Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa i zarządzanie ryzykiem: europejskie i chińskie odpowiedzi na zakłócenie klimatu

Streszczenie

Większość akademików oraz decydentów akceptuje istnienie nieodwracalnego zjawiska, które dotyka naszą planetę – zakłócenia klimatu. Degradacja środowiska naturalnego spowodowana działalnością człowieka bezsprzecznie nie tylko zagraża naszemu bezpieczeństwu, ale także przetrwaniu poszczególnych jednostek, społeczności, państw, a może nawet międzynarodowego systemu jako całości.

Autorzy tego artykułu odnoszą się do różnic w zarządzaniu ryzykiem związanym z zakłóceniem klimatu w Europie i w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej. Punktem wyjścia jest założenie dotyczące rozbieżności pomiędzy podejściem europejskim i chińskim wynikających z różnic strukturalnych i instytucjonalnych. W szczególności zaś autorzy próbują ocenić te różnice, a więc znaczenie suwerenności i nieingerencji w odniesieniu do metod (ocena bezbronności) i zasad (transparentność i inkluzywność) tejże oceny ryzyka.

Początkowa analiza prowadzi do wstępnych wniosków, które potwierdzają wagę kultury politycznej w odpowiedzi danego kraju na zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa, w rozumieniu tradycyjnym bądź nietradycyjnym. W tym ujęciu strategiczne partnerstwo Unii Europejskiej i Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej wydaje się być jedną z możliwych skutecznych platform przyszłej współpracy.

Słowa kluczowe: Chińska Republika Ludowa, Unia Europejska, klimat, bezpieczeństwo, emisja dwutlenku węgla, zarządzanie ryzykiem

Abstract

Most academics and policy makers agree upon irreversible phenomena affecting planet Earth's climate – we have finally faced a climate disruption. As triggered by humans, environmental degradation ultimately threatens not only the security but even the survival of individuals, communities, states and perhaps even the international system as a whole.

This paper addresses differences with regards to risk assessment of climate disruption in Europe and in China. Its departure point is that the divergence between European and Chinese approaches is based on structural and institutional distinctions. Specifically, it tries to assess those distinctions (importance of sovereignty and non-interference) with regards to methods (assessment of vulnerability) and principles (transparency and inclusiveness) of risk assessment.

Initial analysis leads to a tentative conclusion, which confirms the importance of political culture in national responses to security threats (be it traditional or non-traditional). In this respect EU-China strategic partnership is suggested as one of the possibly effective platforms for future cooperation.

Keywords: China, European Union, environment, security, carbon dioxide emissions, risk management

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Security threats and risk management: European and Chinese responses to the climate disruption[3]

Introduction – methodological caveats

Before we can start the analysis a number of methodological points should be raised Firstly, the departure point of what follows in this paper is based on human security paradigm, which itself is often positioned within a larger framework of social constructivism. Our reasoning is therefore structured within the context of this theoretical approach and derives from the assumption that security is a construct that has different meanings for particular referent objects depending on both historical and social contexts.

Secondly, structuring the analysis as a comparative study of European and Chinese responses to non-traditional security risks brought about by climate disruption, allows us to tentatively account for differences in their approaches and consequently offer an original look at the human security level (whereby individual is held as s referent object.

Thirdly and consequently, it is our assumption that the existence of structural/institutional differences between Europe and China such as the respective importance of sovereignty, non-interference, nation-states' and governments' roles vs. NGOs, the level of development and urbanisation, the democratic factor, etc. are of fundamental importance.

Fourthly, climate disruption and its negative consequences for living conditions on Earth have been the subject of research since at least the 1960s (Guha 2000).

[3] A draft version of this paper was originally presented at the annual conference of the European Union Academic Programme in Hong Kong. The conference titled "Security Communities and Security Risk Management in Europe and East Asia" took place on 28/29 November 2013 at the University of Hong Kong.

For the purpose of this paper we will use the term "climate disruption" rather than "climate change". The latter conveys natural – not human causality. The earlier suggests undeniable and irreversible change of the natural environment in the negative manner that affects lives of all individuals on our planet.[4] Moreover, it indicates human activity rather than "natural" tendencies simply observed in the environment. The causes of climate disruption are multiple: carbon emission, land use, animal agriculture and deforestation. The effects likewise: warming of the atmosphere and oceans, ozone layer depletion, diminishing of the amount of snow, rise of the level of seas, increase of the concentration of greenhouse gasses, disruption of the global water cycles, acidification of seas and negative impact on bio-diversity.

