

Trudne partnerstwo: Turcja – UE. Szanse, aspiracje i bariery

Streszczenie

Artykuł traktuje o przyjęciu w struktury Unii Europejskiej Turcji jako kraju położonego na kontynencie europejskim w niewielkiej części, a jednocześnie stanowiącemu lokalizację strategiczną z punktu widzenia bezpieczeństwa UE. Ramy czasowe dokonanej analizy w istocie obejmują cały okres negocjacji akcesyjnych, ale ze względu na jego długość, akcentowane zostaną wyłącznie najważniejsze jego elementy (początek procesu akcesyjnego, kolejne jego etapy, problemy). Celem artykułu jest wskazanie szans i barier wspomnianej akcesji, której wizja oddala się wraz z pogłębianiem się w Turcji kryzysu politycznego zapoczątkowanego działaniami prezydenta Receptayyipa Erdoğan. Główną tezę artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że proces negocjacji rozpoczęty lata temu hamowany był i spowalniany w wyniku kolejnych wydarzeń mających miejsce zarówno w UE (kryzys migracyjny), jak i w samej Turcji (pucz wojskowy z 2016 r.). Autor chce odpowiedzieć na dwa zasadnicze pytania: (1) jakie problemy przez lata negocjacji akcesyjnych okazały się nie do pokonania w tym procesie? oraz (2) jakie perspektywy odnośnie akcesji Turcji rysują się na podstawie obecnych stanowisk obu stron negocjacyjnych? Empiria w tym przypadku bazować musi na analizie historii tureckiego procesu akcesyjnego i najbardziej aktualnych doniesień medialnych (głównie dotyczących puczu z 2016 r.).

Słowa kluczowe: *Turcja, Unia Europejska, rozszerzenie, Cypr, problem kurdyjski, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan*

Abstract

The article deals with the admission of Turkey into the structures of the European Union, as a country located in only a small part in Europe but at the same time constituting a strategic location from the point of view of EU security. The time frame of the analysis made here basically covers the whole period of accession negotiations, but due to the length of the negotiations, only the most important elements will be emphasised (beginning of the accession process, its subsequent stages, problems). The aim of the article is to point out the opportunities and barriers to this accession, whose vision moves away because of Turkey's deepening political crisis triggered by president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The main thesis of the article is the statement that the negotiation process, which started years ago, was inhibited and slowed down as a result of subsequent events taking place both in the EU (migration crisis) and in Turkey itself (military coup of 2016). The author wants to answer two questions: (1) what problems, over the years of accession negotiations, proved to be insurmountable in this process? and (2) what prospects for Turkey's accession are drawn on the basis of the current positions of both negotiating parties? Empirics in this case must be based on an analysis of the history of the Turkish accession process and the most current media reports (mainly on the 2016 coup)

Key words: *Turkey, European Union, enlargement, Cyprus, Kurdish problem, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan*

Hawzhen Kamal Khorshid
Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Difficult partnership: Turkey – EU. Chances, aspirations and barriers

Persistent rooting of Turkey in Europe, the democratisation of Iran, and the resolution of the conflict in the Middle East are goals of strategic importance. Turkey's membership in the European Union is therefore key to strengthening Europe. Europe will not secure itself and will not be able to meet the threats of the 21st century if it treats the EU as a Christian club or to the mythical little Europe of the founding fathers. If the EU aspires to play an important role in international politics – and only then will it be able to defend its interests – it must draw appropriate conclusions (Buras 2004).

Turkey's membership in the European Union has been discussed since the 1960s. Turkey is trying to enter the Union for the longest time among all candidate countries. Negotiations accession launched in 2005 gave hope for integration with the EU in the next ten years. Today we know that accession to the EU structure is a complicated process and does not guarantee success. In the European public discourse various ideas appeared for the forms of Turkish association with the EU without its formal membership – an example of Angela Merkel's concept of "privileged partnership". The privileged partnership would provide Turkey an "exclusive" status while differentiating it from other associate countries. The partnership was meant to be more than a customs union. It would incorporate Turkey more closely into European Foreign and Security Policy and to the European Security and Defense Policy (participation in ministerial meetings foreign affairs, participation in the creation of battle groups). It has also been repeatedly stressed that the question of further enlargement of the Union can not be resolved without reforming its institutions (adoption of the European Constitution and later the EU Reform Treaty), and without fulfilling the criteria of membership by Tur-

