



“Lack of interest in politics”: a result of non-democratic experiences or of the non- existence of the Kantian republican state in the 21st century?

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Abstract

This essay examines the appearance of distrust, disinterest and aversion to politics and political participation in today’s democracies by taking the Kantian concept of a republican state into account. The goal is to find out reasons for the lack of interest in politics by investigating certain aspects in today’s democracies that might be not in compliance with the Kantian understanding of republicanism. The essay will start with an examination of the republican state and why it is mostly referred to as being much as the parliamentary democracy we know today. Then, these results will be compared with modern democracies (USA, Switzerland and Germany) in order to find the underlying reasons for the lack of interest in politics and how it might be possible to overcome it.

Key words: politics, lack of interest in politics, republicanism, republican constitution, people’s sovereignty, perpetual peace, democracy, non-democratic experience, *betzavta* method, responsibility

INTRODUCTION

Every once in a while a politically engaged citizen goes to the polling station to perform his utmost civic duty making a decision after which his will gets proper representation and power. We call it democracy. But what we can observe lately in society is a disappointment in democracy that leads to a lack of interest in politics and decreases the participation in political decisions and elections.

The German word *Politikverdrossenheit* combines the aspects of lack of interest, disappointment, distrust and the resulting aversion against politics. I will stay with the term “lack of interest in politics” in the following paper, but I want you to keep the stronger meaning of the German word in mind, which includes not only disinterest, but also the aforementioned aspects of distrust, disappointment and aversion.

Why does this happen in our Western representative democracies, even though they are commonly reputed to be the best form of government there is? Why does this happen in states whose constitutions are highly influenced by thinkers like Immanuel Kant? This question came to my mind when I participated in the Israeli educational method *Betzavta* that has well shown that there is a huge problem in forming consent between individuals or political parties. This struggle of forming consent is always present and, of course, necessary in our modern democracies. But why are so many people unsatisfied? Why do so many people still refuse to vote? I started to think more about the concept of representative democracies and whether they fulfill the requirements of the Kantian republican state, that he presented in his writing “Perpetual Peace”.

This is the starting point from which I want to examine democracy. My goal is to investigate the ratio between today’s democratic states and the republican state from Kant’s point of view in order to find an answer to the question: Why is there a lack of interest in politics? I will start with a section of “Kant’s understanding of republicanism” and give a brief look at what is said about the republican constitution in his political writings. In the following section “Modern democracies from Kant’s point of view”, I will compare modern democracies with the Kantian republican state, to find out what are the similarities, the differences and find first aspects that could have something to do with the lack of interest in politics. These results will be further examined in the section “Reasons for political disinterest”, where I will also take the experiences of the *Betzavta* method into account. Afterwards, I will finish the paper with a proper

‘conclusion’ about what has been said and how we may counteract against the lack of interest in politics by our societies.

1. KANT’S UNDERSTANDING OF REPUBLICANISM

In this section I want to introduce the republican constitution and how it relates to freedom, sovereignty, representation and democracy. What Kant says about the republic and democracy is in some points irritating and controversially discussed among scientific interpretations. The goal for this short paper is to show why the Kantian republic is mostly referred to as being much like the parliamentary democracy we know today, although Kant seems to be a staunch opponent of democracy in some aspects. In his philosophical sketch “The Perpetual Peace”, he states in the first definitive article what kind of constitution is necessary to achieve this aim of perpetual peace. It is the republican one. The headline of the first definite article says: “The civil constitution of every state should be republican” (Kant, 1991, p. 99).

For Kant, it is the only constitution that can guarantee peace on a rightful basis. In comparison to it, there could not be any peace among despotic states who have no principles of right in the own state and would never be as trustful as states with a system of law (Gerhard, 1995, p. 79). The republican constitution consists mainly of four important points: the freedom for every single individual and their equality before the law, as well as self-reliance as people within society and their dependence on the political body whose power binds them and whose fate they necessarily share (Gerhard, 1995, p. 87). About the aspect of freedom, it has to be underlined that the term “republic” is equal to a state, in which the aim of freedom for everyone is fulfilled in terms of restrictions that apply for everyone equally. Therefore, when Kant points out that this constitution is derived from everyone's will, as it “springs from the pure concept of right” (Kant, 1991, p. 100), it is about the freedom of all men in dependence on the external right:

Right is the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it harmonises with the freedom of everyone else (in so far as this is possible within the terms of a general law) (Kant, 1991, p. 73).

