Jak straciliśmy Chiny? Amerykański spór o politykę wobec Chin w latach 1944–1950

• Authors: Bartosiński Paweł

Title variants

EN

How Did We Lose China? The American Argument about the 1944-1950 Policy vis-à-vis China

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

This article deals with the debate on US involvement in China during the end of World War II and the civil war. The main problem of the controversy over US foreign policy toward China was: what position should American policymakers take on the civil war between the Chinese National Party (Guomindang) and the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong’s 1949 seizing of power in China and the collapse of Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime in mainland China was used by the republican opposition as a pretext to attack the foreign policy of president Truman’s administration. Among the main actors taking part in the American internal dispute over foreign policy toward China were: the so called China Lobby (opting for full-range US involvement in the civil war siding with the Guomindang), the military establishment (stressing China’s military significance for US security in East Asia), foreign service members (working in the US embassy in Chongqing) and last but not least members of Truman’s cabinet (who must have been taking electoral requirements into consideration). American involvement was first of all a political one. Since 1944 US representatives in China (ambassador P. Hurley, special presidential envoy gen. G. Marshall) were engaging in fruitless mediatory missions to reconcile the warring parties and to establish a coalition government. Concurrently, Washington was backing Chiang’s regime by granting him loans and military equipment. Due to internal circumstances and public reluctance to have the US involved in a full-scale military assistance for Guomindang, policymakers decided not to implement the doctrine of containment in China. As the failure of Chiang’s regime became more and more evident, Washington made one last effort to secure its interest in China by approaching Chinese communist representatives in the spring of 1949. Ambassador J.L. Stuart’s efforts proved futile because Mao drove a hard bargain and because of the activity of anti-communist hardliners in the USA. Opinions expressed by experts (such as George Kennan) in the Department of State stating that communist rule in China did not automatically mean subservience to the Soviet Union were ignored by policymakers. Joseph MacCarthy’s accusations of American diplomats’ who worked in China in the mid of 1940’s of being disloyal led to a stiffening anti-communist foreign policy and ultimately prevented the US government from granting recognition to the People’s Republic of China.

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
• Journal: Azja-Pacyfik
• Year: 2011
• Issue: XIV
• Pages: 211-241

Dates

published

2011

Contributors

author

Bartosiński Paweł