Formalna niesamoistność własności

• Authors: Marek Piwowarczyk

Title variants

EN

THE FORMAL HETERONOMY OF PROPERTIES

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

Roman Ingarden believed that the ontological status of properties cannot be exhausted by the claim that properties are non-independent and fulfill the formal function of “belonging to” some object. To explain this he used the metaphor that “properties enter into the account of an object”, a version of the scholastic saying that “accidentia non sunt entia sed entis”. I argue that properties do not have their own qualitative content. For example, in the case of a bar of steel which has property of being hard, the quality of “hardness” does not inhere immediately in this property and then indirectly in the bar, but inheres directly in the bar. The property in question does not have hardness on its own. This seems trivial but it needs to be emphasized because some philosophers treat properties as objects, even if they claim that properties cannot exist without objects. The thesis of the formal heteronomy of properties consists just in this view: properties have no matter on their own. The second part of the article is devoted to the saying “accidentis esse est inesse”. I argue for a strict connection between the thesis that properties exist because of the object’s existence and the thesis of formal heteronomy, and I use the latter to argue against bundle theories of object.

Keywords

EN

INGARDEN; ONTOLOGY; OBJECT; PROPERTIES; ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF PROPERTIES

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Umiejętności / Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
• Year: 2011
• Volume: 39
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 33-42

Contributors

author

Marek Piwowarczyk