

INTRODUCTION TO THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY AND SECURITY STRATEGY

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ABSTRACT

Ensuring freedom from threats to security subjects requires the elaboration of a security strategy. The relationship between security strategy and development strategy is the same as that between security and development themselves – one determines the other. For this reason, the purpose of this article is to discuss the essence of security and its basic conceptual categories, as well as the implementation of its provision through strategic efforts. At the beginning, the essence of the phenomenon of security is presented and the most important definitions are quoted. Similarly, the author discusses the concept of strategy and shows the evolution of its understanding. This allows to discuss the typology of security strategies and to mention the most important figures that became part of history thanks to their achievements in the theory of strategy, including Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Alexander the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte. A few of the most important principles formulated by these figures are recalled, which may be important hints for contemporary strategists as well. Finally, the author gives the most important definitions of ideas related to security: the security environment, the interests of the security subject, opportunities, challenges, risks, threats, rules and methods. Their essence is emphasized in the light of the considerations presented

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above. The author concludes that the strategic categories are superior to the respective political categories and distinguishes three types of contemporary strategic actions. He also recognizes that the biggest challenge in terms of security is the prevention of threats, e.g. by means of stabilization activities whose essence is to maintain and promote the stability of the security environment.

KEY WORDS

security, security strategy, development strategy, theory of strategy

INTRODUCTION

In order to meet the need for the scientific analysis of the concept of *security* in an effective and orderly manner, as well as the need for ensuring freedom from threats, it is important to be familiar with the fundamental definitions relating to the internal and external activity of *security subjects*.

The essence of security lies in guaranteeing an existence which is marked by controlling threats and the freedom to pursue the interests of a particular entity within the context of various opportunities, challenges, risks and threats. To achieve the state of security, a security strategy is necessary, which is developed by humans by first defining their interests and properly assessing their security conditions, then formulating a strategy concept which matches the time and place, and finally establishing a security system which matches the time, place and conditions.

To better understand the development of this dimension of *social reality*, it is helpful to analyse the evolution of *security*. It should be noted that *security* and *development* are the two fundamental dimensions of the existence of individuals and entire human communities, including communities organised into states or international organisations.

These two dimensions are interdependent. Without *security*, effective *development* cannot take place. *Development* itself enables us to increase our security further. The basis for initiating the above-mentioned processes of mutual reinforcement is security.

Such relations also determine the mutual relationships between security strategies and development strategies. Analysing them is conducive to properly incorporating them into current efforts to create development strategies. The aim of this article is to analyse the essence of security and its fundamental conceptual categories, as well as how it is ensured with the help of strategic efforts.

THE ESSENCE OF THE SECURITY PHENOMENON

Security can be described in a myriad of ways, and numerous definitions of the phenomenon have been created¹. *Security* is most frequently defined as a **state** associated with the *security* attained at a certain point in time and space by a particular *security subject*, and as a **process** of development which guarantees a certain level of security to that *subject*. The latter approach is broader and reflects the dynamic nature of security.

The *security* of a given individual or group *subject* is related to its activities which enable it to ensure its continued existence, overcome hazards and freely pursue its own development, including its own interests in an environment which is not completely secure, by seizing opportunities, overcoming challenges, mitigating risks and preventing and combating various threats to the security of the *subject* and its interests. A *security subject* is any individual or group of individuals having their own interests and expressing the ambition of pursuing those interests. *Security subjects* can thus be individual humans, families, various other social groups and circles, nations, international communities and humanity as a whole. In relation to the above, it is possible to divide security into: individual (personal), group (family and local community), national (state)² and international (regional, global).