There is an obvious connection to Kant’s moral philosophy, where freedom is not defined as doing whatever you want, but as restricting yourself by own laws of reason. These principles of constitution lead to the question of power. Who is sovereign in this republican state? Kant repeats that the legislative power can only belong to the common will of the people. So, only the

consistent and unified will of the people as the general common will can be legislative (Kant, 2014, p. 432).

However, in “Perpetual Peace” we apparently find a different opinion. There he states, that there are three different possible ways of sovereignty (autocracy, aristocracy and democracy) and more than that, he sentences democracy to necessarily be despotism (Kant, 1991, p. 100/101). Is this a contradiction? And if it is not a contradiction, then how could this common will be sovereign?

According to the Philosopher Ho-Won Joung, this ambiguity comes from the Kantian differentiation between an abstract form of republic as a norm that cannot to be reached completely, and republic as an empirical and politically accessible community (Joung, 2006, p.33). Kant mentioned this separation of the Platonic ideal (*respublica noumenon*) and the example representing that ideal in the world of experiences (*respublica phaenomenon*), in his writing The Contest of Faculties (Kant, 1991, p. 187).

That means that Kant distinguishes between two kinds of sovereigns: the original sovereign and the derivative (or practical) sovereign. In other words, there is a dualism involved that strictly distinguishes between the a priori common will that forms the legislative power on the one hand and the current, visible ruler of the state (the derivative sovereign) on the other hand (Joung, 2006, p. 43). It could be said, that there is a tension between a necessity a priori and a possibility a posteriori (Joung, 2006, p. 49).

With this in mind, it is possible to understand the confusing statement in “Perpetual Peace”, that the derivative sovereign (the empiric, political ruler) can be either “... an Autocracy constituted by the power of a Monarch, or an Aristocracy constituted by the power of the Nobles, or a Democracy constituted by the power of the People.” (Kant, 1991, p.100) This derivative sovereign is not to be mistaken as the original sovereign, which only can be the general will of the people. We need to understand that the republic itself (*respublica noumenon*) as well as the general will of the people as the original sovereign is an ideal and can never be reached completely by the empiric republican state (*respublica phaenomenon*). Nevertheless, the ideal is essential for the empirical implementation! The ideal serves as a guideline that shows the strict requirements for a perfect rightful state that has to get a proper implementation in reality in the best possible way.

The question is now: “How do we get a *respublica phaenomenon* that comes close to the ideal of *respublica noumenon*?”. By this question, we get to the main point that distinguishes the republican form of government to a despotic one: it is representation. The aim is to represent the

original sovereign by approaching the general will of the people through the derivative sovereign. For Kant, this is the transition from theory to practice:

An original contract [...] is in fact merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the general will (Kant, 1991, p.79).

This quotation shows that the change from a priori necessity to a posteriori possibility is fulfilled by the representation of the original sovereign through a derivative sovereign, who is making decisions as if a whole people has consented to it. It is understandable that Kant assesses the mode of government as more important than the derivative sovereign, because it is the most decisive factor in terms of creating a republic. It can be said that every kind of derivative sovereign, whether it be autocracy, aristocracy or democracy or whatsoever, needs to have a republican government and the accompanied representation to make sure that it will not develop into a despotic form of government, where the executive power would be also the lawgiver at the same time.

Now, with this background information, let's have a look on Kant's statement that leads to controversial discussions:

...a Democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is necessarily a despotism because it establishes an executive power in which All resolve about, and, it may be, also against, any One who is not in accord with it; and consequently the All who thus resolve are really not all; which is a contradiction of the Universal Will with itself and with liberty (Kant, 1991, p.100).

Kant refers to a "democracy in the proper sense of the word" (Kant, 1991, p. 100) which is nothing more but a non-representative, direct democracy. Although Kant sees the people as the one and only legislative power, as aforementioned, he is aware that this aim is hypothetical. If we would have a derivative, current sovereign of the state who would be visible as the whole people itself, there would be no representation at all. It would be a state where everyone wants to be ruler over everyone and by that it would be a contradiction to the aspect of freedom (we investigated in the beginning) and the general will itself.

