DOES THE CONCEIVABILITY OF ZOMBIES ENTAIL THEIR POSSIBILITY?

• Authors: Polcyn Karol
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

According to the two-dimensional argument against materialism, developed by David Chalmers, the conceivability of zombies entails primary possibility, and the primary possibility of zombies entails further secondary possibility. I argue that the move from the conceivability to primary possibility of zombies is unjustified. Zombies are primarily impossible despite being conceivable if the corresponding phenomenal and microphysical concepts have coinciding primary intensions (refer to the same properties in all possible worlds considered as actual) despite being distinct concepts. But there is no good reason to think that phenomenal and microphysical concepts cannot have coinciding primary intensions despite being distinct concepts. As I argue, this conclusion follows from reflection on special cognitive features of phenomenal concepts.

Keywords

EN

CONCEIVABILITY; CONSCIOUSNESS; PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; POSSIBILITY; TWO-DIMENSIONAL SEMANTICS

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 395 – 410

Contributors

author

Polcyn Karol

• Institute of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Szczecin, ul. Krakowska 71-79, 71-017 Szczecin, Poland

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27306