

## THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE CONCEPT OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE FORCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

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### ABSTRACT

Nowadays, humanity has become dependent on the devices and systems which form part of everyday life. This relation was made clear by the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London. The attacks resulted not only in human casualties and damage to infrastructure, but also made people aware of the close relations between the damage and the effective operation of the rescuers. This gave rise to the need to face the problem of protecting the infrastructure which is important for the security of the state and its citizens. At the same time, the issue of threats to critical infrastructure has started to emerge more and more in the literature devoted to internal security and stopped being associated solely with military concepts. In Poland, the notion of 'critical infrastructure' first started to appear in government documents and literature in 2007 after the introduction of the Crisis Management Act. The legislator specifies in the document the conceptual range of critical infrastructure which is closely related to the functioning of facilities, devices, and installations relevant for the security of the state

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and citizens. The following systems were regarded as critical infrastructures: the energy and fuel, communications and ICT, transport, rescue, financial, food and water supply, and healthcare systems, and also the one related to chemical and radioactive substances. This paper is an attempt at characterising the defence of critical infrastructure in Poland and the possibilities of preventing threats to important state security systems in the context of the establishment of the Territorial Defence Force.

### KEY WORDS

Territorial Defence Force, critical infrastructure, security, threat, defence

According to the territorial concept, the main assumption is the establishment and functioning of TDF, as a separate type of armed forces. Due to their territorial responsibilities, territorial defence formations do not cooperate closely in the execution of combat tasks with the operating forces, but are tasked with creating favourable operating conditions for them. Establishing territorial defence in Poland is not a new and previously unknown concept. Actions to organise such formations were undertaken on several occasions in the 1980s.

The first attempt at forming territorial forces was made in the second half of the 1930s. These were at the time referred to as the National Defence and harked back to the tradition of Polish mass levy. The first battalions were formed in January 1937, positioned in Silesia, Seacoast and Pomerania. These consisted of reservists and men not called for compulsory military service (conscript over-quota). In April 1937 the armed forces were divided into a standing army, the Border Protection Corps (subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior) and the National Defence<sup>1</sup>. In accordance with the order of the Ministry of the Interior of 12 March 1937, the purpose of ND establishment was to “further enhance the preliminary training of society and the numbers in the army at peacetime,” and also to increase the infantry reserves, secure mobilisation, and streamline it<sup>2</sup>. The soldiers of the National Defence kept their equipment and uniforms at home, while the munitions and arms of individual platoons were stored in the nearest State Police and Border Guard stations, Polish Army regiments,

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<sup>1</sup> A. Łydka, *Obrona terytorialna – reaktywacja*, polska-zbrojna.pl, 9.12.2016, <http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/21162?t=Obrona-terytorialna-reaktywacja#> (access: 10.03.2019).

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem.

and Border Protection Corps watchtowers. A battalion was the basic National Defence unit, and it could mobilise within 2–4 hours. A brigade was created by 4 to 8 battalions and a half-brigade by 2–3 battalions. These first territorial units in the history of Poland survived until the beginning of the September Campaign in 1939.

At present actions are being undertaken to again form territorial defence forces. The Territorial Defence Force is not a new military formation, as after World War 2 there was a similar component referred to as the Public Security Corps. Therefore, the studies presented below will focus on the Territorial Defence Force, and in particular on the impact of the Territorial Defence Force on the security of the Republic of Poland.

Safety needs are among the fundamental needs of a human being. In order for a human being, society and state organisations to develop, those needs must be satisfied. Safety and security act as a basis and foundation for the functioning of present-day democratic states and communities. Ensuring security in one's territory is one of the essential tasks of each democratic state. Due to the importance of security issues and the growing interest in them, it has received proper recognition for example in the field of science. This is proven by security science being regarded as an independent discipline of science. In the past, security was the subject of interest of many sciences, such as legal, military, humanities, economic, biological, chemical, and physical sciences and geoscience. However, given the importance of this topic, security science has become a separate discipline of science in Poland. By way of Resolution of the Central Commission for Academic Degrees and Titles of 28 January 2011 amending the resolution on determining the fields of science and arts and scientific and artistic disciplines<sup>3</sup>, security science and defence science were added to humanities. At the same time, military science was removed from the list. However, as early as August 2011, the Minister of Science and Higher Education had already regulated the area related to all the scientific disciplines by means of a regulation in accordance with which security science was to form part of social sciences<sup>4</sup>.

Security science covers the majority of problems associated with security in the non-military sense. Its purpose is to provide not only theo-

<sup>3</sup> Monitor Polski 2011, No. 14, item 149.

<sup>4</sup> The Regulation of the Minister of Science and Higher Education of 8 August 2011 on areas of knowledge, fields of science and arts and scientific and artistic disciplines (Dz. U. 2011, No. 179, item 1065).

retical knowledge of the phenomena related to the sphere of security, but also knowledge allowing one to understand, explain, evaluate and forecast these phenomena. Utilitarianism is another objective of this science. This means that security science is tasked with the designs of the best solutions which can be practically implemented in a continuous pursuit of the better and better satisfaction of safety needs<sup>5</sup>. The studies designed for the purposes of this doctoral dissertation will take place within this new discipline of science – security science.

