UNDERSTANDING ENKRATIC REASONING

• Authors: Olav Gjelsvik
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Beginning from John Broome’s approach to Enkrasia, the paper quickly moves to giving a condensed presentation of an approach to practical reasoning motivated by a Fregean approach to inference (in theoretical reasoning). The suggested account of practical reasoning avoids using rationality requirements to do explanatory work when accounting for correct reasoning, and thus avoids lots of problems. It is strictly conservative in its approach, and no new inference rules are required for moving from the theoretical to the practical case. It is suggested that we can stick to deductive reasoning when accounting for practical proper; the crucial premise from theoretical reasoning about practical matters cannot normally be established this way. The paper moves on to tackle counterarguments to the effect that there will simply be too little correct practical reasoning on the present (deductive) approach. The simple account of correct reasoning has too high a cost, it is argued. The paper meets this objection when it argues that much reasoning is enthymematic or incomplete reasoning. By making specific claims about how there may be practical premises to which we do not attend even when there are, in some sense, before the mind, the approach is defended.

Keywords

EN

BROOME; ENKRASIA; REASONING; INFERENCE; WEAK WILL

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 20
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 464 – 483

Contributors

author

Olav Gjelsvik

• Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, IFIKK, University of Oslo, Georg Morgenstiernes hus, Blindernveinen 31, 0313 Oslo, Norway