

The Concept of Russian Federation Foreign and Security Policy by Eugene Primakov

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Abstract. *The aim of this article is to analyze the concept of Russian foreign and security policy by Eugene Primakov, one of the most eminent Russian politicians of the twentieth century. The article applies research methods and techniques appropriate to science about politics. These include a comparative analysis and a method of historical analysis that enabled the presentation of political events and factors shaping the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation. In 1996, President Boris Yeltsin appointed Primakov to the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The goals and assumptions of foreign and security policy have undergone a thorough redefinition, related to the tendencies noticeable in Russia in 1993–1995. Before, foreign policy had been dominated by neoliberal and Euro-Atlantic options, whose representative was predominantly Primakov's predecessor as the minister of foreign affairs, Andrei Kozyrev. After the fall of Sergei Kirijenka's government, Primakov assumed the office of Prime Minister on September 11, 1998 and held it until May 12, 1999. It was a cabinet of political compromise, which was supposed to facilitate agreement with the opposition and the continuation of reforms, although not on the same principles as before. Primakov criticized his predecessors for the wrong political line, the lack of effectiveness of the stabilization policy, which resulted in a fall in production. He stressed that his government did not give up market reform, but called for the state's participation to be increased. Yevgeny Primakov claimed that Russia should strive to formulate a multipolar system of international relations that truly reflects the multifaceted nature of the present world with the diversity of its interests. Primakov exerted a huge influence on the Russian foreign and security policy of Putin's day. His political line was carried out by his successors, and above all Igor Ivanov and Sergey Lavrov. The main directions and assumptions of his concepts are still repeated in official documents articulating the Russian doctrine of security and defense, and nothing indicates that this state of affairs has changed, and this in turn carries the threat of destabilization in Central and Eastern Europe.*

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Introduction

The purpose of this article is to present the concept of Russian foreign and security policy by Eugene Primakov, one of the most prominent Russian politicians in the 20th century. The article applies research methods and techniques appropriate to science about politics. These include a comparative analysis and a method of historical analysis that enabled the presentation of political events and factors shaping the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.

Primakov was one of the most important figures of the Gorbachev perestroika period. Between 1989 and 1990 he was a deputy member of the Political Bureau, in 1989 a member of the Soviet of the Union and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In 1990 he became a member of the Presidential Council and in 1991 a member of the Security Council and Head of the First Chief Directorate of the Committee of State Security (KGB) and a deputy head of the KGB. As the envoy of Mikhail Gorbachev, he went on a mission to Iraq during the Gulf War in order

to establish talks with Saddam Hussein, whom he knew personally. In the years 1991–1995 he was the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia¹.

At that time, the ideological and programmatic options determining Russian foreign policy can be distinguished. The most influential were the European and the Eurasian ones at the time, although one could think that they were mutually exclusive.

The most important features of Russian foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR are:

- power status,
- striving for multipolarity in world politics,
- balance,
- declared pragmatism of foreign policy,
- integrationism,
- bilateralism and multilateralism,
- 'raw nature' of Russian diplomacy.

The mechanism of Russian foreign and security policy reflects the nature of the political system, the main feature of which is the centralization of power, conditioned by historical traditions². When analyzing Russian foreign and security policy, the following factors should be taken into account:

- The Russian Federation recognizes the UN and the Security Council as the most important instrument for ensuring international stability.
- the priority of the Russian security policy is the post-Soviet space.
- Russia strives to change NATO in the direction of its total abandonment of anti-Russian orientation in both military planning and political declarations.
- reserving the right to preventive strikes against countries that could pose a source of danger³.

Primakov as the head of diplomacy and prime minister

In 1996, President Boris Yeltsin appointed him the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The goals and assumptions of foreign and security policy underwent a thorough redefinition, related to the tendencies noticeable in Russia in 1993–1995. Before, foreign policy had been followed by a neoliberal and Euro-Atlantic option, whose representative was mainly predecessor Primakov as a minister of foreign affairs, Andrei Kozyrev. Such a political line was justified by the necessity to carry out reforms that would guarantee Russia a suitable place among liberal Western countries. It turned out, however, that economic reforms, which brought huge social

¹ *Electronic source:* <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Yevgeny-Primakov>, accessed: 11.08.2016.

² Bryc A, Rosja w XX wieku. Gracz światowy czy koniec gry? Warsaw, 2009, p. 54.