A threat, which is a potential basis for an undesirable state of affairs, is an antonym of security. Threats do not form a self-contained category as they always refer to a specific entity for which they are of a dysfunctional nature and may cause harm. Threats are, therefore, an important category which determines security<sup>6</sup>. Thus, it becomes obvious that when studying security and public order, one should address threats directly. Threats are of interest to safety science in respect of their generic identification, determining severity, cause and place, and in particular their effects and impact on public security.

Another crucial determinant of an acceptable level of security being ensured is the effectiveness of the operation of the state institutions established to protect this security.

The general subject of studies in security science, as it is the case in social sciences, are:

- communities and social groups,
- social institutions,
- social processes and phenomena.

Our civilisation and the natural environment constantly pose cyclical threats to be faced and constitute sources of new types of threat. Thus, there are a great many threats causing negative effects of various scales. The complexity of this issue, therefore, makes it necessary to take comprehensive action to ensure security. This is done by, i.a., developing objective methods for identifying threats, determining their scale and probability of occurrence, as well as through risk analysis and management.

Risk is defined as “(...) the possibility for a person to sustain specific losses as a result of adverse events that may arise in the specific man-tech-

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<sup>5</sup> *Bezpieczeństwo a nauka*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo w teorii i badaniach naukowych*, B. Wiśniewski (ed.), Szczytno 2011, p. 89–90.

<sup>6</sup> A. Misiuk, *Administracja porządku i bezpieczeństwa publicznego. Zagadnienia prawno-ustrojowe*, Warszawa 2008, p. 17.

nology-environment system within a specific time frame”<sup>7</sup>. Taking the above into account, one can conclude that risk analysis can be carried out for specific threats and local communities, but it can also be used to assess the level of disruption of critical infrastructure.

This analysis should cover the following elements: first, it should describe critical infrastructure in functional, task-related and substantive terms and present information on the location, geographical location and the age of the infrastructure<sup>8</sup>. Facilities of critical infrastructure should be described one by one in terms of the basis of activity, form of activity, quality management system, environmental management system, capital and percentage share of the State Treasury.

The next stage involves identifying threats by indicating potential dysfunctions which can reoccur or occur in the future.

Another step is to determine the scenarios of critical infrastructure disruptions within a given work area. From the point of view of risk analysis, it is important to devise scenarios as the worst-case scenarios should be also considered in addition to more probable ones with less severe effects<sup>9</sup>. As regards critical infrastructure systems, it can be seen that the likelihood of disruption of critical infrastructure is not high<sup>10</sup>. Nevertheless, the potential effects can be very severe, which is why certain scenarios should not be immediately disregarded, as there is always some possibility of the extreme scenario becoming reality.

Critical infrastructure dysfunction scenarios present the occurrence of negative impacts on the state security, i.e. in the systems and buildings and installations forming part of these systems, or services crucial for the state and citizens’ security. Therefore, assessing risk based on the specified scenarios is gaining in importance. This stage, i.e. risk assessment on the basis of all scenarios, serves as a basis for creating a risk matrix covering the following categories:

- the probability of a specific event provided for in the scenario occurring,
- the effects of a given scenario<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> T. Szopa, *Koncepcja graficznego przedstawiania terytorialnego rozkładu ryzyka i zagrożeń*, [w:] *Mapy terytorialnego rozkładu ryzyka*, M. Dietrich i in. (red.), Warszawa 2004, p. 20–38.

<sup>8</sup> A. Tyburska, *Ochrona infrastruktury krytycznej*, Szczytno 2010, p. 200.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 201.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 202.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 203.

Using the matrix it is possible to precisely describe the critical infrastructure, identify the threats, and, more importantly, assess the risk. This makes it possible to establish security and defence systems which mitigate the risks and threats of undesirable events affecting critical infrastructure. Therefore, the correct operation and autonomy of each stage of risk mitigation affect the performance of threat protection layers, which include<sup>12</sup>:

- the threat prevention layer,
- the threat protection layer,
- the threat countering layer.

The national security conditions of the Republic of Poland, the intensive development of its economic potential and increasing involvement in the shaping of the national and regional security environment, all necessitate the gradual optimisation of the use of all capacities and measures to create an integrated, comprehensive national defence and security system. Therefore, it becomes necessary to create a symbiotic formal and legal system which would determine the use of human resources in the broadly understood national security in the pursuit of national security policy objectives by implementing bodies at all state, local and private levels.

The integrated planning of Territorial Defence Force activities in respect of security, and preparing them at all levels requires a comprehensive approach to crisis situations, and also regulating and assigning tasks in terms of gathering, analysing and utilising the experience of all entities from the national security system, both state and private alike. This is a necessary prerequisite for synergy in respect of security based on the comprehensive use of forces in the public security system of a state.