key. It seems that Angela Merkel was (at least in the initial phase of the negotiations) the most stubborn defender of the idea of Turkish membership. Even in connection with the prolonged closure of Turkish ports and airports for Cypriot ships and aircraft in 2006, Merkel advocated partial and not total suspension of negotiations with Ankara. A certain expression of disapproval of the attitude of the Turkish side, skepticism towards accession and a tribute to the opponents of the enlargement was not to invite the Turkish delegation by the German Presidency to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Union (2007). It did not, however, negatively affect the process itself, as talks on chapter twenty – industrial policy and entrepreneurship – were opened. Shortly thereafter, the EU focused on the signing and ratification of the EU Reform Treaty, and the question of Turkey's accession remained in the background. In September 2009, Marti Ahtisaari – former president of Finland – and several other members of the EU's Turkey commission called on the Union to intensify the work and practical of the negotiation process with Turkey. At this time, the Turkish side confirmed that EU membership is still a priority. In May 2012, "Positive Agenda" was launched, which aimed to give dynamics to the Turkish – EU relations. In the following years, subsequent chapters of the accession process were opened. In November 2015, the Turkey – EU summit was held, which advanced the accession process (Bielawska 2016: p. 100–105).

The changing circumstances of Turkey's accession prospects were better or worse through those years, and until 2015 the Turkish government was systematically introducing reforms, whose aim was adjusting the conditions of the state to European standards. The positions of the EU member countries are very varied. Negative decision about the accession of Turkey may impede the process of enlargement of the EU by new countries. Democratic changes are an example of the fact that the Muslim country can be not only secular but also meeting European standards. That was a great success not only for Ankara itself, but also for Europe because of the main motive for action which was a European aspiration of Turkey. It would be a mistake if Brussels has completely rejected Ankara's membership in the EU (Jurkowska 2012: p. 48).

The European Union is based on the values of respect for the dignity of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the member states in a society based on pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men (TEU: art. 2). Multilingualism and multiculturalism, which are growing at the moment, as the consequence of the influx

of population from other parts of the world, were not always accepted in European societies. The inevitability of this unacceptance, as well as the need for the protection of their own local or minority languages is evident (Szmidt, Mejnartowicz 2009). Different cultures and customs do not necessarily mean the fall of European culture, but its enrichment. Perhaps Turkey's accession to the EU in the coming years is not yet possible, but the efforts of countries wishing to join the Union cannot be overstated, as they are ready to adapt their legislation and economy to the EU standards (Hughes 2011: p. 15–19).

The aim of the article is to analyse barriers to the successful completion of Turkish accession negotiations with the EU. The author will try to determine what barriers are generated by the EU, and which have arisen as a result of the protracted process on the Turkish side. The article is based on the analysis of the accession process and the positions of the authors discussing this issue over the last two decades. The reference to the current status of the Turkey – EU negotiations is also important.

A review of Turkey – EU relations

Turkey was admitted to the Council of Europe, which guards European values and principles, in August 1949, after fulfilling two membership conditions: recognition as a European country, as well as respect for human rights, democratic pluralism and the rule of law. The credibility of Turkey was not at issue at the time, and its membership in the Western countries' group during the Cold War was a matter of great importance. In 1952, Ankara joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, forming one of the most important elements of the Euro-Atlantic defence system. Next, Turkey became a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Except of a membership in European Union, Turkey is a member of (almost) all major European organisations (Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey 2004: p. 13). In 1959, Turkey applied for association with the European Economic Community. After a certain delay (caused by a military coup in 1960) an association agreement was signed in 1963. One article in the document stated that after fulfilling by Turkey all the conditions of the Treaty of Rome, the parties would consider the possibility of accession to the Community (Aksu 2013: p. 151–155).

In 1987 Turkey applied for membership in the European Communities. After two years, the Commission prepared a decision accepted by the European Council, which excluded the possibility of initiating accession negotiations with Ankara. The Commission stated in its opinion that the issues related to the adoption of the Single European Act prevented negotiations. Moreover, the political and economic situation in Turkey and Cyprus has become, in the Commission's view, an additional obstacle to the start of negotiations. It should be mentioned that the Morocco application (submitted in the same time) was rejected without any further conditions. The Community has recognised that this country is not a European country (Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey 2004: p. 13). Although the prospect of Turkey's membership has been repeatedly dealt with by the European Council, the General Affairs Council and the Association Council over the next few years, the ongoing economic and political obstacles to human rights, particularly through Ankara's obstruction, have always been highlighted (Konopacki 2005: p. 51–52).