Finally, this paper is centred on the hypothesis that one of the predominant factors behind Euro – Chinese divergence is political culture that influences respective narratives concerning climate disruption as a non-traditional security threat.

The first part of the paper sets the ground for further discussion by sketching the perimeters, within which contemporary debate regarding natural environment takes place. The second part conceptualises environment disruption as a national security threat. The third and fourth parts of the paper discuss European and Chinese responses to carbon dioxide emissions, understood as the major problem underpinning environmental security. The remaining parts of the paper focus on the cooperation between the EU and China – its limitations and advantages. The conclusion leads us to accept the importance of cultural divergence and its influence on environmental security narratives. At the same time strategic partnership is suggested as the most suitable institutional platform to address the challenges emanating from global environment.

The state of the natural environment at the beginning of the 21st century (global perspective)

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change the current warming trend is of particular significance because most of it is very likely human-induced and

[4] Global warming is yet another term that features prominently in social discourse referring to natural environment for years now. As such it crucially lacks objectivity, it picks on only one tendency that has been observed in natural environment in the last couple of years. Curiously enough, for many "global warming" might actually sound positive as it suggests milder living conditions. As John P. Holdren (2010) asserts "global warming is dangerous misnomer as it implies something that is: uniform across the planet, mainly about temperature, gradual, quite possibly benign whereas what is actually happening is highly nonuniform, not just about the temperature, rapid compared to capacities for adjustment and harmful for most places and times, hence the term disruption". See more: Holdren 2010.

proceeding at a rate that is unprecedented in the past 1300 years (Solomon et al. 2007). In a more general manner, NASA reports the evidence that supports the thesis of a rapid climate change on its website: a) During the last century the global sea level rose approximately 17 cm. This rate of increase is nearly double of that of the last century (Nasa: WWW). b) The three major surface temperature reconstructions show that Earth has warmed since 1880. The majority of the warming occurred since 1970s, 20 warmest years occurred since 1981 and all 10 warmest years in the last 12 years. c) The increased heat was absorbed by the oceans, which caused the rise of the temperature of the top 700 m layer by 0.17°C in the last 45 years. d) The ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctic have decreased in mass. The total Greenland's ice loss was between 150 and 250 km^3 per year between 2002 and 2006, while Antarctica lost about 152 km^3 of ice between 2002 and 2005. e) Both the extent and thickness of the Arctic sea ice has declined rapidly over the last several decades. f) Almost all glaciers around the world are retreating including the ones in the Alps, Himalayas, Andes and Rockies. g) The number of meteorological extreme events increased such as record high and low temperatures as well as intense rainfall events. h) The acidity of surface ocean waters has increased by 30 percent in last 150 years as carbon dioxide is constantly absorbed by the upper layer of the oceans at the rate of 2 billion tons of CO_2 per year) The spring cover in the Northern Hemisphere has decreased over the last five decades and the snow is melting earlier.

Apart from the evidence described above which support the existence of climate disruption, NASA discuss its causes which in great part belong to human activity. It was estimated by 1300 independent scientific experts from around the world that there is more than 90% probability that the cause of warming the planet are human activities over the past 250 years. One of the result of these activities is continued emission of greenhouse gases such as CO_2 which levels have raised from 280 parts per million to 379 parts per million in the last 150 years (Stocker et al. 2013: p.19).

Environmental security: non-traditional risks for national security

Back in 1994 Robert Kaplan published his seminal paper in "The Atlantic", in which he postulated integrating environment into mainstream security discourse (Kaplan 1994). In his own words: "It is time to understand The Environment for what it is: the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water

depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh – developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts – will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War."

In an objective spirit one has to admit that scholars are divided over the idea of environmental issues actually causing conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1984: p. 5; Gleditsch 1998: p. 381; Urdal 2005: p. 417). Especially if one thinks of security in traditional terms – as interstate relationships – then, with certain exceptions, it is rather hard to find evidence supporting such claims (Allan 2012). Yet, especially among proponents of human security, who like to put an individual at the very centre of their security analysis, the point of talking about state security without referencing individuals living in it is challenged. The same in fact applies to international system. The argument, which seems more and more compelling, given the evidence from recent history, is that even the international order cannot be understood solely on the principles of sovereignty of states (Paris 2001: p. 87). As the United Nations 1994 Human Development Report argued "The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust… Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives" (United Nations Development Programme 1994). On top of that, human security importantly draws our attention to non-military threats as endangering foundations of human existence and by extension security of states (United Nations Development Programme 1994).[5]