Kant indeed states that the representation is greater if less people have the power, but it is not a cancellation of democracy; it was rather used to show that if we speak of a direct democracy as a derivative sovereign, then it would be a direct contradiction to republicanism, while it would be at least possible in the two other forms (autocracy and aristocracy), provided

the derivative rulers would just act like “servants of the state” (as Friedrich the 2nd introduced his office) and by that, be representatives that are separated from legislation and under the regulation of law (Kant, 1991, p. 101).

To sum this up: Kant states that the only way to have a republican form of government in a democracy is by a representative system, while the other systems are (at least) more or less representative. But we need to add to this that Kant was aware of the fact that autocracy and aristocracy are always in danger of becoming despotic. So he simply assumes that they at least “will be associated with a form of government which accords with the spirit of a representative system” (Kant, 1991, p. 101), whereas his offense against democracy (in the true sense of the word) derives from its impossibility of being a republic at all.

When we now think about the gravity of representation in Kant’s political writing it is hard to imagine that Kant really could disagree to the system of parliamentary democracy, because if the constitution of a state achieves the separation of power, and if it is built in a way that it represents the will of the people in the regulation of rights, then parliamentary democracy (with the parliament as the visible, derivative sovereign) is the only known form of government which fulfills the strict requirements of republicanism (Gerhard, 1995, p. 90).

2. MODERN DEMOCRACIES FROM KANT’S POINT OF VIEW

In the previous section we investigated why the Kantian republic is mostly referred to as a parliamentary democracy and we discovered that it fulfills the requirements of freedom, separation of powers and representation. What could Kant think about other systems that are seen as democratic systems, but differ from the parliamentary democracy? Could there still be some constitutional problems, or observable differences, between a parliamentary democracy (e.g. Germany) and the Kantian republic that could be a reason for the lack of interest in politics?

In this section we will have a brief look on some today’s states (USA, Switzerland and Germany) from Kant’s point of view. In order to find a possible breeding ground for political aversion among the people, we will investigate one issue for every state that Kant would consider as problematic or even contradictory to the people’s sovereignty.

Starting with the United States of America as a “federal presidential constitutive republic”, we have a representative democracy with a separation of powers as following: the president as the derivative sovereign and the “commander in chief” of the military forces, the Congress as the strongest representative organ, whose most important power is to control government spending and the highest court as the juridical power (Foreign Policy Association,

2011, pp. 5-8). Taking this political system into account, it is most interesting to focus on the power of the president as the derivative sovereign and examine whether the function of this office is in compliance with the republican constitution. So, I would like to ask a controversial question: Is it possible to evaluate the president as an absolute monarch? This question has arisen, because it has a direct connection to one of the main points in the republican motivation, which is that the question of war and peace should not be made by one or few, but only by the will of the people.

According to that, Kant himself pointed out what the difference between an absolute monarch and a limited monarch is:

What is an *absolut* monarch? He is one at whose command war at once begins when he says it shall do so. And conversely, what is a *limited* monarch? He is one who must first ask the people whether or not there is to be war, and if the people say that there shall be no war, then there will be none. For war is a condition in which *all* the powers of the state must be at the head of state's disposal (Kant 1991, p.186, 187).

Interestingly, it is not easy to place the office of the president of the United States into the position of a limited monarch (which actually should be the equivalent today). Although concrete war declarations are not that common anymore, war and military strikes by the United States (among others) still take place. Has the question, whether there should be war or not, ever been posed to the people?

The United States constitution states the following about the office of the president:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states when called into the actual service of the United States.
-Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. constitution

Although the president's authority to conduct war is not as arbitrary as it would be in an absolute monarchy, as it has to be authorized by Congress and conferred by statute, one aim of the above quoted "commander in chief clause" is to repel invasions on the United States. This power cannot be stripped by Congress and it enables preventive military actions without precise permission by Congress or law (Adler, 2006, p. 525).

This "commander in chief clause", that (e.g.) President Bush took advantage of during his term allowed him to establish military tribunals and take actions that he perceived as necessary to maintain national security and common defense. The war in Iraq can be seen as such a case, as it was presented to the people as a preventive act against a possible nuclear threat (Greiner, 2011, p. 124). It's hard to say if the political framing of the Bush administration, which successfully

connected Iraq with the attack on the World Trade Center on 11th September 2001 in order to obtain the consent of society by explaining actions as preventive war, would be in harmony with what Kant wrote about the derivative sovereigns and the use of their executive power (Gershkoff, Kushner, 2005, pp. 525-537).

