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2013 | 20 | suppl. 2 | 54 – 65
Article title

TICHÝ’S TWO-DIMENSIONAL CONCEPTION OF INFERENCE

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Abstracts
EN
In this paper we revisit Pavel Tichý’s novel distinction between one-dimensional and two-dimensional conception of inference, which he presented in his book Foundations of Frege’s Logic (1988), and later in On Inference (1999), which was prepared from his manuscript by his co-author Jindra Tichý. We shall focus our inquiry not only on the motivation behind the introduction of this non-classical concept of inference, but also on further inspection of selected Tichý’s arguments, which we see as the most compelling or simply most effective in providing support for his two-dimensional account of inference. Main attention will be given to exposing the failure of one-dimensional theory of inference in its explanation of indirect (reductio ad absurdum) proofs. Lastly, we discuss shortly the link between two-dimensional inference and deduction apparatus of Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic.
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  • Katedra filozofie, Masarykova Universita, Arna Nováka 1. 602 00 Brno, Czech Republic, pezlar@phil.muni.cz
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bwmeta1.element.cejsh-e81a7dad-4552-48f2-99d9-53ceb6863cfd
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