Natural environment is therefore to be understood as a constituent part of security agenda belonging analytically to security studies and by extension to IR rather than, as conceived before, to applied sciences. This approach has in turn informed experts and policy makers alike in their understanding of links between environment and national security. In 2003 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall published their paper on abrupt climate change and its implications for United States National Security (Schwartz, Randall 2003). In their "scenario" Schwartz and Randall question the ability of many societies to adapt to quick changes in environment. According to us, conflicts

[5] The Human Development Report identifies seven specific elements that are supposed to construct human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.

and possibly wars are plausible as effect of such changes especially when coupled with food shortages, decreased availability of potable water and finally disruption of energy supplies. They conclude that: "… while the US itself will be relatively better off and with more adaptive capacity, it will find itself in a world where Europe will be struggling internally, large number of refugees washing up on its shores and Asia in serious crisis over food and water. Disruption and conflict will be endemic features of life" (Schwartz, Randall 2003).

More recently, Institute of Environment Security cooperating with Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change (GMACCC) and the University of Cambridge's Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL) with the support of the European Climate Foundation (ECF), presented its briefing that summarises security-related findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).[6] The briefing staunchly supports the thesis concerning the influence of the state of natural environment on peace and security worldwide.[7] It focuses on six security-related climate change impacts: rising and extreme temperatures, increase in draught and inland flooding, declining snow and ice cover, sea-level rise, and storm surges and extreme weather. These impacts are unevenly distributed among states, which according to the document depends mainly on the geographic setting. However, political factors tend to be decisive as climate related security threats are greatest in countries with ineffective governments (weak, failing, failed states) and/or with existing conflict.[8]

Underpinning all of the above and therefore a fundamental challenge for societies around the globe is the burning of fossil fuels that creates high levels of carbon dioxide (CO_2) as well as a number of other pollutants that directly affect all elements of the ecosystem and profoundly undermine health of individuals. It is therefore of vital importance (as identified by IPCC) to limit the burning of fossil fuels and with it the emission of harmful products of combustion.[9]

The next part of the paper analyses two cases: the European Union and its carbon dioxide trading scheme, as well as the Chinese approach through the principles of risk management.

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6 See more at: http://www.envirosecurity.org/news/single.php?id=365 (11.05.2015).

7 See more at: http://gmaccc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/AR5_Summary_Defence_Poster.pdf (11.05.2015).

8 As for Failed states, recently the failed state index prepared by the Fund for Peace has been changed to Fragile State Index in order to identify pressures leading to state failure. See more at http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/methodology (11.05.2015).

9 See more at: http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/emission/index.php?idp=16 (11.05.2015).

European and Chinese policies on carbon dioxide emissions

EU: public policy through price-based instruments

European response to climate disruption can be divided into four major areas: carbon emission trading, the promotion of renewable energy, carbon capture and storage, and energy efficiency in buildings (Boasson, Wettestad 2013: p. 1).

The most noticeable in that respect is the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Launched in 2005, it was the first such large emissions trading scheme in the world, to this date it also remains the biggest.[10] It covers around 45% of the EU's greenhouse gas emissions limiting emissions from 11,000 heavy energy-using installations as well as flights to and from the EU and three EEA-EFTA states.[11]

The system works on a "cap and trade" principle. That means that there is a limit set every year on the total amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by factories. As the cap is reduced every time the total emissions should fall down 21% against the 2005 levels by the year 2020. Companies receive or buy emission allowances, which they can trade with one another if needed. Heavy fines are imposed if companies exceed their limits.[12] Importantly, unlike in the first trading period (2005–2007) and second trading period (2008–2012) the third period (starting in 2013) is characterised by Europeanisation. Instead of national allocation plans (first and second trading period) the allocation is determined directly at the EU level, making it a harmonised pan-European scheme with auctions being the major rule. Effectively ETS is much closer to Single European Market than ever before (all within the framework established by Kyoto protocol) (Boasson, Wettestad 2013: p. 55).

However, the EU ETS has not proved effective so far. There are many reasons behind its apparent ineffectiveness. They include over-allocation of credits, windfall profits and price volatility.[13] Financial crisis that started back in 2008 appeared to question the whole grounds of the system. As it turned out, due to economic pressures many

[10] EU ETS operates in the 28 EU countries and three EEA-EFTA states (Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway), http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/ (11.05.2015). In fact the first emission trading scheme was introduced in New South Wales, Australia in 2003, http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.au/Home/Industries/Electricity/Greenhouse_Gas_Reduction_Scheme (11.05.2015)

[11] See more at: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/ (11.05.2015).