³ Tymanowski J, Bezpieczeństwo polityczne i ekonomiczne w relacjach polsko-rosyjskich, [in:] Bieleń S, Skrzypek A (Eds). Geopolityka w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich. Warsaw, 2012, p. 69.

costs, did not bring the expected economic effects, nor did they raise the systematically declining prestige of Russia in the international arena. Disillusionment with the West was also aggravated by the intensification of the US activities aimed at extending NATO to Eastern European countries⁴. In this situation, Primakov's foreign and security policy was reoriented, its basic priorities changed, and the main feature became pragmatism, also characteristic of the Putinist period. Russia was faced with the task of rebuilding its international position and wanted to aspire to the role of a global power. Therefore, it was necessary to redefine the Russian doctrine of foreign and security policy, which was also adapted to the great-power ambitions. 'Primakov represented — Maciej Zaniewicz wrote — opposite position in the so-called debate of neo-liberals with neorealists. He believed, following Kenneth Waltz, that the main players in the international arena are countries differing above all with 'relative capabilities', commonly understood as power. According to neorealist theory, states function in anarchy and fight for their survival and security, using power politics for this purpose. Kenneth Waltz specifically addresses the national interest of the state. In his opinion, the position of the state and its national interest depend on the international structure and the structure of the state. The authority of a given state can only, to a greater or lesser extent, act in accordance with an objectively existing national interest, which remains independent of it, and it only depends on its wisdom whether the state will conduct its policy based on that interest. Starting from this assumption, Primakov's abandonment of the Euro-Atlantic direction for a multipolar policy was a more accurate recognition of the national interest of the Russian Federation, which did not change, but was overlooked by Kozyriev and Yeltsin⁵.

After the fall of Sergei Kirijenka's government, Primakov assumed the office of Prime Minister on September 11, 1998 and held it until May 12, 1999. It was a cabinet of political compromise, which was supposed to facilitate agreement with the opposition and the continuation of reforms, although not on the same principles as before. Primakov criticized his predecessors for the wrong political line, the lack of effectiveness of the stabilization policy, which resulted in a fall in production. He stressed that his government did not give up the reform path, but called for the state's participation to be increased in it. In turn, the critics of Primakov's office claimed that it differs from the previous, even from the Soviet, only through its rhetoric. They talked about leaving the path of liberal reforms and returning to the socialist economy⁶. „Irrespective of his ideological premises — Andrei Piontkovsky wrote — and his real intentions, the Primakov's government was doomed to continue the virtual economy system. And he did exactly that. The slogan of strengthening the native entrepreneurs meant in practice further subsidizing unprofitable enterprises and ineffective owners. Discussions on strengthening the role of the state ended with tax concessions for Gazprom and other raw oligarchs

⁴ Zaniewicz M, *Life and legacy of Yevgeny Primakov*, <http://www.eastbook.eu/2015/07/01/%C5%Bcyicie-i-spsplodzia-buggienija-primakowa/>, accessed: 16.09.2019.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Piontkowski A, *Od jeczyznimu do putinizmu, czyli najwyższego i ostatecznego stadium bandyckiego kapitalizmu w Rosji*, [in:] Magdziak-Miszewska A (Ed.), *Rosja 2000. Koniec i początek epoki?* Warsaw, 2000, p. 37.

⁷. Despite the criticism of the liberals, his government was considered one of the most market-oriented after 1992. Primakov did not make radical moves in the field of economic policy, which also conditioned Russian obligations to international financial organizations. By relying on the operation of market mechanisms, the government led to even greater arrears in the payment of pensions, disability pensions as well as wages in the budgetary sphere and the army. Although the evaluation of his government's work was far from enthusiastic, the popularity of Primakov, who was perceived as politically independent, was systematically growing. The over-strengthening of the Prime Minister, who managed to gain the support of a large part of the bureaucratic elite, became a political threat to President Boris Yeltsin. After dismissing Primakov, he was replaced by Sergey Stiepaszyn, known for his loyalty to the regime⁸.

Primakov's doctrine

It assumed that Russia should first heal the internal situation and then focus on regaining international position. The official direction was associated with a change in political thinking towards the West, which ceased to be treated as an enemy. „Interestingly — Monika Bryc wrote — already in 1987, Yevgeny Primakov, still as the head of IMEMO (Institute of World Economy and International Relations) published in „Pravda” an article entitled *On a New Philosophy of Foreign Policy*, in which he questioned the Leninist approach. ‘New thinkers’ agreed that common interests and, above all, the need to avoid nuclear war, are fundamental, which undermines the basic class interests”⁹.