A "turning point" for Turkey was Helsinki European Council of December 1999, which stated that Turkey is a candidate for membership of the European Union on the basis of the same criteria applied to other candidate countries. The Council's decision initiated a number of measures (Accession Partnership, Annual Commission Reports, initial screening of the *acquis*), which stimulated the Turkish reforms (LaGro 2007: p. 6–10). The outcome of this process was a European Council document of October 2002, which stated that Turkey has taken significant steps to meet the Copenhagen political criteria and, as the Commission reported, has significantly approached the fulfilment of economic criteria and the adoption of Community law. This opened the possibility of starting accession negotiations with Turkey. In response to strong pressure from the Turkish side, the European Council's Summit of December 2002 promised to set a date for the start of accession negotiations on the end of 2004, as long as Turkey achieves all of the Copenhagen criteria. In order to prepare this country for negotiations, the scope of the Accession Partnership and customs union policy between Ankara and the EU has been extended, and financial assistance increased. As a result of these activities, the Turkish government has significantly increased the pace of reform since the beginning of 2003, demonstrating the will to fulfil all the conditions set by the Council (Konopacki 2005: p. 52). The approach to Turkey's accession of some EU members was (and still is) varied, drawing attention to the size of this country and its socio-economic backwardness, lack of sufficient progress in respect for human rights,

the threat of uncontrolled immigration and potential accession costs. This attitude of Western Europe to Ankara, however, is not new. Atatürk used to say that “the West has always been prejudiced against Turkey, while Turkey is constantly striving towards the West” (Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey 2004: p. 15).

There is no question that Turkey’s accession to the EU creates serious challenges for both parties, as well as opportunities and benefits. Besides all the consequences of Turkey’s failure to join the EU must also be taken into account.

Aspirations and chances

Since many years Turks feel rejected in Europe – they often get the opinion that they are culturally belonging to Asia, and their admission into the Union causes disasters. For Muslim communities living in EU members, the successful completion of accession negotiations could be a factor facilitating integration with the Western community, professing a different system of religious, political and cultural values (Bautista 2004). Adoption of Turkey to the EU would be a clear proof for the world that Europe is not a closed fortress or an inaccessible “Christian club”. This would demonstrate its tolerance and openness, genuine respect for values based on the idea of diversity, democratisation, and the rule of law, freedom and human rights. Turkey’s membership in the Union would mean that Islam is compatible with Western liberal democracy and that in the age of multiculturalism, international terrorism and increasing immigration, the world is not condemned to “clash of civilisations”. In this way, Europe could play a non-usual role in shaping the relationship between the West and the world of Islam. In the Muslim world, Turkey’s membership in the EU could illustrate that tradition and religiosity can be reconciled with the universal principles of modern society. Turkey’s membership in the EU institutions would create a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world, which could be the foundation for building mutual trust and reducing tension between the two sides (Misiągiewicz 2009: p. 129). Turkey’s membership in the EU would allow for creation a kind of buffer between Europe and the conflict region like the Middle East (Paszyński 2004: p. 7).

Turkey’s accession would help to strengthen the position of the EU internationally, especially in the context of its security strategy “Secure Europe in a Better World” (accepted in December 2003) and the “Enlarged Europe and its Neighbourhood” programme developed by the European Commission and the European Parliament. Given

the geo-strategic position of Turkey, its membership would be of major importance to European foreign policy in the Mediterranean, Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkish military potential would also provide important support for the Common Security and Defence Policy. Turkey has for many years been involved in international peacekeeping operations in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, as well as in the EU military missions in Macedonia. In this way, Turkey's membership in the Union would be a logical consequence of existing cooperation within NATO and the Council of Europe (Konopacki 2005: p. 53–54). It is difficult to thoroughly analyse Turkish aspirations in this area, as they are quite clear – it is about the full membership in the EU. Therefore, the analysis of barriers and opportunities remains.

Barriers – the EU point of view

Opponents of the accession of Turkey accuse it of not meeting the basic condition of membership – it is not European country. To answer this argument, one should consider many factors. These include: geographical location, culture, history, choices made by Turkey and the attitude of other European countries (Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey 2004: p. 9). After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the territory of Turkey was reduced. Only 3 percent of its area lies within the continental boundaries of Europe. However, as much as 11 percent of Turkish society, as well as economic and cultural capital of Turkey, Istanbul, are located in this territory (Kastoryano 2013). Turkey is clearly on the line dividing Europe from Asia, part of both continents. While the northern, western and southern borders of Europe are undisputed, those in the south and the south-east remain fluid and open to interpretation. Therefore, the geographical location does not can give a clear answer in this topic (Jurkowska 2012: p. 42). The arguments against Turkey are further limited accession of the European Union. One of the most important Copenhagen criteria for Ankara is “the ability of the Union to absorb new members at the same time maintaining the pace of European integration” (European Parliament 2006). The accession of a large country with a growing population like Turkey could lead to destabilisation of the European Union. Turkey would be the largest EU member, the second largest to the size of the population. It could affect the functioning and balance of the EU institutions (Thomas 2011: p. 111–115). Turkey would play an important role in the decision-making process. Following the EU's rules, the member's position in the most important institutions (including the