[12] See more at: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/monitoring/index_en.htm (11.05.2015).

[13] Proponents argue that "the learning phase" (phase I of the EU ETS 2005–2007) was designed mainly to create the infrastructure for the carbon market, not to achieve significant reductions.

companies started selling out their allocated credits, treating them as assets. As a result of this, prices of credits in the marked dropped down to as little as 4 Euros per tonne (1 tonne = 1 credit) (The EU ETS and the economic downturn 2012) – hardly an incentive to limit greenhouse gasses emissions.[14] Consequently, as admitted by European Commission in a report released by late 2013 (EU Energy, Transport and GHG Emissions Trends to 2050, 2013), decarbonisation of energy sectors will only mean cutting emissions by half the amount needed to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius in 2050 (Capros et al. 2013). It seems that economic and domestic political concerns are still detached from the long-term perspective. Discounting future environmental risks while comparing them with the more imminent costs once again played against the environment during "energy" European Summit in October 2014. As transpires from the documents published after the meeting the share of renewable energy consumed in the EU should be 27% (initially 30%) by the year 2030 (to be reviewed by 2020 and until then non-binding) (European Council 2014).

China: Top-down, bureaucratic approach

According to Asia Development Bank less than 1% of the 500 largest cities in the PRC meet the air quality standards recommended by the World Health Organisation, and 7 of these cities are ranked among the 10 most polluted cities in the world (Zhang, Crooks 2012). Data gathered by WHO shows that in 2010 1.2 million premature deaths occurred due to diseases caused by the poor state of natural environment (Wong 12.01.2013). Needless to say, this situation is getting worse every year.

To address these morbid facts Chinese government has recently embarked on a new strategy to reduce greenhouse gases emissions. The current 5 year Plan (2011–2015) aims to limit air pollution by 25% around Beijing, by 20% around Yangtze River delta and 15% around Pearl River Delta (Saikawa 2014). In fact, China is currently the biggest emitter of CO_2 (not per capita of course).[15] China acquires around 80% of its

[14] Interestingly, on 24 September 2014 the European Parliament's environment committee (ENVI – Environment, Public Health and Food Safety) upheld plans to give out billions of euros worth of carbon allowances to heavy industries for free so as to help boost their competitiveness in international markets. This will be valid for the period 2015-2019. See more at: http://www.greens-efa.eu/emissions-trading-12800.html (11.05.2015).

[15] See more at: http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/graphics/2014-11-18-total-and-per-capita-co2-emissions-from-fuel-combustion-us-and-china.html (11.05.2015).

electric energy through burning coal and it does not look like the situation is going to change in the future. According to World Energy outlook it will actually remain at this level till 2035 (World Energy Outlook: WWW).[16]

Except for one pilot programme introduced in the area of Shenzhen, Chinese approach reveals state-based bureaucratic pattern (Song 2013).[17] Firstly, it is a top-down approach based on central government, which decides about the matter. Secondly, it is a part of a bigger 5 year-development plan[18]. Thirdly, it reflects the sour reality, epitomised by the saying: *Tian gao, Huangdi yuan* – "Heaven high, emperor far". This means that in reality many state owned companies either block or ignore central government laws.[19] Another kind of this typical bureaucratic response, as Xinhua news agency recently reported, is that judicial clarification is leading in the direction of applying death penalty to biggest polluters (Coonan 21.06.2013). Be it as it may as Michael Faure and Hao Zhang demonstrate environmental application of criminal law is notoriously opaque because there is no single code. That results in a variety of norms originating from diverse laws, which lack precision and clarity (Faure, Zhang 2012: p. 104; see also: Wang 2012: p. 28–31).

Comparative perspective on risk management in Europe and China

The following part of the paper will employ two notions that will be helpful in the analysis: risk assessment and risk management. According to the United States Environment Protection Agency Ecological Risk Assessment (ERA)[20] is the process for evaluating how likely it is that the environment may be impacted as a result of exposure to one or more environmental stressors such as chemicals, land change, disease, invasive species and climate change.[21]

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16 On the other hand according to Greenpeace Chinese coal consumption is actually decreasing for the first time in decades. See more: The End 2014.

17 The other major element used in Europe – environmentally related taxation is *in statu nascendi* in case of China. See more: Bachus, Cao 2011: p. 35-54; Xu 2011: p. 28–66.

18 In fact China's 12th Five Year Plan also calls on industries to "gradually develop a carbon trading market". See more at: http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/agencyannouncements/chinese-power-companies-adapt-quickly-to-challenges-of-emissions-trading.html (11.05.2015).

