CONCLUSIONS OF PRACTICAL ARGUMENT: A SPEECH ACT ANALYSIS

• Authors: Lewiński Marcin
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Conclusions of theoretical reasoning are assertions—or at least speech acts belonging to the class of assertives, such as hypotheses, predictions or estimates. What, however, are the conclusions of practical reasoning? Employing the concepts of speech act theory, in this paper I investigate which speech acts we perform when we’re done with an instance of a practical argument and present its result in a linguistic form. To this end, I first offer a detailed scheme of practical argument suitable for an external pragmatic account (rather than an internal cognitive account). Resorting to actual examples, I identify a class of action inducing speech acts as characteristic conclusions of practical argument. I argue that these speech acts—promises, orders, pieces of advice, proposals, and others—differ chiefly depending on the agent of the action induced (me, us, you, them) and their illocutionary strength.

Keywords

EN

ILLOCUTION; PRACTICAL ARGUMENT; PRACTICAL REASONING; SPEECH ACTS

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 28
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 420 – 457

Contributors

author

Lewiński Marcin

• Nova Institute of Philosophy, Nova University of Lisbon, Campus de Campolide – Colégio Almada Negreiros 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28207