Primakov stressed that Russia cannot allow the formation of a unipolar international order. Its security depended on having the status of a superpower. He claimed that only political short-sightedness could be explained by the removal of Russia from the list of powers. Strong Russia would gain Western respect and legitimacy to treat the post-Soviet area as its sphere of influence. Primakov assumed that various centers of opposition forces should be used against the US in order to prevent the country's hegemony on a global scale. He did not agree with the thesis that the US is the only superpower. Yes, it is the strongest country in terms of economic, military and political influence, but it is not a superpower, because the superpower is a category of cold war. That is why Russia should be active in international structures and use conflicts of interests in its policy¹⁰.

Primakov was not an advocate of the creation of a „geopolitical axis” with France and Germany, which would be called „Big Europe” and would be a common security, economic, humanitarian and energy space, and above all a coalition of powers that will be able to compete with the United States for political level. Attempts to establish and then strengthen Moscow's cooperation with Berlin and Paris had been undertaken since 1998, since Primakov assumed the post of Prime Minister

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37–38.

⁸ Zołotowski J (Ed.), *Rosja XX wiek. Od utopii komunistycznej do rzeczywistości globalistycznej*. Cracow, 2004, p. 163.

⁹ Bryc A, *Rosja w XX wieku. ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

of the Russian Federation. Leaders of Germany, France and Russia held frequent meetings, but ultimately these countries rejected such a proposal¹¹. This was mainly argued for „playing European patriotism”, a threat to „Atlantic unity” and „weakening of American influence on the Old Continent”¹². It would also lead to the weakening of the European Union’s influence in the post-Soviet area, as two blocks were distinguished in the concept — the European Union with the leading role of Germany and the Eurasian Union, where Russia was to become the hegemon¹³. Although the implementation of this idea was abandoned at the time, Vladimir Putin later tried to make efforts the Russian-German-French summit meetings take place at least once a year.

The Primakov’s concept is also referred to as the concept of pragmatic consensus. It was introduced by Evgeny Primakov at the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly. He stated that the polycentric order in international relations was the most favorable for Russia, in which it could still play a significant role. The position of Russia at the interface of the most important global centers of strength would allow one to support others¹⁴.

Of particular importance in this context are Russian-German relations, which are extremely correct despite the clear distance and cooling down in Russia’s relations with the European Union after Russian aggression to Ukraine in 2014. Both Russia and Germany strive to establish and consolidate their place in the international structure¹⁵. According to Stanisław Bieleń, the fact that Germany is a peaceful country oriented for European integration is undisputed today, but one cannot be sure that subsequent generations of Germans will not return to territorial revisionism or expansionism¹⁶. From Germany’s point of view, access to Russian gas and oil fields as well as a guarantee of raw materials supplies is important. The Chancellor of the reunification period, Helmut Kohl, stated even that „Russia is and will remain the most important neighbour of Germany in the East”¹⁷. Germany was the first Western European country to recognize on December 26, 1991 the Russian Federation as the successor of the Soviet Union. Ewa Szkop wrote: ‘The economic relations of Germany and Russia are not so dependent, from political relations, as in the case of Central and Eastern EU countries. Admittedly, the special development of cooperation took place in the times of Gerhard Schroder, who was sympathetic

¹¹ Wojcieszak Ł, *Obwód Kaliningradzki w relacjach Unia Europejska-Rosja (1992–2005)*. Bielsko-Biała, 2008, p. 117.

¹² Bieleń S, Raś M, *Polityka zagraniczna Rosji*. Warsaw, 2008, p. 100.

¹³ Musiałek P, W poszukiwaniu antyzachodnich sojuszników. Strategia Rosji wobec światowych potęg. *Electronic source*: http://www.academia.edu/10072725/W_poszukiwaniu_antyzachodnich_sojusznik%C3%B3w._Strategia_Rosji_wobec_%C5%9Bwiatowych_pot%C4%99g, accessed: 12.09.2019.

¹⁴ Gołaś K, Rosyjska polityka zagraniczna: koncepcja pragmatycznego konsensusu. *Electronic source*: <http://geopolityka.net/rosyjska-polityka-zagraniczna-koncepcja-pragmatycznego-konsensusu/>, accessed: 16.09.2019.