19 See more at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/world/asia/as-chinas-environmental-woes-worsen-infighting-emerges-as-biggest-obstacle.html (11.05.2015).

20 The term environmental risk is commonly used in Europe in the way that ecological risk is used in United States (Suter 2007).

21 See more at: http://www.epa.gov/riskassessment/ecological-risk.htm (11.05.2015).

According to International Organisation for Standardisation (of which China as well as all EU member states are members) norm ISO 31000:2009, the principles of risk management should encompass value creation – resources expended to mitigate risk should be less than the consequence of inaction. Apart from that, risk management should: be an integral part of organisational processes, be part of decision making process, explicitly address uncertainty and assumptions, be systematic and structured, be based on the best available information, be tailorable, take human factors into account, be transparent and inclusive, be dynamic, iterative and responsive to change, be capable of continual improvement and enhancement and finally be continually or periodically re-assessed.[22]

As mentioned in the introduction, the departure point of the paper is based on the notion that the differences between European and Chinese approaches to environmental security in general and CO_2 emissions in particular are mainly based on structural/institutional distinctions between Europe and China, e.g. the respective importance of sovereignty, non-interference, nation-states' and government role (vs. NGOs), the level of development and urbanisation, the democratic factor, etc. Obviously the limited character of this paper does not allow thorough investigation of the influence these variables have on European and Chinese approach to risk assessment regarding climate disruption. Let us then focus on one method and one principle that constitute risk management basics and see how they operate in each political context. It is our arbitrary choice to select:

a. assessment of the vulnerability of critical assets to specific threats as a method of risk management, and
b. transparency and inclusiveness as principles of risk management.

The remaining part of the paper will demonstrate that both are fundamentally different in Europe and China. Furthermore, it is claimed that reasons behind such divergence are mainly influenced by political culture.

The EU ETS ("cap and trade") system is part of public policy of European Union. As a comparatively open governance system EU makes all sorts of information publically available. In fact, transparency in decision-making is enshrined in the European Law. As Alberto Alemano observes: "Openness is a principle that has progressively been integrated in European law, first embryonically through the work of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in relation to the right of access to documents

[22] See more at: http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso31000.htm (11.05.2015), see also: Purdy 2010.

and, after the 1990s, through Treaty amendments and secondary legislation. Currently enshrined in Article 1 TEU ('decisions are taken as openly as possible to the citizen') and Article 15 TFEU ('EU's institutions shall conduct their work as openly as possible'), this principle expresses the precepts of good governance and, as such, is instrumental to the enjoyment of the newly Treaty-sanctioned right to participate in the democratic life of the Union."

Europeans, it seems, are more or less convinced of the significance of climate change and potential impact of climate disruption on national economies as well as human lives. Therefore, at least in declaratory sphere, the EU ETS is a cornerstone of the European Union's policy to combat climate change. The significance of the latter is clearly emphasised by the placement of the climate agenda among top priorities addressed by the "Europe 2020" strategy.[23]

Climate change is also one of the major concerns for the EU citizens. According to the 2011 special Eurobarometer survey on "Climate change" more than two-thirds of Europeans saw climate change as a very serious problem. Moreover, the study showed that, at least back in 2011, climate change remained a bigger worry for EU citizens than financial crisis (Special Eurobarometer: WWW; see also: Spence et al. 2011).

The EU citizens are also consulted on national level through public opinion polls which have direct influence over public policies. Latest example is the Angela Merkel's government decision to close down all nuclear reactors by 2022, which was a reaction to public concerns fuelled by the Fukushima incident (BBC: WWW).

On the other hand Chinese approach to CO_2 emission is much less open. Firstly, as mentioned before, Chinese society at large does not see climate disruption as national security threat. If at all, climate disruption is seen largely as potentially impairing economic development and therefore slowing down the countries' "peaceful rise".

Health of individuals (human security level of analysis) is rarely seen on the agenda of Chinese policy-makers. Admittedly, in recent years various Chinese institutions refer to the potential threats that climate disruption may bestow on the country, i.e. agriculture and livestock industry, forest and other natural ecosystems, water resources or the coastal zone (e.g. China's National 2007: p. 16–19). Usually, however, there is no direct reference to potential impact on the lives and health of communities or indi-

[23] Climate change and Energy sustainability are regarded as one of five targets for the EU in 2020. More specifically the strategy stipulates: reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 20% (or even 30%, if the conditions are right) lower than 1990 levels, acquisition of 20% of energy from renewables as well as 20% increase in energy efficiency. See more: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/ (11.05.2015).

viduals. Regrettably, provincial governments still favour economic performance over health considerations. It seems that there is a genuine lack of realisation of the problem, especially on the level of provincial governments. Humans after all are critical asset, which the People's Republic of China (PRC) has largely based its national economic strategy upon.