In other words, they (the monarchs) should treat the people in accordance with principles akin in the spirit to the laws of freedom which a people of mature rational powers would prescribe for itself, even if the people is not literally asked for its consent (Kant, 1991, p.187).

The critical reactions against some controversial political actions show a high aversion among the people and it is motivated through actions taken by governments that are not in accordance with principles akin to the spirit to the laws of freedom. This aspect of a government that is able to influence the will of people and take actions on own behalf is for sure the first possible reason for distrust and aversion towards established political powers.

Let's find another aspect by taking this time the direct democracy of Switzerland into account. The first question that arises is of course: can the Swiss form of direct democracy be considered despotism as the Kantian prediction would assure? Or, in other words, we should investigate if direct democracy is a true direct democracy (in the proper sense of the word). The Swiss form of government has some representative aspects, that are not ideally a direct democracy as it might have existed in Ancient Greece, where the government was supposedly a mixture of decisions made through direct participation of the citizens and declarations 'by turn', by a randomly chosen elite (Mowlam, 1979, p. 181).

So, it is to be said in the beginning that it is not the despotic form of government Kant referred to. Nevertheless, Switzerland has the most direct form of government can be observed nowadays and we should investigate if it has a negative influence on the people according to the correlation of freedom and representation that we investigated in the first chapter. However, first we must generate a brief understanding of how direct democracy works and if it fulfills public demands and increases political participation, like many supporters of direct democracy emphasize. If this is not the case, it could be another possible breeding ground for a lack of interest in politics and it would support the Kantian statement, according to which the general will of the people in Switzerland is not truly represented, because of too little representation through the elected representatives.

The procedures of direct democracy in Switzerland roughly work as follows: The Swiss electorate has three possibilities to directly participate in the political decision making process by constitutional initiative, constitutional referendum and legislative referendum. For every change

in the constitution, the Parliament has to submit the amendment to the people (constitutional referendum); for any change in law, the parliament has to submit for popular approval (legislative referendum); and, in addition to the constitutional referendum, it is possible for the people to introduce amendments to the federal constitution by themselves (constitutional initiative) (Mowlam, 1979, p. 184, 185).

Supporters of the political system in Switzerland state that the first and the last word always belongs to the people, the legislative sovereign, as they can control the elites via initiatives and referendum. Other people claim that it is a highly undemocratic system, where the actual power is transferred to interest group leaders who are not responsible to anyone (Mowlam, 1979, p. 182, 183).

I want to point out some critical voices to show some aspects that underline the emotional state of a citizen with a lack of interest in politics. The claim that people are more interested in politics and elections because of direct participation, is empirically refuted. Studies show that participation in the elections of the Federal Council, which serves as the executive head of government (the derivative ruler), has always been below the 49% since 1975. (Bundesamt für Statistik (Schweiz). Wahlbeteiligung an den Nationalratswahlen in der Schweiz von 1971 bis 2015.).

The lack of interest in politics is a phenomenon in the Swiss Confederation too. What are the reasons for that? One reason for the low level of participation in the Federal Council elections could be an awareness that the status quo will certainly not change. The Swiss people are aware of the fact that the executive is not that powerful as it is in representative states. It is possible that they simply do not see the need for the election of the Federal Council which consists of members of the same three major parties every time again.

But even in the more important elections concerning a direct system, made possible by the three ways of referendum and initiatives, we observe a low participation rate. The problem here could be that those people who go to elections because they do not like any of the proposed amendments, are the majority who vote anyway, and the other people, who do not really care about reforms, simply stay at home.

If there are no representatives who can decide on reform amendments, perhaps with a more objective view, it is not easy to create any new political direction. That leads to a standstill, which consequently makes people doubt the system in general. As another point we could add is that participation through referendums and initiatives is possible by breaking down difficult problems to a simple “yes-or-no-question”, and this can be seen as unsatisfying. For sure, Kant

would not be pleased with Swiss democracy, as there is not enough representation, neither through the elected representatives, nor through the public referendums or initiatives.

