Metafizyczne warunki możliwości myślenia aksjologicznego
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The initial thesis of the article is that axiological thinking is possible on condition that it is preceded by a constituent experience or a metaphysical settlement. After the rejection of thinking in values by Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger, only a strong metaphysical base can legitimize an axiological vision. Such are the philosophies of the good of Emmanuel Levinas and Józef Tischner, which assume the source experience of the absolute Good. I therefore define them with a common term "vertical agatology". According to Levinas, this happens through the encounter with the face of Another. According to Tischner, the experience of the good which takes the negative form of a preferential revolt is decisive: "There is something that shouldn't be." Acorrding to Barbara Skarga, on the other hand, the good appears unexpectedly in human relationships. It comes from man as something surprising and accidental: “It is something that did not have to be”. This type of understanding I call a “horizontal or small agatology”. The distinctive feature here is the affirmative astonishment. Another perspective on the traditional understanding of values is the axiological universality of Władysław Stróżewski. In his view, value as Logos is the keystone of the whole preference order. The Logos is understood here as the highest value, or (in analogy to Plato’s concept of idea) as the value of values. At the same time, value means to him the triad of the transcendentals – goodness, truth, and beauty. In this way, value is located in the middle of metaphysics. The pre-axiological dimension also sets out two basic experiences: love and hope. Although they are not the values themselves, they shape a certain starting topos in which we move and which determines our preferences. Love as an experienced fulfillment allows us to desire other fulfillments and to keep a hope for the unexpectable future.
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