On the principle side, there is a fundamental problem with the freedom of information in PRC. Chinese central government has been rather reluctant to share any data on the true state of environment. The same applies to provincial governments. This has been mainly caused by perception problems and political factors. Usually when Chinese media report on climate disruption they refer to it as something distant perhaps even foreign. As such it should not bother Chinese scientists or public. Even if public discourse is held on the topic it is often framed so as to emphasise the costs that the Chinese economy would have to bear and the consequent advantages for western competitors, who are sometimes even suggested to stand behind the challenge (Jia 2006; after Schröder 2012). Here again, provincial governments as well as Beijing stick to secrecy when it comes to revealing real data on the state of natural environment in China. According to the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (Beijing) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (Washington) in January 2013, China's air quality information disclosure made historical progress. 80 cities began to disclose real time air quality information. At the same time however, the annual rate of increase in release of the air pollution related information has declined (PITI Evaluation Results: WWW). Beijing is one of the most notorious cities in China in terms of air pollution. Municipal authorities only recently started releasing official information concerning air pollution in the city. In most cases however such data are not accurate, which is why the citizens of Beijing turn to the Twitter feed of the United States embassy for live information regarding the level of some pollutants. This has already caused diplomatic tensions between Beijing and Washington, when back in 2009 Chinese Foreign Ministry official, Wang Shu'ai, told American diplomats to halt the Twitter feed, saying that the data "is not only confusing but also insulting" (Wong 12.01.2013).

One obvious and imminent reason behind such approach is that curbing fast economic development in China might question the source of legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party – its claim regarding the improvement of the standard of life of the masses. On a more fundamental level it is probably also the question of Chinese history. Here again *Tian gao, Huangdi yuan* testifies to particular institutional context that underlines Chinese governing practices. On top of that, as in many Asian societies

whistle-blowers are seen as trouble-makers rather than concerned citizens fighting for the common cause. In that respect international media are full of tragic examples of individuals who were punished by local authorities for trying to bring their problems to the attention of provincial governments.[24]

As Minxin Pei argues that today's "dynasty" is in a period of bureaucratic ossification. He points to the emergence of a "decentralised predatory state", in which officials feather their nests at the expense of the state, the economy and the people. Tension is growing, he suggests, between the state and the society. China's gradualism, also aims to generate rents for those with political power and those whose support the powerful need. This is a vision of the state, not as benign maximiser of the public welfare, as traditional Chinese and contemporary communist ideology would suggest, but rather as a vehicle for competitive rent-seeking" (Pei 2006: p.132)[25]

Europe – China: political culture divergence. Challenges and opportunities for strategic partnership.

On the surface it appears that in case of risk management of climate disruption in Europe and in China structural/institutional variables play an important role. The EU, with its *sui generis* intergovernmental/supranational mode of governance, appears to be better equipped to tackle global challenges to human security. All four phases: initiation, agenda setting, decision-making and implementation are based on convergence of interests of multiplicity of actors (the EU institutions, the EU member states, industrial groups). As a multi-stake platform of constant negotiations EU has proved over the years a more or less functional model of cooperation based on established normative base that is underlined by the culture of deep consensus. In that respect McCormick argues that one of the five distinguishing futures of European political culture is the reduction of independence of national interests in favour of broader European interests (McCormick 2010: p. 99). On top of that,

[24] See more: Jailed China 2010.

[25] One has to note the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign that has been initiated by President Xi Jinping. Going after "tigers" and "flies" has already produced a number of shocking cases. One would hope that anti-corruption crusade should help to at least partially improve the situation also with regards to natural environment but that remains to be seen. For the time being, economic growth seems to be still on top of the agenda of CCP, perused within the new framework of "the Chinese Dream". See more at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/chinesedream/ (11.05.2015) For an overall short introduction to the topic see: Wang 2013.

as Skjærseth and Wettestad ascertain, international institutional context has been decisive in all the phases, since the Kyoto Protocol is at the roots of the EU ETS (Skjærseth, Wettestad 2008: p. 190).