¹⁵ Dobroczyński M, *Między mocarstwami*. Warsaw–Toruń, 1996, p. 100.

¹⁶ Bieleń S, Skrzypek A (Eds), *Rosja. Rozważania imperiologiczne*. Warsaw, 2015. 239.

¹⁷ Wawrzyńczak A, *Polityka zagraniczna a sytuacja wewnętrzna Rosji za rządów Władimira Putina*, [in:] Zamarlik M (Ed.), *Polityka zagraniczna Rosji*. Cracow, 2002, p. 122.

to Vladimir Putin, but it is supported by a representative of the Christian Democrats, Angela Merkel. Certainly the challenge and the verification of mutual cooperation was the Georgian-Russian conflict, and although in its aftermath the relationship between the parties cooled down, pragmatism and the return to business as usual were victorious¹⁸.

According to Aleksander Wawrzyńczak, after Putin's presidential term of office, the implementation of the multipolar international concept of Primakov became real¹⁹. In accordance with the assumptions of Primakov during the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia shows itself in its foreign and security policy only to strong states of the European Union, marginalizing relations with the states and the European Union as a whole. This is, of course, related to the strategy of Russian foreign and security policy towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and above all the Baltic states and Poland²⁰. Russia does not treat the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as equal diplomatic partners. There is a planned marginalization by establishing bilateral relations with leading Western European countries, which Russia treats as equals²¹. Irina Kobrinskaja wrote: 'Central and Eastern European countries, and above all Poland, categorically protest against such a situation and try — in the same way — talking to the West (omitting Russia) to achieve their goals. The period from 1991 is not only the history of Russia's withdrawal in Central and Eastern Europe, but also the period of lack of dialogue, the time of monologues or solo arias of competing soloists who do not want to listen to each other, who are looking at — just looking and almost not listening to this cacophony's conductor — the West. At present, in the middle of 1997, politicians and analysts are actually trying to find the answer to the question of who (whoever over shouted?)'²². Rebuilding the influence in the post-Soviet area or at least allocating foreign influence in the region is a strategic goal of the Russian Federation, therefore it does everything to maintain control over the processes taking place there²³.

Primakov claimed that Russia could not understand the specificity of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, therefore lost its influence in this region and should accept it. As a consequence, Russia pursued, and still does, a policy towards Central and Eastern European countries based on the depreciation of the region²⁴. „It is said — in a press interview in 1996 — that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are pushing NATO to take them into its ranks. I must admit that we have made many mistakes in our relations with these countries. Completely breaking the economic ties developed within the framework of CMOs, we put them in a very difficult situation — after all, their economy was focused on relationships with us.

¹⁸ Szkop E, *Gospodarka w relacjach Unia Europejska-Federacja Rosyjska*. Warsaw, 2011, p. 61.

¹⁹ Wawrzyńczak A, p. 12.

²⁰ Daniluk A, *Integracja obszaru poradzieckiego jako element polityki bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej*, [in:] Minkina M, Kaszuba M (Eds), *Polska-Rosja. Polityka bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej. Kontynuacja i zmiana*. Siedlce, 2016, p. 86.

²¹ Kobrinskaja I, *Długi koniec zimnej wojny*. Warsaw, 1998, p. 99.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 99–100.

²³ Słowikowski M, *Miejsce i rola Rosji we współczesnym systemie stosunków międzynarodowych w świetle ewolucji stosunków unijno-rosyjskich*, [in:] Piskorska B (Ed.), *Unia Europejska i Rosja. W kierunku nowego otwarcia*. Lublin, 2012, p. 43.

²⁴ Kobrinskaja I, p. 100–101.