Council and the European Parliament) reflects its population potential. This concerns mainly the European Parliament, in which Turkey would have been given a similar number of seats as Germany. However, the impact of a large representation would be limited by the fact that voting takes place usually in accordance with the position of the party, not the member state (Smyk 2004).

Looking at the political role of Islam in Turkey, the character of the secular system established by Atatürk after the founding of the Republic must be properly understood. Secularism in Turkey means the elimination of Koranic rights from the public life. Muslim institutions remain under state control. The government supervises the sacred objects, affects the activities of charitable religious foundations, schools, hospitals and orphanages, and employs imams as civil servants. In addition, it is also prohibited to wear Muslim headscarves not only in schools, but also at official state events (Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey 2004: p. 27). In 2004 it was estimated that the risk of using democracy in Turkey by radical groups for their own aims cannot be completely excluded. On the other hand, the Turkish secular system of the state seems to be deeply rooted in society, as is orientation towards Europe and the West. Moreover, further modernisation of the state and reforms by the government in connection with Turkey's desire to join the EU can contribute to change the mentality of a more backward part of society and secure a secular political system in the country. There is no doubt that in some parts of the Turkish society traditional practices discriminating against women and girls are still present. They concern mainly the so-called "honorary crimes", forced marriages and limiting access to education, which results in high percentage of illiterate women and excludes many women from the labor market and from the protection system health. There are large differences in this issue between the eastern and western parts of the state (Jurkowska 2012: p. 45–46).

Another problem is the location of Turkey in the region of the Middle East. It borders with one of the most conflicted regions in the world. Turkey's membership in the EU may cause the Union's involvement in the unresolved conflicts of this area, and what is behind it, it could have a negative impact on its unity and stability (Marczewski, Świeżak 2006: p. 88). In addition, opponents of accession Turkey in the EU draws attention to the fact that it is a country definitely different from the rest countries of the Union. They think that Turkey is not a leader among Muslim countries and cannot exert any direct influence over them – which reduces the attractiveness of its accession to the European Union (Gwiazda 2005: p. 3).

Undoubtedly, the most difficult challenge for the Turkish authorities in the area of regional issues and international commitments is still an unsettled Cypriot issue. By agreeing to start talks without prior settlement of the Cyprus question, the European Council has only deferred the problem and has not helped to resolve it. The early admission of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU, despite the failure to resolve the conflict with Turkey, was a mistake, because it allows the authorities of this country to put pressure not only on Turkey, but also on the entire Union. While in 2005 the European Commission decided to give Turkey more time to regulate the basic matter related to the recognition of one of the member states (Kuru, Stepan 2012: p. 168–173), the Republic of Cyprus, a year later, the unsettled Cypriot issue led to the freezing by the European Council of eight negotiating chapters most relevant to potential accession (Osiewicz 2015: p. 207). The situation has not changed since then, and the problem of Cyprus makes it impossible in practice to continue constructively the negotiation process, given the fundamental importance of the frozen chapters. In the Enlargement Strategy 2014–2015, the Commission called the candidate countries to reach, as quickly as possible, a settlement of any contentious issues in the context of bilateral relations both with other candidates and the EU member states (European Commission 2014: p. 20). Another problem noted by the Commission was unregulated disputes with Greece in the Aegean Sea. The most important one concerns the division of territorial waters. The remaining ones are related to the status of individual islands and islets, a dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf and the division of the air space. Today's Greece – Turkey relations are much better than in the 1990s, nevertheless all of the disputes mentioned above remain unregulated and may pose a potential threat to peace in the region. As in the case of the Cyprus question, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which Turkey would be admitted to the EU without first settling disputes with Greece (Osiewicz 2015: p. 208).