Over sixty years of European integration have taught Europeans how to effectively share their sovereignties in areas of non-immediate political relevance. Asia on the other hand offers a different picture in that regard. Sovereignty is still a considerably new value that had to be acquired, often in a violent manner, and therefore appreciated by most of its political elites and, in some cases, large parts of the societies. China in this regards offers a vivid contrast to the European experience given its most recent history. Arguably one should bear in mind this specific context when reading the "Chinese Dream", as introduced by the PRC president Xi Jinping, and aimed at a "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."[26]

On a deeper level, one might actually venture an opinion that the differences between European and Chinese approach to climate disruption are due to political culture characteristics. That is not to say that we should accept Huntington's perspective uncritically. Yet, it seems to us that historical experience of Chinese and their traditional normative basis rooted in the writings of Mencius and Confucius are still important in understanding Chinese self-centrism and subjective defensiveness.[27] Daniel Bell makes an interesting case claiming that Confucianism is still strong among many societies in East Asia. Even Chinese Communist Party has recently embarked on the revitalisation of this ethical and philosophical system as a cornerstone of a new/old normative basis. He suggests that perhaps one day Chinese Communist Party might actually become Chinese Confucian Party (Bell 2008a: p. 6; see also: Whitehead 2002: p. 6–26). Then again given the patterns of democratisation processes in Asia in general and their effects as well as long tradition of autocratic governance in China one might rather easily side with those authors that, based on cultural approach, see Confucianism as naturally promoting a government of paternalistic meritocracy (Chull 2012).

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[26] 11 November 2014 saw the opening of the two-day Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit which was held in Beijing. Ahead of the summit Xi Jinping was heard talking about the "Asia-Pacific dream" arguing for free trade and investment in the region. See more at: *China media* 2014. On the side-lines it should be noted that to provide clear skies for the summit Beijing decided to introduce temporary measures to improve air quality such as factory intermissions as well as reduction of the number of road vehicles. Similarly as in the case of 2008 Olympics such steps were criticised as potentially counterproductive in the long term. See more at: Jing 2014.

[27] For an interesting discussion of various aspects of Confucianism and state, gender and war see: Bell 2008b.

International security and the challenges of EU – China cooperation

The diverging trends in European and Asian management of security risks translate into wider context of the EU – China cooperation in strategic affairs and conflict resolution. It seems that they lead to unresolved tensions between Europeans and Asians in general and Chinese in particular as the conference in Copenhagen back in 2009 clearly showed (Dimitrov 2010: p. 795). It was preceded by the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, which distinguishes between industrialised nations, obliged to reduce their CO_2 emissions, and developing countries (including China), which have been allowed to continue releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere without restrictions. The underpinning principle is the one of "Common but differentiated responsibility".[28]

However, the climate summit in Copenhagen was a political failure. As the leaked US diplomatic cables showed, both the US and China, the world's two top polluters, joined forces to undermine the efforts of the European nations to reach a meaningful agreement (Traufetter 2010). In November 2013, during the climate talks held in Warsaw (11–22 November 2013)[29], Chinese diplomacy continued to stress the importance of the Copenhagen declarations as conditioning further progress in CO_2 emissions cuts worldwide. The bottom line of the tension was that China demanded that the pledge of 30 billion USD designed to help the poor countries to cope with climate change should be fulfilled first (Reklev 2013). On top of that China makes it clear that it wants to see if the rich countries can increase such fund up to 100 billion USD by the year 2020 as promised. Consequently "Common but differentiated responsibility" becomes a source of tension as the EU countries try to emerge from the financial turmoil. On the other hand, as Miriam Schröder asserts, the US made its participation in any post-Kyoto agreement on CO_2 reduction conditional on inclusion of large emitters such as China and India (Schröder 2012: p. 17).[30]

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[28] Although the US signed the protocol, it never ratified it. As a consequence the Chinese and the Americans could continue polluting without restrictions. At the same time amid economic hardships European nations will have to cut their energy consumption (signed and ratified Kyoto protocol). They, therefore, fought for a new agreement in Copenhagen, one that would tie the United States, China and newly-industrialized nations India and Brazil to specific emission-reduction targets.

[29] See more at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/meeting/7649.php (11.05.2015).

[30] Interestingly enough, during the APEC summit in Beijing (5-11 November 2014) agreed on jointly reducing carbon emissions in the coming decades – both countries are responsible in fact for more than 40% of global emissions. See more at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/11/12/us-and-china-just-announced-important-new-actions-reduce-carbon-pollution (11.05.2015). Shortly afterwards media speculated that it is to be interpreted as setting grounds for the G20

It appears therefore that environmental security has become a site of contestation between Europe and China largely driven by divergence of economic interests as well as political cultures that underline respective governance systems.