On the other hand, in these countries there was euphoria, the conviction that they would quickly find their niche in the West. They failed. Currently, through NATO, they want to take deeper root in European structures, in the European Union. However, the decisive vote has the NATO member states themselves ... We must do everything to find solutions acceptable to both parties"²⁵. Primakov reminded that in connection with the removal of Soviet troops from the GDR and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the West promised Russia that NATO would not be enlarged to the East, although these promises were not confirmed by any documents. „If NATO — in an interview for „Oblejja Gazeta” — created in its time to counter the threat at the global level, will take up the Warsaw Pact, then from our point of view, the geopolitical situation is changing into a worse one. Why? Because intentions in politics are always a great change in politics. And the possibilities are constant. Of course, I do not believe that NATO will attack us. However, a hypothetical situation may arise in which we will be forced to act not in our own interests"²⁶. At that time, Russia was waiting for compensation for extending NATO to its western borders. Western countries tried to understand the Russian position and reservations about NATO enlargement, but they did not intend to grant Russia a veto power. No wonder, then, that Evgeny Primakov, after becoming the Minister of Foreign Affairs in early 1996, strengthened the activities aimed at implementing the concept of multipolarity²⁷. Russia took action to strengthen the OSCE's competence in solving security problems and making this structure something like the European equivalent of the UN. This is evidenced by the submission on March 21, 1996 of proposals to develop the „European Security Charter”, which was to be the basis for the creation of a security system independent of the US²⁸. US policy, aimed at extending NATO, Primakov commented as follows: „The US itself creates the illusion of threat and defends Europe against it. In addition, they are extending NATO to support those states that are ready to fulfill their orders unconditionally. In this way, they limit old members"²⁹.

Evgeny Primakov claimed that Russia should strive to formulate a multipolar system of international relations that truly reflects the multifaceted nature of the present world with the diversity of its interests. World order in the 21st century should be based on the priority of law and broad democratization of international relations. This idea in Russian intentions may take geometric forms of triangles or axes of Russia-China-India or in the European dimension Russia-France-Germany or as exotic as Russia-Iraq-Iran, which would counteract the global influence of the United States. In the further perspective of the development of these ideas, Russia was to act as an independent force. The multipolarity gave Russia the right to become one of the most important entities in world politics³⁰. Yuri Afansjew

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 99–100.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 106–107.

²⁷ Stolarczyk M, *Russia in Poland's foreign policy in the years 1992–2015*. Katowice, 2016, p. 168.

²⁸ *Electronic source*: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Yevgeny-Primakov>, accessed: 11.08.2019.

²⁹ 10 najciekawszych cytatów Jewgienija Primakowa. *Electronic source*: <https://pl.sputniknews.com/opinie/20150627583869/>, accessed: 12.08.2016.

³⁰ Lisiakiewicz R, *Polityka Rosji wobec Polski za prezydentury Władimira Putina (2000–2008)*. Toruń, 2011, p. 81.

wrote: 'When the former head of government Yevgeny Primakov proposes the creation of the axis Moscow-Beijing-Delhi, but the vice-president during a visit to China declares: I am ready to fight with everyone, especially with advocates of pro-Western orientation, the world shudders and asks the question whether the leaders of Russia live in a real or virtual dimension'³¹.

Conclusions

Modern Russia Putin is even more determined to regain the position of the superpower. It is reinforced by the view that the European Union is weaker and weaker. The Russians believe that in economic terms, the Union is „a bureaucratic entity that cultivates a socialist policy that suppresses growth”. They argue that the culture of compromise determines the weakness of the Union and overestimate the importance of its internal crises. This in turn encourages Russia to act with even greater confidence³². The present Russian policy indicates that in Moscow, faster than elsewhere, changes in the modern world were realized and used to realize their own goals³³.

Russia emphasizes its political independence from any external factors. It declares that it is shaping its foreign and domestic policy itself. Russian democracy has to be shaped without external control, while Russia will assess what is democratic and what is not³⁴.

The contemporary state doctrine of Russia is characterized by striving to increase its share in the global economy while limiting the influence of external entities on decisions made in the Kremlin. 'The slogans of openness and susceptibility to cooperation — Maciej Raś wrote — began to be accompanied by a tough, assertive defense of their own interests, underpinned by imperial rhetoric'³⁵. In foreign policy, real rapprochement with emerging Asian powers was made and Russian diplomacy in Latin America was resumed. With the development of bilateral relations, the Kremlin stimulated cooperation within the Moscow-Beijing-Delhi triangle, aspiring to become the main animator and coordinator. As a consequence, under Vladimir Putin's presidency, Russia's position on the international stage was strengthened, to some extent also thanks to skillful shaping of relations with China, India and Brazil.

Evgeny Primakov died in Moscow on June 26, 2015. He undoubtedly had a huge influence on the Russian foreign and security policy of Putin's day. The line defined by Primakov was carried out by his successors, and above all Igor Ivanov and Sergey Lavrov. The main directions and assumptions of his concepts are still repeated in official documents articulating the Russian doctrine of security and defense. The

³¹ Afansjew J, Groźna Rosja. Warsaw, 2005, p. 223.