Migration is another important problem. “The civil war that broke out in Syria in 2011 changed Turkey's policy towards refugees coming from the south. President Erdogan assumed that Syrian insurgents would quickly overthrow the Assad regime and that Turkey would gain political influence in that country by providing assistance to the opposition and accepting refugees. Therefore, Turkey chose to pursue and ‘open door’ policy towards Syrian refugees. The Turkish government began setting up refugee camps at the border with Syria, initially refusing to accept international assistance for Syrians” (Adamczyk, Ilik 2016: p. 196). The creation of refugee camps on the Turkish

border in cooperation with international forces was a great help for the EU countries, but it did not solve the problem in the long term. It should also be mentioned that the Turkish government received significant help (actually payment) in connection with the problem of refugees from Syria and Iraq.

The coup of 2016 made doubts about European standards in Turkey even more justified. In addition, it became an opportunity for the government to tighten up efforts aimed at the liberal part of society (the one that refers to the European standards in its activities). In response to the failed coup, the Turkish authorities arrested 2745 judges and prosecutors whose loyalty was questioned. 2839 soldiers were also arrested. The coup cost the lives of 161 civilians and about a hundred soldiers and 1500 wounded, which is undoubtedly a dark stain on Turkish democracy. Many observers claim that the coup was staged by Erdoğan just to clench fists on the opposition side (Sikorski 2016). From the beginning, the AKP party was in opposition to the army, which was attached to the idea of Kemalism, i.e. strict separation of the state from religion. In the opinion of many Turkish military leaders, governments of moderate Islamists were a threat to the secular republic. Already in 1997, the military intervened in an attempt to block the presidential nomination for Abdullah Gül – AKP politician. After AKP's takeover of power, Recep Erdoğan stepped up against the army, leading many prominent officers to court on more or less credible charges. The rest decided to cooperate with the new authorities or were dismissed and replaced by loyal officers of the younger generation. The return of AKP politics followed a conflict with religious leader Fethullah Gülen, whose supporters gained considerable influence in the justice system and the police. Erdoğan, in a dispute with “gülenists”, turned to the army, concluding a tactical alliance. As part of cooperation with the army, many generals were cleared of charges and the army was left with a free hand on the Kurdish question (Wojcik 2016). Among the possible reasons of the coup, the most frequently mentioned are changes in the Turkish constitution planned by President Erdoğan – increasing the prerogatives of the president, including full control over the army, limiting the role of the Constitutional Court (Lewandowski 2016). Changes in the constitution were not possible due to the lack of a constitutional majority. The AKP did not manage to obtain such a majority despite the expedited elections in which abuse occurred (Wojcik 2016).

It seems that these events had also an impact on Turkey's European aspirations. In October 2016 president Erdoğan stated that Turkey no longer needs membership in the European Union (Dinan, Nugent, Paterson 2017: p. 102–107) but unilaterally

does not abandon accession talks (that are stuck in a deadlock for almost a decade). Erdoğan used the unsuccessful coup as a pretext to deal with political opponents. There were repressions and mass arrests of people from the opposition to the AKP. European politicians responding to this clear violation of democratic principles and the rule of law stressed that these steps distance Turkey from the EU and make it difficult to conduct further accession negotiations, but also prevent the abolition of visas for Turkish citizens (Adamczyk 2017: p. 40).

„The military coup underlined the elitist duality as a permanent dynamic that influences national politics and shapes the state foreign policy. Even though the coup was not successful, it highlighted the urgent need for establishing an assertive rule that would cast away any attempt of regime reversal and would secure the AKP rule. One of the main pillars of asserting the leadership rule and legitimacy is the Western alliance. It is important to underline that the coup occurred in a time of turbulence in the Middle East: Shaking governments in the Middle East, parochial groups taking-over the reign in some countries and expanding their attacks on neighbors as illustrated by the case of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the refugees' flows going to Turkey and the revolution setbacks in Egypt and Lybia. In these circumstances, the AKP kept its assertive and proactive foreign policy, not in developing relations based on zero problems with neighbors but in confirming its importance for its Western allies in countering ISIS danger and acting as a security valve towards Europe with regard to the refugees' issue” (Magued 2017). In internal politics, the coup is still a foundation for the president to strengthen his own position and gain popularity in society – evidence of the anniversary of events during which Erdoğan promised to “chop the heads off the traitors”. This is probably the reason for the emergence of the death penalty in the public debate. During a series of events related to the celebration of the anniversary, Erdogan dismissed the criticism of the ongoing purge, as a result of which about 150 000 people were suspended or dismissed, and over 50 000 were arrested to face accusations. Critics say that the purge, made possible by an exceptional state that provides government intent, directed Erdogan's political opponents in the same way as the suspected conspirators (Kenyon 2017). After the coup, Turkey became the “world's largest prison for media workers” because of the “persecution for critical voices” policy pursued by the Ankara authorities. In the reports on the situation in Turkey, it is indicated that the actions of the government of Erdoğan, which led to the imprisonment of over 100 journalists. Turkish authorities without legal proceedings, and by virtue of decrees, closed about 150 editor-

ial offices, which was possible thanks to the coup that was introduced after the attempt and the still existing exceptional state. Media agencies also report that the Turkish justice system is now “more politicised than ever before” (*Turcja wspomina* 2017).