This article relates exclusively to two categories of security – national and international. Security manifests in all areas of activity of the *subject*. Hence, its structure is in essence identical to structure into which the functioning of the *subject* is arranged. In relation to *international* and *national security*, its sectors or areas include economic, socio-cultural, military, public, common, environmental, legal, resource and information security. Internal and external security can also be listed, depending on the location

¹ For a review of existing definitions, see e.g. J. Stańczyk, *Współczesne pojmowanie bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 1996; J. Czuputowicz, *System czy nieład? Bezpieczeństwo europejskie u progu XXI wieku*, Warszawa 1998; Akademia Obrony Narodowej, *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, 2nd ed., Warszawa 2002.

² *National security* and *state security* are two different conceptual categories which, from the practical perspective and at the current stage of historical development (the age of *nation states* and *nations* of citizens), can be conventionally treated as synonyms; this approach is utilised by the Polish legal system – the Constitution uses the terms *the security of the state* (Poland) and *national security* (e.g. as part of the term *National Security Council*) interchangeably; from the point of view of Polish legislature, both of the above categories can be treated as equivalent.

and direction (from the outside or the inside) from which opportunities, challenges, risks and threats emerge³.

The most universal of methods used to influence security are implemented via *strategies*, that is implementing the tenets of particular strategies. *Strategies* can be considered to constitute a praxeological category as they are related to the efficient functioning of every subject of action and refer to the most universal methods of human action.

The term *strategy* comes from the Old Greek words *stratós* (army) and *ágein* (to command). Originally, the word was exclusively associated with warfare. The term *stratégós* referred to leading and commanding an army and devising ways of fighting. Leaders were not only responsible for troop movements, but also diplomacy, supplying their army and proper reconnaissance. It can thus be stated that strategy has long been understood to include responsibility and planning the entirety of all operations.

An army's movements have always been aimed at achieving a goal – winning a battle or war. This is similar to the current use of the word – as an example, a company pursuing a detailed strategy expects particular benefits as a result of its actions, enabling it to achieve economic security.

Security strategy is one of the numerous dimensions of strategy, one which relates to ensuring the security of a given subject. *Security strategy* combines theory and practice motivated by security issues relevant to a given *subject* and managed by a primary, individual or collective, decision-maker, predominantly concerned with prioritising security issues and selecting the methods of solving them.

In the early 20th century, the term *strategy* was expanded to include the *war strategy* category, which constitutes a set of methods of utilising the entire military and non-military potential of a given (international) security subject, such as a *nation-state* or a regional coalition, for the purpose of waging war.

In the second half of the 20th century, a new term was introduced – *defence strategy* or *defensive strategy*, which expanded the existing understanding of the meaning of the *strategy* category to also include an algorithm governing the use of all resources of the state as the dominant

³ S. Koziej, *Wstęp do teorii i historii bezpieczeństwa (skrypt internetowy)*, Warszawa/Ur-synów 2010, koziej.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Teoria_i_historia_bezpieczenstwa.doc (dostęp: 17.09.2018).

security subject, including preventing, controlling and resolving conflicts and crises of political and military nature.

On the turn of the century, the term *strategy* was expanded once again. The term *security strategy* was coined, which includes the terms *national security strategy* and *international security strategy*. The above category relates to determining the methods of using all resources available to an internationally-significant *security subject*, such as a *nation-state*, coalition, alliance or even an international community, for the purpose of preventing conflicts and crises and resolving disputes, both military and non-military in nature.

Several types of strategies can be distinguished. From the point of view of strategy subjects, strategies can be divided into personal, group (familial, corporate), national (referring to states) and international (regional, global). From the perspective of particular fields, they can be divided into political, financial and political, socio-cultural, security and defensive, resource-related, environmental, industrial and economic, legal, marketing and commercial. As already mentioned, in this article, I limit the discussion to issues related to national security, including from the perspective of the international environment and, as a result, international security. The basic tools of security strategy include diplomacy (public and back-channel, state and private), the information potential amassed by the subject (public and non-public, overt and covert), military forces, economic potential (state- and non-state-owned).

As an example, American literature frequently uses the acronym **DIME** (DIPLOMACY – INFORMATION – MILITARY – ECONOMICS).

