Ocena wkładu Davida Rossa w zrozumienie powinności
AN ASSESSMENT OF DAVID ROSS CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF OBLIGATIONS
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This article goes beyond simply presenting the philosophy of D. Ross. It is rather a discussion, not only with his views, but also with those of his commentators. This discussion is quite focused, as it refers to those issues which show the dependence between theory and practice, and between the general moral law and specific laws. The analyses are also aimed at investigating the legitimacy of attempts to supplement the two best-known ethical theories (teleologism and deontologism), made both by Ross and by his commentators, to introduce the concept of prima facie obligations to Kant's theory of perfect and imperfect obligations. Ross tries to review critically both the concepts of Aristotle and the theory of I. Kant. It is not possible, however, to introduce either Ross' prima facie obligations or Stratton-Lake's propositions to Kant's conception, if only because the philosopher from Königsberg understood obligations in a different way than Ross or his followers. For Ross, obligations are not specific instances of general duties, but reasons showing the proper features of human acts. They are not the principles of obligations, but only conditions on which specific demands may be made.
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