian troops or of parties involved in the conflict. Both sides considered the military option. Moscow was waiting for an occasion to lure Georgia into a trap. If South Ossetia were recognized as a de facto regime, it could claim its right to self-defence and call upon Russia for help. Russia invoked this claim only incidentally. If, however, South Ossetia was not a de facto regime, Georgia’s use of force against irregular groups cannot be considered as aggression and does not fall under the self-defence concept of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Russian operation had no legal grounds in the UN Security Council decision and did not meet the conditions for humanitarian intervention, nor those for a pre-emptive operation. Russia’s only plea was the defence of its armed forces attacked in South Ossetia (self-defence, Art. 51 UN Charter) but the scale and the territorial reach of Moscow’s reaction was excessive. It is meaningful that Russian troops also entered Abkhazia. Russia called upon the protection of its citizens abroad and invoked its Constitution as well as the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’. This last argument cannot be accepted because it refers to the state’s obligation to protect its citizens within its territory. Recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia by other states will be hard given the universal disapproval of Moscow’s decision. The contemporary international practice is reluctant to recognize a seceding entity against the wishes of the state from which it has purported to secede. The presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the basis of agreements made by Russia with these entities contravene earlier armistice agreements (August 12th and September 8th 2008).

Contributors

author
  • Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego, Kolegium Prawa, ul. Jagiellońska 59, 03-301 Warszawa, Poland

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.cejsh-a9ea94d5-bd73-42e0-b6db-138dbf21a779
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