Following John of St. Thomas’ Cursus philosophicus thomisticus and Mastri’s and Belluto’s scotistic Cursus philosophicus I sketch four different types of relations, or, more precisely, four ways in which relational predicates indicate (in the sense introduced by Anscombe in Three Philosophers (Blackwell 1961), p. 23) some entities: (i) relationes secundum dici (e.g. having coiffure like Ella Fitzgerald, that is, this kind of coiffure): these are non-relational entities given by a description involving some comparison; (ii) relationes transcendentales (e.g. in case of an emotion of anger — being directed towards some person): relations which are not distinct entities themselves, but rather the inner traits of some entities (like emotions), displayed in their identity criteria and in the logical properties of the relevant predicates (like „is angry”); (iii) relationes rationis (e.g. being someone’s most favourite picture): relations which are not positive entities in the subjects they are said to inhere; (iv) relationes praedicamentales (like being someone’s son) — distinct relative entities constituting a category of relation. For (iv) I discuss in some detail the question of identity criteria of such entities.