As for the dynamics, institutions, and principles that underpin sustainable security arrangements it is our accretion that possibly the only viable avenue to tackle climate disruption as a common security threat would be the EU-China Strategic Partnership. As a high level formal cooperation strategic partnership offers a number of benefits. On the other hand it is also ridden with numerous limitations.

One of the major constraints of EU – China strategic partnership is probably the divergence based on the status of the two economies – what is also referred to as "asymmetrical bilateralism". To put it simply, the fact that China is a unitary state while the EU is a sort of confederation of states means that China could "divide and rule" between the EU and its member states, or between different member states (Romano, 2010 after Lee 2012:p. 28).

There is a stark need to address this by engaging political and business leaders from both sides in reshaping the debate on the future of this strategic partnership (Romano, 2010 after Lee 2012:p. 28). Failure of such efforts is likely to benefit special interest groups (mainly housing and transport) at the expense of societies at large. After all, China and the European Union together account for around 35% of global energy consumption and 28% of energy-related CO_2 emissions (Romano, 2010 after Lee 2012:p. 28). In fact, the 16th EU – China Summit (Bejing, 21 November 2013) stressed the EU and China are developing city pairings and other mechanisms to foster joint projects from low-energy buildings to clean mobility, integrated water and waste treatments to social inclusion and efficient public services.[31]

Let us not be fooled, however, by the diplomatic language of political declarations. As Jonathan Holslag rightly observes: "The Sino – European relationship is by no means an endurable strategic axis. China more assertively defends the idea that it has the right to adhere to its own principles in conceiving its future policies. In the quest for new political friends and commercial partners, the fear to lose out from other strong developing countries that apply similar interpretations of sovereignism means that Chi-

summit in Brisbane (November 2014) and United Nations Climate Conference that will take place in Paris in 2015. The G20 Summit (15-16 November 2014) however cooled down the enthusiasts with Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot stressed that the global economy aims at a growth of 2.1% through additional funds. See more at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-30072674 (11.05.2015).

31 See more at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1099_en.htm (11.05.2015).

na will be even less able to make concessions towards Europe" (Holslag 2011: p. 310). In other words, the room for the EU – Chinese cooperation in a number of strategic areas is in fact quite limited. What is worse, as ascertained above, there is a tendency in China, due its political culture and economic realities, to treat areas such as climate security as economic competition proxy rather than as independent *milieu*.[32]

Conclusion: human security paradigm and the future of strategic partnership

There is a rather lengthy list of divergent attitudes and policies between EU and China in the realm of international security. Firstly and most importantly, there is still the question of the clashing visions of global governance: that includes mainly the role of the UN and non-proliferation regime. Secondly, there is the problem of energy security, namely Chinese investments in energy-rich states regardless of human-rights violations and Chinese practices that often run against the market logics. Thirdly, in East Asia Brussels is still concerned with China's role regarding North Korea, Burma and Japan. Cross-strait relations remain a low-intense conflict. Fourthly, China's defence policy and the lack of transparency concerning China's Peoples Liberation Army's (PLA) modernisation and growth. Finally, there remains the question of arms embargo that should be seen in a triangle context of EU-US relationships (Zaborowski 2008).

To sum up, the EU is becoming less relevant to China as a strategic player and, consequently, quite possibly less important as a norm entrepreneur concerning climate disruption. Arguably, the only viable solution for the EU to address the challenges that it faces regarding the growing relevance of China in economic, political and security aspects is to foster the integration in political and defence field (Iglesias 2013).

Since climate disruption is a global challenge, institutionally only strategic partnership seems to offer a potentially useful platform to address the future challenges in this regard[33]. However, it needs a revitalisation on the basis of common human values that underpin both Confucian as well as European normative bases. Arguably, one of the major obstacles on that path may prove to be the negative public perceptions that Chi-

[32] Importantly first decade of the 21st century has seen a decline of EU importance in Chinese Politics. See: Holslag 2011: p. 310.

[33] As a matter of fact bilateral cooperation between China and the EU on the environment dates back to 1994. In 2005, a formal bilateral Partnership on Climate Change was launched at the EU-China Summit (Lee 2012).

nese hold against Europeans and *vice versa*.[34] It is argued that human security paradigm offers unprecedented opportunities for both Europe and China to come to terms with structurally/institutionally based divergences. It could allow both partners strengthen its communication efforts, public diplomacy strategy and visibility.

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[34] The other pillar being of course trade. See more: Noguera, 2013.

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