³² Leonard M, Popescu N, Rachunek sił w stosunkach Unia Europejska-Rosja. Londyn-Warsaw, 2008, p. 23–24.

³³ Serczyk W.A, Europa a Rosja. Refleksje i postulaty badawcze, [in:] Anculewicz Z, Sobczak J (Eds), Europa a Rosja. Opinie, konflikty, współpraca. Olsztyn, 2003, p. 23–24.

³⁴ Matwiejenko J I, Wilk M, Rosja. Współczesny system polityczny. Łódź, 2008, p. 14.

³⁵ Raś M, Wyznaczniki polityki zagranicznej Rosji, [in:] Unia Europejska i Rosja. W kierunku nowego otwarcia. Warsaw, 2012, p. 14.

Primakov doctrine is present in Russian politics to this day and there is no indication that this state of affairs will change, and this in turn carries the threat of destabilization in Central and Eastern Europe. In January 2003 Primakov questioned the validity of Putin's policy towards Ukraine, considering that Donbas should stay within its borders. It is worth noting that in other realities, after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, he was already in a different position, which Russia presented in his last book 'Russia: hopes and anxieties' in the chapter 'Russia and the crisis in Ukraine': 'The victory of pro-American forces in Kiev announced the establishment of US military control on the Black Sea, which compromised the vital interests of Russia. It could also be used with the intention of making Turkey more yielding in relations with the US. After the actions of Washington, it can be said that he tried to involve the Russian armed forces in a conflict on the former Ukraine. In this case, Europe (...) would remain in the orbit of US influence for decades'³⁶.

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³⁶ Zaniewicz M, Życie i spuścizna Jewgienija Primakowa, *Electronic source*: <https://www.eastbook.eu/2015/07/01/%C5%BCycie-i-spu%C5%9Bcizna-jewgienija-primakowa>, accessed: 16.09.2016.

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Streszczenie. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza koncepcji rosyjskiej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa autorstwa Jewgienija Primakowa, jednego z najwybitniejszych polityków rosyjskich XX wieku. W artykule zastosowano metody i techniki badawcze właściwe dla nauki o polityce. Wśród nich wymienić należy analizę porównawczą oraz metodę analizy historycznej, która umożliwiła przedstawienie wydarzeń politycznych i czynników kształtujących politykę zagraniczną i bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej. W 1996 roku prezydent Borys Jelcyn mianował Primakowa na stanowisko ministra spraw zagranicznych Federacji Rosyjskiej. Cele i założenia polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa uległy gruntownej redefinicji, związanej z tendencjami zauważalnymi w Rosji jeszcze w latach 1993–1995. Do tej pory w polityce zagranicznej dominowały opcje neoliberalna i euroatlantycka, których reprezentantem był głównie poprzednik Primakowa na stanowisku ministra spraw zagranicznych, Andriej Kozyrjew. Po upadku rządu Siergieja Kirijenki Primakov objął urząd premiera 11 września 1998 roku i piastował go do 12 maja 1999 roku. Był to gabinet kompromisu politycznego, który miał ułatwić porozumienie z opozycją i kontynuację reform, chociaż nie na takich samych zasadach jak dotychczas. Primakov krytykował swoich poprzedników za niewłaściwą linię polityczną, brak skuteczności polityki stabilizacyjnej, które przyniosły w konsekwencji spadek produkcji. Podkreślał, że jego rząd nie rezygnuje z drogi reform rynkowych, ale domaga się zwiększenia w nich udziału państwa. Jewgienij Primakov twierdził, że Rosja powinna dążyć do sformułowania wielobiegunowego systemu stosunków międzynarodowych, realnie odzwierciedlającego wieloaspektowość obecnego świata z różnorodnością jego interesów. Primakov wywarł ogromny wpływ na rosyjską politykę zagraniczną i bezpieczeństwa doby putinowskiej. Jego linia polityczna była realizowana przez następców, a przede wszystkim Igora Iwanowa i Siergieja Ławrowa. Główne kierunki i założenia jego koncepcji nadal są powtarzane w oficjalnych dokumentach artykułujących rosyjską doktrynę bezpieczeństwa i obrony i nic nie wskazuje na to, żeby ten stan rzeczy uległ zmianie, a to z kolei niesie zagrożenie destabilizacji w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej.

