VALUE PERCEPTION IN THE ULTIMATUM GAME: A BLINDED RANDOMIZED TRIAL

• Authors: Fiala Jan , Starý Oldřich , Fialová Martina , Holasová Adéla , Mejzlíková Tereza , Bemš Július
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In a blinded, randomized Ultimatum game we study the decision rates using two different reward systems. We discuss the individual value perception and explain why we decided to test a non-monetary reward against the standard low stake monetary reward. We demonstrate that the value systems based on two different, inconvertible currencies lead to different decision rates in the same population. We provide the details of our single blind randomized protocol and discuss other protocol modifications designed to demonstrate the variability of the offer and/or response rates in the Ultimatum games. We provide our concept of rational, non-rational and irrational components contributing to the decision making process in different accord depending on the individual perception of the reward value and confront our experimental findings with the key assumptions provided by other authors.

Keywords

EN

ULTIMATUM GAME; VALUE; UTILITY

• Publisher: Institute of Slovak and World Economics and Institute for Forecasting, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 64
• Issue: 6
• Pages: 519 – 538

Contributors

author

Fiala Jan

• Czech Technical University in Prague, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Department of Economics, Management and Humanities, Technická 2, 166 27 Prague 6, Czech Republic

author

Starý Oldřich

author

Fialová Martina

author

Holasová Adéla

author

Mejzlíková Tereza

author

Bemš Július