V ZÁVOJI „LOGIKY“

• Authors: Marek Káčer

Title variants

EN

In disguise of „logic“

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

Present paper analyses the use of the word „logic“ in utterances of lawyers. A lawyer does not use this word just to designate the rational nature of his reasoning process but also to persuade his addressees that his reasoning is not set up arbitrarily. Although motivation of the first kind of the usage is triggered by correct semantic insight it happens frequently that the lawyer’s „logic“ designates something else than the process of his reasoning. It designates just the outcome of the reasoning but not the way how it was created. Thus the meaning of „logic“ shifts from formal relations between concepts to their material (substantial) relations which are conveyed through observation of ordinary course of factual events. However if we wanted to restore the original meaning of „logic“ in these cases, we could do it in the following way: to the concept/conclusion designated as „logical“ we add all necessary conditions of its logical validity. Example given in this paper indicates this restoration method may secure new refutation strategies against such concept/conclusion. The paper also tries to identify why lawyers use „logic“ as a kind of persuasive word. It seems to be plausible they do so because they intuitively suppose that logical operations inevitably lead to true conclusions.

Keywords

EN

LOGIC; ARGUMENT; SELF-EVIDENT; TRUE; LAW; LAWYER

• Publisher: Institute of State and Law of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)
• Year: 2012
• Volume: 95
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 197 – 208

Contributors

author

Marek Káčer

• Právnická fakulta Trnavskej univerzity v Trnave, Hornopotočná 23, 918 43 Trnava, Slovak Republic