Barriers – Turkish point of view

“An overstepping of Ankara’s ambition over the possibilities of influencing current international politics revealed Turkey’s weakness, which was unnecessarily entangled into religious conflicts of the Middle East. You can risk saying that Turkey has compromised and ridiculed itself in the international arena. Until recently, Turkey perceived as a secular, stable and predictable country has become a Middle East state, understood as an unstable, unpredictable and conflictogenic country inhabited by Muslim population” (Adameczyk 2017: p. 38). The fact that Turkey’s accession to the EU has become part of the internal policy of EU member states – despite the official recognition of her candidacy and the start of accession talks. From Turkish point of view, this undermines the credibility of the EU (Eralp, Torun 2011: p. 71–72).

Negotiation in deadlock was insulting for the Turks, which Erdogan emphasised in his speeches on international forums. At the same time, the creation of the image of the state – the main actor of the Middle Eastern regional policy – within Turkey meant that the social divisions, whose background is for or against membership in the EU, were getting deeper and deeper. This thesis is justified not only by the statements of the leader, but also by the results of the constitutional referendum, which indirectly related to the issue of membership. Erdogan also does not exclude social consultations around the candidacy of Turkey for EU structures. In addition, the strengthening of the Turkish economy over the last several years reassures a relatively large part of the Turkish society about the lack of need to ask for financial support from Europe. Erdoğan goes even to the alleged blackmail over the flow of refugees, which has not prompted France and Germany to take decisive diplomatic steps. This, in turn, implies a question about the deeper background of the accession negotiations discussed here and leads to the statement that, among other things, due to the migration crisis, the EU needs Turkey more than Turkey needs EU. The Turkish authorities generally do not recognise the EU’s right to speak and make demands on Turkey’s internal affairs. This applies not only to respect for European standards, but also to problems that have been put up for years in international fora (for example, the Kurds case – Erdogan accuses Western countries

of supporting the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which is banned in Turkey). The right to such interest from Western European countries is also denied by a large part of Turkish society (Fleet, Faroqhi, Kasaba 2009: p. 196–199). The decrease in this support is also due to the growing sense of national pride.

Instead of conclusions

Ankara's European aspirations in the Cold War era were not the main determinant of its foreign policy and did not condition its actions in the international arena. The Turkish elite saw membership in the European Communities as a complement to political engagement in NATO (Wódka 2013: p. 26). Although it was considered eligible to become a member of EU, Turkey is still a candidate country, that started its negotiations to obtain this status in 2005. European Commission assessments from 2015 and 2016 clearly show that Turkey is getting closer to obtaining membership, although it received "early stage" note in "fisheries", "freedom of movement for workers and right of establishment for companies" and "freedom to provide services" categories. Till now Turkey's membership had been postponed, although its eligibility was announced many years ago. The reason for this is the fact that a general structure of EU has dramatically changed since the first call made on Turkey. Member countries dispute over the advantages and disadvantages of its accession. The arguments for – divulged mainly by United Kingdom then and Poland now, are: highly developed economy, with Turkish airlines set on the 2nd position in the world, strong management and natural resources, great localisation between Europe and Asia, that provides Turkey with a lot of important connections both economic and political and moreover military power, which would definitely elevate EU's position in the time of crisis. However, opponents – for the major ones stand France and Germany – claim that Turkey is not "European enough" with its territory only in 3 percent located in Europe. German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, said in 2015 "I have always been against EU membership, President (Tayyip) Erdoğan knows this, and I still am". Most of the member countries are significantly against Turkey in the EU, in the surveys lead both among citizens and authorities. One of the issues stopping the members from confiding their trust in Turkey is human rights issue, especially women's rights, which in the report of EU's Commission are in better shape, though still neglected and the improvement in this area is obligatory, if Turkey wants to think about accessing EU. In 2017, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff said

“In law Turkey is still a candidate, in fact, it is not. Nobody believes in Brussels or in Ankara for that matter that Turkey will eventually join the European Union. And that is why we say it is better to make a new start and put the relationship on a new foundation.” The whole process, from this position, seems to be over.

