BOOTSTRAPPING OBJECTION

• Authors: Christian Piller
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

If our mental attitudes were reasons, we could bootstrap anything into rationality simply by acquiring these mental attitudes. This, it has been argued, shows that mental attitudes cannot be reasons. In this paper, I focus on John Broome’s development of the bootstrapping objection. I distinguish various versions of this objection and I argue that the bootstrapping objection to mind-based accounts of reasons fails in all its versions.

Keywords

EN

BROOME; INTENTION; REASON; REASONING

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 20
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 612 – 631

Contributors

author

Christian Piller

• Department of Philosophy, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, United Kingdom