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2020 | 27 | 4 | 522 – 538
Article title

SUBJECT AND PREDICATE IN EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS: A SURVEY OF FREGE’S PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTIONS

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EN
Abstracts
EN
Frege argues that considering Socrates as an object in the proposition “Socrates exists” raises two problems. First, this proposition would be uninformative. Second, its negation entails a contradiction. Attempting to solve these problems, Frege claims that Socrates is representing the concept of a man whose name is Socrates. Therefore, existence is a second-order concept. This paper surveys the main modern theories about the types of existence, in order to find another response to Frege’s problems. For, if Socrates’ existence differs from the type that “exists” implies, “Socrates exists” is informative and its negation is not a contradiction. At last, this paper argues for an idea, in which “existence” is not a concept or property. Existence is the principle of the objects. So, “Socrates exists” is in fact “the existence is Socrates,” and “Socrates does not exist” is “there is no existence that is Socrates.” This idea could be an alternative for responding to Frege’s problems.
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  • 601 Fisher Hall, Duquesne University, 600 Forbes Ave, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
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YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-deed94d0-fe3a-4d24-8155-49f959e6584f
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