We will sum up and broaden these results in the next section. Now, we will have a look at parliamentary democracy in Germany. Germany, as a parliamentary democracy, is the one of these three states that is most similar to the Kantian republic, as we already have shown in the first section. Regardless, the same problems with the lack of interest in politics arise in Germany. Before we have a look on how this is possible, we should further investigate if there are still some aspects that Kant could possibly disagree with.

During my research, I found the most controversial aspect in the work of Ingeborg Maus. She considers the separation of powers to be unequal: judiciary and the executive on the one hand, and the legislature on the other. According to her, the highest power of a state that refers itself to people's sovereignty can only belong to the legislation that simply empowers the other ones. But in Germany, she observes the judiciary and the executive surpass legislation by interpreting rights at their own discretion (Maus, 2007, p.18).

In other words, the authorized ones surpass the authority. When there is a contract that stands to the principle of people's sovereignty, a nation always acts with the function of the lawgiver and by that it is always the higher instance to the opponent public authorities (executive and judiciary) and it controls them.

She thinks that there is a loose legislation in the juridical methodology: the courts are not strictly bound by law anymore and give space to surpass legislation together with the executive (Maus, 2018, Beitrag II).

Actually, every right, especially fundamental rights, require legislative form. But, indeed, the judiciary is able to interpret laws at will and work against legislature, as in the case of Germany, the powers overlap each other's responsibilities.

Would Kant agree with Ingeborg Maus's argument that there is an inequality among the powers that lead to less representation of the people's sovereignty? Giving a proper answer to that question would require a bigger examination, but I wanted to show this point of view as an example of controversial discourse that still exists in reference to the Kantian republic and what is really meant by that. Political distrust and disbelief in elections, called in this article "lack of interest in politics", like in every other example in this section, are recited shortage of representation. This shortage will be summarized in the next section.

3. REASONS FOR POLITICAL DISINTEREST

It is now time to focus on the lack of interest in politics that more or less manifests itself in our modern democracies. The most emphasized aspect of political participation we investigated is voting. Although there is a variety of forms to become politically active, the most common way is through suffrage. And with it, the lack of interest starts. The time for elections is the time where the citizens have the power to decide. However, they have to ask themselves such questions, as: Who is going to be their representatives? Who will change something about bad conditions? Who will keep their promises?

These questions also make visible the limitations of voting as a mechanism for popular control over political choices: Voters have a minimal impact on the selection of candidates, they cannot choose the agenda nor can they choose when to vote (Mowlam, 1979, p.180). Once representatives have been elected, however, it is not immediately possible to adjust any decision taken by them anymore. The direct way to judge false behavior or indecision of any kind is by subsequently choosing not to vote for them again next time. Negatively we could say: people give their actual governance into the hands of the elected representatives, so, aside from demonstrations, protests or citizen's initiatives, it is nearly impossible to influence the political decisions of the representatives at the legal level.

There is a long term of regency where institutions exclude people from making decisions and lead them to a position of control afterwards. Therefore, many people wish more direct democracy and the chance to change things immediately. But, as we have seen with the example of Switzerland, the level of participation is not higher and the results of initiatives mostly strengthen the status-quo. Additionally, there is the danger that populism becomes rampant by the fast simplification of serious problem into a simple yes-or-no-question. All of this contributes to the lack of interest in politics as well.

Furthermore, it is not easy to find a party that clearly shares the "same opinion" as you. As a result of the huge variety of political thoughts and statements, it is not surprising that parties have difficulties to "speak with one voice" and to produce a clear program. It is hard to keep up to with original goals when there are so many individuals with different needs and attitudes. In addition, experience has shown us that even if you are a staunch supporter of a political party and even if you would stand the inconvenience of some decisions, it could happen that your party either won't get enough votes or has to work with another party (that you wouldn't have elected) to receive enough number of votes for forming a government. It looks like citizens endure a

distortion of power and that might increase the dislike for politics in general and decrease the level of participation in political decisions and elections.

Even though it might seem so at this stage, the goal of this article is not to reject democracy, but rather supporting the state of mind that speaks in favor of representation and democracy and helps to work against the lack of interest in politics. But, before we try to approach this matter, I want to introduce the experiences I have had with the “Betzavta method”, which will lead me to a final conclusion.