Zusammenfassung. Der Zweck dieses Artikels ist die Analyse des Konzepts der russischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik von Evgeni Primakov, einem der größten russischen Politiker des 20. Jahrhunderts. Der Artikel verwendet politikwissenschaftliche Forschungsmethoden und -techniken. Dazu gehören die vergleichende Analyse und die Methode der historischen Analyse, die es ermöglichte, politische Ereignisse und Faktoren darzustellen, die die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Russischen Föderation prägen. 1996 ernannte Präsident Boris Jelzin Primakov zum Außenminister der Russischen Föderation. Die Ziele und Annahmen der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik wurden gründlich neu definiert, im Zusammenhang mit den Tendenzen, die in Russland in den Jahren 1993–1995 zu beobachten waren. Bisher haben neoliberale Optionen die Außenpolitik dominiert und Euro-Atlantic, dessen Vertreter hauptsächlich der Vorgänger von Primakov als Außenminister Andrei Kozyrjew war. Nach dem Sturz der Regierung von Sergei Kirijenko trat Primakov am 11. September 1998 sein Amt als Premierminister an und hielt es bis zum 12. Mai 1999. Es war ein Kabinett politischer Kompromisse, das die Einigung mit der Opposition erleichtern sollte und Fortsetzung der Reformen, wenn auch nicht zu den gleichen Bedingungen wie zuvor. Primakov kritisierte seine Vorgänger für die falsche politische Linie, die mangelnde Wirksamkeit der Stabilisierungspolitik, die zu einem Produktionsrückgang führte. Er betonte, dass seine Regierung den Weg der Marktformen nicht aufgegeben habe, sondern die Teilnahme des Staates an ihnen gefordert habe. Evgeny Primakov argumentierte, dass Russland sich bemühen sollte, ein multipolares System internationaler Beziehungen zu formulieren, das die Vielschichtigkeit der gegenwärtigen Welt mit der Vielfalt seiner Interessen realistisch widerspiegelt. Primakov hatte einen großen Einfluss auf die russische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Putin-Ära. Seine politische Linie wurde von seinen Nachfolgern und vor allem von Igor Iwanow und Sergej Lawrow umgesetzt. Die wichtigsten Richtungen und Annahmen seines Konzepts werden immer noch in offiziellen Dokumenten wiederholt, in denen die russische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungslehre artikuliert ist, und es gibt keinen Hinweis darauf, dass sich dieser Zustand geändert hat, was wiederum das Risiko einer Destabilisierung in Mittel- und Osteuropa birgt.

Резюме. Целью данной статьи является анализ концепции российской внешней политики и политики безопасности, автором которой был Евгений Приматов, один из величайших российских политиков 20-го века. В статье используются методы исследования и приемы, соответствующие политологии. К ним относятся сравнительный анализ и метод исторического анализа, который позволил представить политические события и факторы, формирующие внешнюю политику и политику безопасности Российской Федерации. В 1996 году президент Борис Ельцин назначил Примакова министром иностранных дел Российской Федерации. Цели и предпосылки внешней политики и политики безопасности претерпели тщательное переопределение, связанное с тенденциями, заметными в России в 1993–1995 годах. До сих пор нелиберальные варианты доминировали во внешней политике и Евроатлантический, чей представитель был

в основном предшественником Примакова на посту министра иностранных дел Андрея Козырьева. После падения правительства Сергея Кириенко Примаков вступил в должность премьер-министра 11 сентября 1998 года и занимал его до 12 мая 1999 года. Это был кабинет политического компромисса, который должен был облегчить соглашение с оппозицией и продолжающиеся реформы, хотя и не на тех же условиях, что и раньше. Примаков раскритиковал своих предшественников за неправильную политическую линию, неэффективность стабилизационной политики, что привело к снижению производства. Он подчеркнул, что его правительство не отказалось от пути рыночных реформ, но потребовало от государства участия в них. Евгений Примаков утверждал, что Россия должна стремиться сформулировать многополярную систему международных отношений, которая реально отражает многогранность современного мира с разнообразием его интересов. Примаков оказал огромное влияние на российскую внешнюю политику и политику безопасности эпохи Путина. Его политическая линия была осуществлена его преемниками, и прежде всего Игорем Ивановым и Сергеем Лавровым. Основные направления и предпосылки его концепции до сих пор повторяются в официальных документах, излагающих российскую доктрину безопасности и обороны, и нет никаких признаков того, что это положение дел изменилось, что, в свою очередь, несет угрозу дестабилизации в Центральной и Восточной Европе.

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