Based on the criterion applied, the following typology of security strategies can be compiled:

1. Security strategy concept developed according to the prevention and response criterion.
2. Security strategy concept developed according to the role criterion:
 - declarative,
 - real (practical),
 - ideal (theoretical).
3. Security strategy concept developed according to the confrontation procedure criterion
 - consecutive (sequential) actions,
 - concurrent actions.
4. Security strategy concept developed according to the criterion of algorithms used to achieve victory over the enemy with the aim of:

- defeating the enemy by way of achieving victory in direct combat,
 - attempting to exhaust the enemy without the use of force and by way of indirect, long-term actions,
 - destroying enemy forces and resources by achieving total victory, consisting in completely and irreversibly obliterating the enemy's potential.
5. Security strategy concept developed according to the criterion of activity areas and strategic tools:
- political,
 - economic,
 - information,
 - military,
 - diplomatic,
 - trade,
 - other.
6. Security strategy concept developed according to the range criterion:
- total, globally-distributed,
 - limited to a particular theatre of conflict or war.
7. Security strategy concept developed according to the content criterion:
- operating,
 - preparatory and transformational.

To develop strategies has always been the task of prominent theorists and practitioners of strategy. The following strategists have now become widely recognised as classics of strategy theory:

1. Sun Tzu (544 BCE – 496 BCE) – one of the most important thinkers of ancient China, author of the *Art of War*, the oldest surviving textbook on warfare; he is considered to be the precursor to realist security theory, and his treatise is now considered a foundational text on praxeology and broad interpretation of numerous other strategy-dependent areas of human activity, such as corporate management. Sun Tzu was a supporter and promoter of non-force measures, as well as psychological and information warfare; his treatise was translated into French by French Jesuit priest Jean Joseph Marie Amiot and published in 1772, and parts of it were translated into English by British officer Everard Ferguson Calthrop and published in 1905 under the title *The Book of War*. The first complete English translation with commentary was published by Lionel Giles in 1910; military and political leaders such as Chinese revolutionary Mao Zedong, Japanese Prince Takeda Shingen and American General Norman Schwarzkopf

Jr. were all cited to draw inspiration from the book. The US Army lists *The Art of War* as one of the books which should always be stocked by military libraries⁴; information about the life of Sun Tzu can be found in a biographical note contained in Sima Qian's 2nd century BCE book titled *Records of the Grand Historian* – according to Sima Qian, Sun Tzu was a general serving King Helu of Wu, who reigned in the 6th century BCE.

2. Thucydides (c. 460 BCE – between 404 and 393 BCE) – descendant of a rich aristocratic family from Athens. During the Peloponnesian War, he served as a strategist on the island of Tasos from 424 BCE. His *History of the Peloponnesian War* is considered to be his magnum opus. He intended to provide a maximally accurate description of the war for future rulers, enabling them to learn about the causes of the war and how to act in similar situations. The treatise was popular in antiquity, focusing on security and wartime policy; the *History* contains the four basic tenets of realism; firstly, for Thucydides, the *state* is the primary subject of war and politics; secondly, Thucydides assumed the state to be a monolithic *security subject*; thirdly, he assumed that leaders acting on behalf of the state are rational; fourthly, Thucydides, similar to contemporary realists, was interested in matters of security, which is why it was his opinion that the state must be able to defend against internal and external adversaries; the state strengthens security by increasing its internal and economic potential, as well as entering into alliances with other states with which it shares interests. Thucydides also claimed that, before and during the Peloponnesian War, it was fear of the enemy that motivated states to enter into alliances – for state leadership, it was a rational decision to do so. Thucydides identified the dilemma of realist and liberal thinking: does an international ethical order guarantee certain rights of states, as is claimed by idealists? Or is it rather the case that the power of particular states is the decisive factor due to there being no supranational ruling entity? Thucydides was the precursor with regard to analysing warfare – war as interpreted as a special phenomenon which occurs within the sphere of relations between states and being of international character.

3. Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) – joined the military as a twelve-year-old; one of his superiors was prominent Prussian strategist General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who was quick to notice the young officer's tal-

⁴ *Military History and Professional Development US Army*, Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College, Kansas 1985.

ent. Clausewitz fought against Napoleon's forces between 1812 and 1814 (as part of the Russian army, e.g. in the Battle of Borodino) and between 1814 and 1815 (as part of the Prussian army); as a colonel, he led the charge of Prussian cavalry in the Battle of Lutzen, among others; in 1815, he became counsel for the chief of staff of the 3rd Prussian Corps, which was responsible for preventing Napoleon from combining his forces at Waterloo. He was eventually promoted to general, and between 1818 and 1830, he was head of the Berlin War College; he was widely known as a war theorist, writer, praxeologist and war operations "engineer", as well as the creator of modern, universal strategy theory; regarding his approach to the operational aspects of warfare, he was a proponent of using force, direct action and decisive battles between adversaries.

The following leaders are considered to be the most accomplished strategy theorists and practitioners:

1. Alexander the Great of Macedon (356 BCE – 323 BCE) – considered to be the greatest strategist of antiquity, his military conquests are famous to this day; he was a king and an accomplished conqueror, having conquered the Persian Empire, reached the Indian Ocean and taken control over nearly the entire world of antiquity; his strategies masterfully combined force, timing and spatial awareness.

2. Gaius Julius Caesar (100 BCE – 44 BCE) – Roman politician, leader and writer. He was born to the Julius patrician family. From mid-70s BCE, he was an influential member of the Populares political faction. Caesar was a member of the Collegium Pontificum before being elected high priest by a landslide result. In addition, he was Praetor of the Hispania Ulterior province (62 BCE). With the support of urban plebs and the influential Pompey the Great, he marginalised the previously all-powerful Roman senate. In 60 BCE, he became a member of the First Triumvirate, which took over real control of Rome. He achieved numerous military victories north of the Alps, defeating the Helvetii and the Germanic peoples, as well as suppressing a large-scale Gaul uprising led by Vercingetorix. He solidified Rome's rule over its entire territory, which spanned areas from the Rhine to the Pyrenees. Caesar also ventured farther – to Britain and beyond the Rhine to Germanic-owned lands. In 49 BCE, he crossed the Rubicon river and spoke the famous words "the die is cast". This marked the beginning of a civil war which led to the defeat of his former ally Pompey the Great and Caesar's rapid conquest of Italia, forcing his enemies, mostly members of the senate, to flee to the eastern reaches of the empire. In 48

BCE, he was appointed dictator for an indefinite period and, in 44 BCE, he became lifetime dictator of Rome. He became famous for his term as vice-roy of Gaul. Caesar was able to defeat the opposition, which was centred around the senate and Pompey – the Optimates, which led to several years of fighting resulting in him becoming the absolute ruler of Rome. He was a master of complex tactics combining political and military actions.

3. Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) – French military and political leader, also known as Napoleon I, Emperor of the French and the ruler of the First French Empire between 1804 and 1814 and in 1815. He was former First Consul of the Republic of France between 1799 and 1804, as well as President (1802–1805) and eventually King of Italy (1805–1814). Napoleon is considered to be the most brilliant military commander in history; the Napoleonic Wars impacted nearly the whole of Europe – he was the greatest commander and a manoeuvring genius who believed that the most important element of the theory of strategy is its principles.

4. Chandragupta Maurya – he went down in history as the mightiest and most noble of rulers in the five thousand years of India's civilisation, and one of the greatest monarchs in global history. The main principles of his policy were humanitarianism in internal governance and rejection of wars of aggression. Also worth noting is the internal transformation of the emperor himself: from a ruthless politician and warrior who did not hesitate to use force or deception, known as Chandashoka and Ashoka the Destroyer, to a proponent of universal peace and rejecting aggression, earning him the name of Ashoka the Just. His empire spanned nearly the entire Indian subcontinent by approx. 260 BCE.

