Shale gas in Poland: An analysis of tax mechanisms and dynamic interactions

• Authors: Walentek Dawid
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This is a preliminary research into possible taxation mechanisms for firms that will be operating in the shale gas industry in Poland and potential market interactions between the incumbents and the entrants. The study places focus on the level of welfare and it includes a static and a dynamic analysis. The result of the former is that the lump sum tax is the first best of all considered tax mechanisms for the Polish shale gas from the welfare perspective. The second best option for taxation is a combination of the current CIT rate and a windfall profit tax. In respect to the dynamic analysis, the results suggest that Gazprom can remain the market leader in Poland even if the shale gas producers start to operate, due to the sequential character of the competition in the Polish natural gas market. Counterintuitively, it will not come at the expenses of the consumers in Poland and it can bring potential welfare gains.

Keywords

EN

Dynamic game; Poland; Regulation; Shale gas; Tax mechanism

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
• Journal: Journal of Economics and Management
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 26
• Pages: 128-149

Contributors

author

Walentek Dawid

• Political Economy and Transnational Governance. Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research. University of Amsterdam

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Identifiers

ISSN

1732-1948