PL EN


Journal
2012 | 20 | 3(79) | 5-11
Article title

Objects, Their Parts, and Essences

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
According to some philosophical views, parts of objects (either three-dimensional or four-dimensional) and whole objects are distinct entities. This raises the question of how to identify objects and their parts across possible worlds. By the principle of the necessity of diversity, the distinctness of objects and their parts must be preserved across possible worlds and this, paradoxically, seems to imply that in other possible worlds objects cannot be temporally or spatially different from what they actually are. For example, it seems that if Descartes and his temporal part are two distinct objects, Descartes could not have lived any shorter than he actually did. I argue that we can avoid this paradoxical conclusion once we realize that no temporal part of Descartes can be identified in other possible worlds with an independently existing person. In general, the view I defend is that parts of objects are not identical with independently existing objects across possible worlds.
Journal
Year
Volume
20
Issue
Pages
5-11
Physical description
Contributors
author
  • Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowska 71/79, 71-004 Szczecin, Poland, karol.polcyn@gmail.com
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-e9d4051d-cbb5-40d6-8ca8-0e33c893fe59
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