As the future member of EU community, Turkey is donated by EU a pre-accession support, which stands at 4.5 billion for 2014–2020. Turkey still is an important economic partner for the European Union. Since 2006 (except 2009) the export of EU’s goods to Turkey has been noting a significant increase from EUR 50 018 million in 2006 to EUR 78 005 million in 2016. Import showed increase from EUR 41 927 million in 2006 to EUR 66 702 million in 2016 (although the value in 2016 was a 1.2% decrease in comparison to 2015) (European Commission 2017).

Turkey has to cope with a large number of refugees flowing into the country. As part of the EU policy on the migration problem, the EU supports Turkey financially on the basis of legal collaborations, discussed above. Although relations between Turkey and the Union, and in particular some of its member states in Western Europe, are strained, Ankara is a guarantor of the slowdown of the influx of the Middle East and North Africa refugees. After last year’s EU – Turkey agreement, the country’s migration route to Greece was closed.

It has to be pointed out that another problem is a conflict between Erdogan’s Turkey and Germany – intensified, among others, by a resolution of the Bundestag of 2016 recognising the Armenian slaughter of 1915 as a genocide, but also the result of the internal situation in Turkey. Turks often do not realise how their actions are perceived in Europe. Their main consequence is that Turkey is perceived as an increasingly disloyal and unpredictable ally. Turkey has the strengths to lead a tough game with European countries. However, Ankara realises that if it meets with a strong EU response, it will be in a losing position. Above all, the Turkish economy and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who wants to win the presidential election in 2019, will need a strong deal and economic cooperation with the EU (Turcja: twarda gra 2017).

Samuel Huntington prophesied that global politics in the coming decades will be dominated by the problem of “clashing” of civilisations. He states that after the end of the Cold War, there will be no economy or ideology in the world. Conflicts will become a cultural divide, and the national protagonists will remain the most important protagonists on the chessboard, as this form of organisation is the best guarantee of cultural diversity (Götz 2005). The current state of relations between Turkey and the EU ap-

pears on the one hand as a clash of civilisations, and on the other hand as an example of a political and economic clash in a complicated international context.

References

- ADAMCZYK Artur (2017), *Quo Vadis Turcja – koniec europejskiego kierunku polityce zagranicznej Turcji?*, „Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej”, nr 11.
- ADAMCZYK Artur, ILIK G. (2016), *Greek-Turkish Relations, UE and Migration Problem*, „Yearbook of Polish European Studies”, vol. 19.
- AKSU Kenan (2013), *Turkey: A Regional Power in the Making*, Cambridge.
- BAUTISTA Daniel. (2004), *Turkey's Accession to the European Union*, „Brussels Insight”, October.
- BIELAWSKA Agnieszka (2016), *Angela Merkel wobec integracji Turcji z Unią Europejską w latach 2005–2015*, „Roczniki Intergracji Europejskiej”, nr 10.
- BURAS Piotr (03-04.2004), *Europa na nowy wiek*, „Gazeta Wyborcza”, nr 62.
- DINAN Desmont, NUGENT Neill, PATERSON William E., *The European Union in Crisis*, London 2017.
- ERALP Atila, TORUN Zerrin (2011), *Turcja-UE: po prostu kolejny impas?*, BECZEW Dimityr, *Co myśli Turcja?*, Warszawa-Londyn.
- Erdogan: nie potrzebujemy już członkostwa w Unii, ale pierwsi nie zrezygnujemy*, <https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/erdogan-o-czlonkostwie-turcji-w-unii-europejskiej,777623.html>, 28.11.2017.
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014), *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15*, Brussels, 8.10.2014, COM(2014) 700 final.
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015), *The European Union's cooperation with Africa on migration* Brussels, 22 April 2015, press release http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4832_en.htm, (22.04.2015), Brussels.
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016), *State of the Union 2016: Strengthening European Investments for jobs and growth*, press release http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3002_en.htm (14.09.2016), Strassburg.
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2006), *Rezolucja legislacyjna Parlamentu Europejskiego w sprawie instytucjonalnych aspektów zdolności Unii Europejskiej do przyjmo-*