Increasing the effectiveness of entities responsible for security is possible, i.a., through continuous technological development and exchange of knowledge between entities responsible for national security and authorities responsible for managing this security, through the establishment of legal regulations.

The exchange of safety knowledge, experience and information in everyday practice enhances the effectiveness of safety policy. Therefore, ensuring national security should be perceived in the context of the whole spectrum of state actions aimed at ensuring defence capacity and creating conditions for maintaining this capacity in the event of a conflict or elevated threat levels. One of such preventive actions is to develop formal and

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<sup>12</sup> Ibidem, p. 204.

legal bases for security policy based on an integrated system for the utilisation of experience, will all the entities responsible for the security of the Republic of Poland participating.

The field of security is characterised by tremendous potential and is a source of many actions against nationals as well as regional threats.

Changes in the perception and security of critical infrastructure are a consequence of the breakup of the bipolar world, symbolising the Cold War clashes between two camps – the communist and democratic states. Arms races have shaped the way critical infrastructure is defined and distinguished. Military threats determined the outlook on critical infrastructure, tactics and techniques for protecting key security elements and actors.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century made theoreticians and practitioners in the field of state security aware not only of the need to verify knowledge about critical infrastructure, but also forced them to change the concept of critical infrastructure protection, pointing to it being of crucial importance. The perception of critical infrastructure issues changed in the referenced period as special attention was being devoted to the appropriate protection and defence of critical infrastructure in the event of its exposure threats and also to technical safeguards against new threats (not only of military origin), such as cyberterrorism.

The appropriate protection of critical infrastructure, therefore, forms a basis for the functioning of the state, maintaining its economic potential, and security of citizens, etc. An effectively operating critical infrastructure of the state is the foundation for the proper functioning of the state economy. It also creates conditions for the development of citizens by enhancing state defence.

Preparing the concept of critical infrastructure protection and defence is an immensely complex task and requires attention being paid to the vital characteristics of critical infrastructure, including:

- complexity,
- accessibility for internal and external users,
- international nature,
- dynamic nature,
- multiplicity of organisations,
- necessity for various entities to cooperate,
- interrelations between various critical infrastructure bodies.

Critical infrastructure is regularly transformed. Therefore, the dynamic nature of this infrastructure requires constant amendments to its defi-

dition as well as drawing up lists of security measures, taking into account the analysis of new threats.

The most common threats to critical infrastructure are natural disasters and technical and man-made failures, such as sabotage, criminal activities and terrorist attacks. Therefore, the appropriate securing of critical infrastructure aims at protecting its elements against disasters but also from human activity, which, without such a form of protection and defence planning, could have negative consequences for the security of the state and its citizens. Therefore, it appears that the idea of creating or recreating the Territorial Defence structures is another attempt made over several years at enhancing the defence potential of the country. Suspending compulsory military service in 2010 and the professionalisation of the Armed Forces have not been without an impact on the resource of trained reservists. After the announcement of increasing the numbers of armed forces with the National Reserve Forces not being fully realised, the establishment of the Territorial Military Service appears to be another attempt at “attracting” people to the military. At this stage, it is difficult to credibly evaluate the idea and its implementation. Some doubts are raised, however, by soldiers active in other forms of military service having various powers. On the other hand, one should see it as an advantage that the decision makers in their concept of establishing another type of armed forces place such great emphasis on the territorial aspect of service, and do not only refer to its material advantages, as well as that they perceive the potential of defence-oriented organisations and uniformed speciality classes. Nevertheless, many issues still remain unclear, including the task arming and equipping individual soldiers to entire squadrons.

Undoubtedly, the formation of TDF in the assumed form and size will entail the need to increase spending on state security and defence. According to the author of this dissertation, it is worth investigating these issues from the point of view of potential benefits to the country resulting from the opportunities for smaller and larger communities to become involved in real and measurable security issues of a given region or locality. All initiatives aimed at raising public awareness and making people feel responsible for the homeland on a day-to-day basis, and not only in the wake of great disastrous, crises and conflicts, is praise- and support-worthy.

Another aspect warranting approval in economic terms, is the ready barracks infrastructure left after the garrisons decommission in the early 1990s, as well as the leadership and command structure for this type of Armed Forces in Provincial Military Staff and Provincial Recruiting Head-



quarters. When it comes to defence, the Territorial Defence Force is not less effective than much more expensive armoured and cavalry units. Furthermore, given Poland's location, its topography, urban and wooded areas, which constitute 50% of the country's territory, these contribute to effective and economic irregular defence operations with the use of light weapons.

Summing up, special attention should be paid to ensuring Poland's security through maximising the potential of the human factor in state defence. In my opinion, this should be realised through the establishment of Territorial Defence forces. These should be unconditionally prepared in all the strategic areas and regions relevant for the security of the Republic of Poland.

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