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Journal

2020 | 83 | 27-42

Article title

Nieostrość języka prawnego w świetle filozoficznych koncepcji nieostrości

Content

Title variants

Languages of publication

Abstracts

PL
The purpose of the paper is to discuss the usefulness of application of various philosophical conceptions of vagueness to the problem of vagueness in law. Although it cannot be expected that any philosophical conception may solve the practical problems of interpretation and application of vague terms in legal texts, the philosophy of language may help lawyers to better understand their problems. The paper describes main philosophical conceptions of vagueness and in particular metaphysical, epistemic, semantic, and pragmatic theories. It is argued that the pragmatic conception of vagueness has the best explanatory force with respect to the problem of vagueness in law. The application of this conception, however, must be based on acceptance of internalistic theory of meaning and on the assumption that the purpose of legal interpretation is to reveal the intention of the legislator. Both assumptions are controversial.

Journal

Year

Volume

83

Pages

27-42

Physical description

Dates

published
2021-02-17

Contributors

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ceon.element-f3816a27-6717-3c3e-a114-50fa73201a67
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