5. Tokugawa Iyeasu (1543–1616) – statesman who founded the Tokugawa shogun dynasty. He grew up during a period of clan warfare. In 1570, Tokugawa established his seat of power in Imagawa, from where he gradually expanded his territory and sphere of influence in service of General Nobunaga. After Nobunaga's death in 1582, he took over more lands, becoming ruler of five provinces. He allied himself with Nobunaga's successor, General Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and moved his seat of power to the small fishing village of Edo (modern-day Tokyo), further expanding his sphere of influence. Hideyoshi died in 1598; two years later, the conflict between the former faction of Hideyoshi and Tokugawa soon came to a head with the Battle of Sekigahara (1600). Iyeasu emerged victorious and was finally able to take control of the entire country, ushering in a new era in the history of Japan – the Edo or Tokugawa Period. In 1603, Tokugawa Ieyasu

was named shogun by the emperor, a title he conferred upon his son in 1605 while still remaining as the de-facto ruler. Tokugawa changed the law and established new rules of conduct for the knightly clans of Japan, his reforms remaining in force for more than 250 years.

The operating principles of strategy are the most well-known ones, i.e. the historical principles of efficient preparation and conducting combat (negative cooperation) which increase the probability of success (victory) while incurring the lowest possible costs (one's own losses). The main motivation behind applying operating principles of strategy is to gain, maintain and press home advantage over the adversary. Advantage is to be understood broadly and multi-dimensionally in this context, not only quantitatively (materially), but also qualitatively (immaterially).

This understanding of advantage leads to the formulation of what can even be described as the law of combat, according to which, in combat, as in nature, the stronger strategy always wins (that is to say, it is not the numbers or strength of arms that is the decisive factor). This perspective distinguishes between two types of strategies used to defeat enemies. If the scale of threat posed by the enemy is expressed as the result of multiplying the enemy's material potential (physical strength) by his immaterial potential (will to act):

$S = P \times W$, where S – the enemy's strength; P – the enemy's physical potential; W – will to act, then two strategies can be used to achieve victory:

- a) reduce the enemy's potential – physical approach (destruction, paralysation – operating theory developed by Clausewitz);
- b) reducing the enemy's will – psychological approach (information operations – operating theory developed by Sun Tzu).

Sun Tzu offers an effective synthesis of the essence of advantage in the form of a "super-principle", claiming that it is advantage that dictates how one should fight: "It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him"⁵.

Strategy theorists have formulated different lists of strategic principles. The most widely-recognised ones were developed by Sun Tzu and C. Clausewitz. According to Sun Tzu, the basic principles (immaterial force multipliers) which follow from his famous treatise are as follows:

⁵ Sun Tzu, *Sztuka wojny*, Warszawa 1994, p. 38–39.

1. reconnaissance,
2. deception,
3. surprise,
4. manoeuvre,
5. direct action,
6. psychological pressure⁶.

Clausewitz listed nine principles of war, which are now considered classics:

- mass
- objective
- economy of force
- simplicity
- surprise
- unity of command
- security
- offensive
- manoeuvre⁷.

Basic categories of security strategy Proper carrying out of strategies must be subject to a certain logic of action, which shapes the classic strategic cycle. The cycle comprises four basic phases: defining the interests of a given subject and determining its strategic goals; assessing the strategic security environment (conditions); formulating a strategic concept and determining the resources necessary to implement it, i.e. establish a security system⁸. Taking into account the above-mentioned general approach to security (both international and national), it can be noted that the key conceptual categories in this context are:

- the interests of a national subject (or the mission of an international organisation⁹) and the resulting strategic and operating goals related to security;

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ C. Clausewitz, *O wojnie*, transl. by A. Cichowicz, L. Koc, 2nd ed., Warszawa 1958.