- wania nowych państw członkowskich, 2006/2226(INI), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2006-0569&language=PL>, 28.11.2017.
- FLEETK., FAROQHISuraiya, KASABAR. (2009), *The Cambridge history of Turkey*, Cambridge.
- GÖTZ Katarzyna (2005), *Turcja w Unii Europejskiej a zderzenie cywilizacji*, <http://www.psz.pl/120-unia-europejska/katarzyna-gotz-turcja-w-unii-europejskiej-a-zderzenie-cywilizacji>, 28.11.2017.
- GWIAZDA Adam (2005), *Członkostwo Turcji w Unii Europejskiej – szanse i zagrożenia*, „Wspólnoty Europejskie”, nr 10(167).
- HUGHES Edel (2011), *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: The Politics of Exclusion?*, New York/London.
- JURKOWSKA Beata (2012), *Perspektywy przystąpienia Turcji do Unii Europejskiej: szanse i zagrożenia*, [w:] *Nie tylko Śródziemnomorze. Problemy polityczne i społeczne świata islamu*, KBWiPA UŁ, Łódź.
- KASTORYANO Riva (2013), *Turkey between Nationalism and Globalization*, London/ New York.
- KENYON Peter (2017), *A Year Later, A Divided Turkey Remembers Failed Coup Attempt*, <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/07/16/537549673/a-year-later-a-divided-turkey-remembers-failed-coup-attempt>, 7.03.2018
- KONOPACKI Stanisław (2005), *Droga Turcji do Unii Europejskiej*, „Studia Europejskie”, Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, nr 1.
- KURU Ahmet T., STEPAN Alfred (2012), *Democracy, Islam, and secularism in Turkey*, New York.
- LAGRO Esra (2007), *Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter*, New York.
- LEWANDOWSKI Mariusz (2016), *Legalny sultanat Erdogana – dlaczego doszło do puczu i czemu zamachy stanu są złe*, <https://bezprawnik.pl/turcja-czemu-zamach-stanu-erdogan/>, 25.01.2018.
- LOESCHER Gil (2002), *A World Where Everyone Belongs, Awake!*
- MAGUED Shaimaa (2017), *Turkey's Foreign Policy and the Western Exigency before and after the Military Coup*, „Dialogi Mediterranei”, no 24.
- MARCZEWSKI Piotr, ŚWIEŻAK Paweł (2006), *Zderzenie Cywilizacji. Sąd nad teorią Samuela Huntingtona*, Warszawa.

- MISIAĞIEWICZ Justyna (2009), *Polityka zagraniczna Turcji po zimnej wojnie*, Toruń.
- OSIEWICZ Przemysław (2015), *10 lat negocjacji akcesyjnych Turcji z Unią Europejską. Analiza postępów w obszarze kryteriów politycznych na podstawie raportów Komisji Europejskiej*, „Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej”, nr 9.
- PASZYŃSKI Marian 2004, *Turcja Państwem Członkowskim Unii Europejskiej?*, „Wspólnoty Europejskie – Biuletyn Informacyjny” nr 10, 2004, p. 7.
- REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON TURKEY (2004), *Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?*, British Council and the Open Society Institute, Brussels
- SIKORSKI Kazimierz? (2016) *Zamach stanu w Turcji: FethullahGulen oskarża Erdogana o zainscenizowanie przewrotu*, <http://www.polskatimes.pl/fakty/swiat/a/zamach-stanu-w-turcji-fethullah-gulen-oskarza-erdogana-o-zainscenizowanie-przewrotu,10414766/>, 28.11.2017.
- SMYK Katarzyna (2004), *Konsekwencje przystąpienia Turcji dla procesu decyzyjnego w Unii Europejskiej*, www.rcie.lodz.pl/docs/turcpozrada.pdf, 28.11.2017.
- SZMIDT Dorota T., MEJNARTOWICZ Agnieszka (2009), *Europejska wielokulturowość i wielojęzyczność*, „InvestigationesLinguisticae”, vol. XVIII.
- TEU, Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012.
- THOMAS Daniel C. (2011), *Making EU Foreign Policy: National Preferences, European Norms and Common Policies*, New York.
- TURCJA WSPOMINA nieudany zamach stanu. Wielki marsz w Stambule, <https://www.tvp.info/33232921/turcja-wspomina-nieudany-zamach-stanu-wielki-marsz-w-stambule>, 7.03.2018.
- TURCJA: TWARDA GRA mimo politycznego rozchwiania (2017), <http://www.defence24.pl/611213,turcja-twarda-gra-mimo-politycznego-rozchwiania-wywiad>, 28.11.2017.
- WÓDKA Jakub (2013), *Polityka zagraniczna „nowej Turcji”. Implikacje dla partnerstwa transatlantyckiego*, Warszawa.
- WÓJCIK Łukasz (2016), *To najdziwniejszy zamach stanu, do jakiego doszło w Turcji. Z kilku powodów*, <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/swiat/1668766,1,to-najdziwniejszy-zamach-stanu-do-jakiego-doszlo-w-turcji-z-kilku-powodow.read>, 22.01.2018.