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2020 | 27 | 3 | 395 – 410
Article title

DOES THE CONCEIVABILITY OF ZOMBIES ENTAIL THEIR POSSIBILITY?

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Abstracts
EN
According to the two-dimensional argument against materialism, developed by David Chalmers, the conceivability of zombies entails primary possibility, and the primary possibility of zombies entails further secondary possibility. I argue that the move from the conceivability to primary possibility of zombies is unjustified. Zombies are primarily impossible despite being conceivable if the corresponding phenomenal and microphysical concepts have coinciding primary intensions (refer to the same properties in all possible worlds considered as actual) despite being distinct concepts. But there is no good reason to think that phenomenal and microphysical concepts cannot have coinciding primary intensions despite being distinct concepts. As I argue, this conclusion follows from reflection on special cognitive features of phenomenal concepts.
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  • Institute of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Szczecin, ul. Krakowska 71-79, 71-017 Szczecin, Poland
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YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-dc248c3f-0cde-4402-b4eb-4dd7dfbed95c
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