RADICAL RATIONALIZATION ACCOMMODATES RAMPANT IRRATIONALITY

• Authors: Lipski Joachim
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper the author will offer one such criterion. More specifically, he argues that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this notion can be distinguished from a more commonly used notion of rationality and hence cannot be shown to be undermined by the potential prevalence of a corresponding kind of irrationality.

Keywords

EN

COGNITIVE BIASES; INTENTIONALITY; INTERPRETATION; RATIONALITY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 25
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 53 – 73

Contributors

author

Lipski Joachim

• Research Center for Neurophilosophy and Ethics of Neuroscience, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Schellingstr. 10/III, Room J 308, 80799 Munich, Germany