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2014 | 21 | 2 | 145 – 167
Article title

UNDER-DETERMINATION, SCEPTICISM, AND REALISM

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EN
Abstracts
EN
This study aims to articulate and compare the structure, presuppositions and implications of two paradigmatic sceptical arguments, i.e. arguments from under-determination of scientific theories by observational data (UA) and Cartesian-style arguments (CA) invoking sceptical scenarios of severe cognitive dislocation. Although salient analogies between them may prompt one to think that a unified diagnosis of what is amiss with them is called for, it will be argued that this may be a false hope, if those analogies do not underwrite a complete homology. That said, possible parallels of one promising anti-sceptical exposure of CA are pointed out for the case of UA, which conspire together to render the problem of under-determination less threatening than it could at first appear.
Contributors
  • FF univerzity v Hradci Králové, Náměstí Svobody 331, 500 03 Hradec Králové, Czech Republic
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bwmeta1.element.cejsh-b7053c57-40cd-4aba-8fa4-c4e38ff0281b
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