⁸ A similar approach is espoused by e.g.: H.R. Yarger, *Strategic theory for the 21st century: the little book on big strategy*, Carlisle 2006, p. 6: “The strategic process is all about how (concept or way) leadership will use the power (resources or means) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) in accordance with state policy”.

⁹ The equivalent of interest in an international organisation is its mission, which is defined at the organisation's founding.

- the security environment (conditions), i.e. the opportunities, challenges, risks and threats to achieving security-related interests and goals. The threats assume the form of crises and conflicts.
- strategic (long-term) and political (operating, ongoing) concepts (principles and methods) of actions aimed at achieving established goals in a given set of conditions;
- security systems – i.e. resources of the subject designated for the purpose of implementing established concepts and carrying out tasks, and which match the nature of and are prepared for these tasks.

Let us shortly discuss these basic categories.

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE INTERESTS OF THE SECURITY SUBJECT

A **security environment** is all internal and external, military and non-military conditions in which a security subject pursues security-related interests and achieves security-related goals. These conditions are best described using the following basic categories: opportunities, challenges, risks and threats.

The **interests of a particular security subject** (nation, group or individual) constitute a synthesis of the subject's expectations resulting from and shaped by its identity, professed values, history, traditions, current needs, pursuits and future ambitions. Interests can be divided into vital and desirable. The former relate to the subject's existence and survival in the conditions it finds itself in. The latter relate to the quality of this existence. The former reflect binary values, are not gradual and are non-negotiable. The latter are gradual, as well as, in a sense, auxiliary and negotiable¹⁰.

¹⁰ The current Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Poland from 2007 lists three categories of national interests: vital, important and other significant interests. This is an issue of the relationship between strategy and politics. From the praxeological perspective, the strategy of a given subject (state or international organisation) takes priority over its policy. This type of tolerance is in its essence similar to that which occurs in the art of war between strategy and operations. A reverse approach is also popular, i.e. one where politics dominates strategy, and which treats strategy as a military-exclusive field (military strategy). This is frequently a result of limiting oneself to analysing the behaviour of a subject (state) exclusively as actions determined by existing conditions, not as actions resulting primarily (though not exclusively) from the need to pursue the subject's interests (in the case of states – national interests). Being aware of one's interests leads to strategic thinking, and being focused on what is

Interests constitute the point of reference for determining strategic security-related goals. In general terms, security-related strategic goals are nothing other than operationalised interests. Operationalised in this context refers to being defined using the language of necessary action, in line with existing conditions, limited by time and space, taking into account external and internal needs and possibilities. In other words: these goals follow from the division of particular national interests into their base elements, a division conducted within the context of particular and predictable strategic security conditions, as well as needs and possibilities (the state's strategic potential). These are states, phenomena and processes in the security sphere which are desirable from the point of view of these interests. While national and international interests constitute reflections of inherent, and thus timeless (and independent of current conditions) values, aspirations and pursuits of the subject, strategic goals refer to concrete, currently existing conditions. States and other international subjects achieve their strategic security-related goals by pursuing their security policies as the ongoing activity of these subjects and their governing bodies. Thus, political goals (as operational goals) constitute an extension (a more detailed version) of strategic goals. Political goals relate to particular actions which are part of the entire security strategy of the subject.

Opportunities are circumstances, phenomena and processes occurring in the security environment independently of the subject's will, which are conducive to pursuing the subject's interests and achieving goals. They are primarily generated by neutral subjects in the security environment. In general, they are impermanent in nature. In the globalising world, where interdependencies between subjects are growing, opportunities are more frequent to present themselves. The art of seizing opportunities is currently becoming an increasingly important part of security management.

Challenges are problematic security-related situations which generate security dilemmas for subjects (international community, state). These are frequently caused by partners and allies, who have their own expectations and raise the standards which members of alliances or coalitions must meet. Challenges can be accepted or ignored. Overcoming a challenge requires

referred to as objective conditions limits the subject to operational thinking (if the subject is a state – to political thinking).

effort and incurs costs, but may result in future opportunities. Ignoring a challenge most frequently renders it more difficult to benefit from partnerships and may give rise to threats in unfavourable conditions.