The huge problem of forming consent between various parties or individuals is shown very well by the Israeli method *Betzavta* (which means “together”), which is based on interactive tasks in a group followed by reflection sessions afterwards: “The goal of the interactive task is for people to delve into their natural patterns and behaviors, while the reflection session afterwards gives an opportunity to reflect on that behavior” (Betzavta Method).

As a participant in this method, I remember the loose boundaries before every interactive task. The tasks were short, but they lead directly into dilemmas and conflicts that made the participants deal with their own freedom and the individual freedom of everyone else. It consequently made them think about what could be considered as right or wrong. Every participant experienced the difficulty of making decisions that involved not only themselves, but other people as well.

Betzavta’s uniqueness is that it combines the personal and the political, acknowledging that there is an individual in every group process and allowing for a ‘bottom up’ approach to learning. The themes are rooted in democracy education, but the individual is challenged to come to terms with their own dilemmas. This combination of the personal and the political is what is needed to affect society – an awareness of oneself in order to work together in a group and make positive changes in society (*Betzavta Method – Mellem Education*).

This personal connection that *Betzavta* tries to take into account, could support the disbelief in politics today in particular. It shows precisely the main factor that increases the lack of interest in politics and it goes even beyond democracy and representation. It is something that is directly connected to freedom in the Kantian sense: responsibility.

With freedom there comes responsibility. This may be one of the main clues concerning the history of enlightenment.

Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity (Kant, 1991. p. 54).

The self-incurred immaturity was the first escape away from responsibility you could think of. The pathos of the Enlightenment, though it has never been really forgotten ever since it was formulated, needs to be remembered when we speak about the right to vote or the right to do and say what we want as far as it can be in harmony with the spirit of freedom in the Kantian sense.

The fear of responsibility may be one of the most fundamental reasons for a lack of interest in politics. Everything we found out in the sections above is built on the correlation of freedom and responsibility. Despite all the problems of representation that still need overcoming in order to approach the ideal of a *respublica noumenon*, we need to take responsibility for ourselves and for others.

Obviously, this can be a hard thing to do and it might feel easier to keep out of political decisions than to make decisions with the acknowledgment of being responsible for yourself and others.

CONCLUSION

The final section will be used for a summary of what has been said and for some small suggestions that we may focus on to possibly overcome these difficult conditions. Let us summarize the results by reformulating three different questions we investigated in the previous sections.

The first question “why is there a lack of interest in politics?”, as the general question was answered by explaining aspects of the lack of representation and, connected to that, the feelings of powerlessness, distrust and indifference.

We could formulate the second question as: “is there a lack of interest in politics because of the non-existence of a republican state?” This question was answered most certainly with “yes”. As the *respublica noumenon* is an ideal that can never be fulfilled completely, it sets a high goal for our *respublica phaenomenon* that has to deal with many problems as well as the lack of interest in politics. This ideal therefore can still be seen as improvable.

The third question we indirectly posed and answered was about the need to reconcile freedom and responsibility in our political and social mind. The conclusion was that it takes courage and will to take decisions autonomously. The overcoming of political disinterest needs the awareness to be responsible for oneself and others. It also includes acting as anticipated, as self-conscious, reasonable beings.

In the end, it can be said that even though we, as citizens, have to cope with bad experiences as being deceived by false promises, having the impression that we do not have a say in any decision, developing distrust in political representatives, dealing with social and global problems - we can in the end, hope to overcome it one day by merely reminding ourselves about the responsibility and freedom that every human being has in him or herself, at least from Kant's perspective.

The representation of our political will, as well as the making of decisions in general, are a huge factor in our everyday life, and because of its problematic ambiguity, it is a factor that develops the lack of interest in politics. However, it is to be said that I don't want to claim that the process of voting determines or reflects every kind of political participation, but it is for sure the most visible form of it as you can statistically estimate people's participation. Elections are just one sphere of broader problems in politics, but they are exemplary of the "fear of responsibility" that can be seen as the breeding ground for the lack of interest in politics.

Maybe this fear can be overcome by first looking back to it, as a well-known problem faced by humans ever since, and secondly by looking forward to a necessarily better future, as we have already taken multiple political and social steps into the right direction. We should remind ourselves and anyone else who refuses to go to elections that the more people vote, the higher the representation, as a simple, but, due to the contained aim of peoples sovereignty, highly important motivation.

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