Risks are possible negative results of the actions of a given security subject. The more active a subject in the field of security, the higher the risk. Example risks include potentially negative consequences (e.g. increased terrorist activity) of Poland's involvement in international military operations or the dangers related to agreeing to the establishment of an American missile defence base on our territory. Considering that, in modern conditions, it is objectively more important to conduct a wide range of operations than in the pre-globalisation era, the importance of effective risk estimation and reduction, as well as strategic risk mitigation, is increasing.

Threats are direct or indirect destructive occurrences. Threats are the most well-known factor in the security environment. Threats can be divided into external and internal, potential and real, subjective and objective, military and non-military, crisis and war, intentional and random. Intentional threats can be understood to comprise four elements: the actor, his intentions, abilities and time to react. Threat level increases with the adversary's hostility and the development of the adversary's abilities, and is inversely proportional to the time available to react¹¹. Real threats manifest as phenomena referred to as crises and conflicts. These two categories are sometimes incorrectly conflated. A crisis is a special internal state of the subject.

A conflict is a confrontational type of relationship between two subjects. Crises, understood to mean internal states which deviate from the normal, undisturbed state, can be caused by both internal factors, e.g. one's own mismanagement, and external ones, e.g. conflicts with other subjects. Crises can also arise as a consequence of random events.

Rules and methods of achieving strategic goals in particular conditions are applied while taking into account particular opportunities, challenges, risks and threats, and are defined in strategic concepts.

A strategic concept consists of a set of main principles and a theme of action of the security subject and strategic stage- or field-specific strategic

¹¹ See: J.M. Fish, S.J. McCraw, Ch.J. Reddish, *Fighting in the gray zone: a strategy to close the preemption gap*, September 2004, p. 4.

tasks, i.e. political goals for state (organisation) authorities and operational goals for executive forces and means in various period and fields of activity of the subject in question.

In general terms, every strategic concept of national security consists of two elements: an operating strategy concept and a preparatory strategy concept. Operating strategy of national security is a sub-field of state security strategy which encompasses the rules and methods of achieving strategic goals (completing strategic operational tasks) in predicted security conditions and determining the operational requirements of the national security system.

Preparatory strategy of national security (state security) is a sub-field of state security strategy which encompasses the rules and methods of preparing (maintaining and transforming) the national security system to match the requirements resulting from the operating strategy of national security.

CONCLUSIONS

1. To summarise the above securitological discussion, it should be noted that strategic categories have priority over their corresponding political ones.

2. If strategy is construed as dealing with the most general and long-term issues (interests, goals, concepts, etc.), and policy is understood to mean the ongoing governance of the state, then a long-term *security strategy* has priority over the ongoing security policy, and strategic goals are significantly more permanent than political ones, and the strategic concept is much less mutable than the political concept.

3. In modern conditions, the operating strategies of security of every subject consist of three types of strategic actions. These include:

- a) stabilisation efforts (maintaining and promoting security),
- b) crisis response, frequently referred to as crisis management,
- c) active defensive (war) efforts.

4. The greatest security-related challenge is considered to be preventing threats. This is achieved via stabilisation efforts, which consist in maintaining and promoting stability in the *security environment*. These efforts primarily consist of:

- a) monitoring the constituents of security, predicting their development, engaging in neutralisation or elimination efforts of sources of potential threats,

- b) actively promoting stability and reinforcing positive developmental trends in the security environment,
- c) maintaining and perfecting security systems to be sufficient to overcome emerging challenges,
- d) broadly-understood stabilisation efforts, carried out for preventive purposes, can also include deterrence, which is currently defined in a broader fashion than during the Cold War, when it referred to mutually-assured destruction.

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