'GRAMMAR RULE' IN LATER WITTGENSTEIN

• Authors: Cana T.
• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

The paper deals with Ludwig Wittgenstein's approach to the 'rule following activities'. Wittgenstein made many profound remarks, especially on the nature of the rules determining our communication in an everyday language. Some of these remarks are in the center of a current philosophical controversy known as 'rule following considerations'. Among many contributors the most important one is probably Saul Kripke. The aim of this paper is to refute Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's approach to these activities, which Kripke developes in his book 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language'. According to Kripke, the central argument of 'Philosophische Untersuchungen' - the private language argument - leads us to so-called sceptical conclusion. From this conclusion it follows that in the everyday language there is no clear meaning of the term 'following a rule'. The paper is an attempt to reconsider this approach and to demonstrate that this sceptical interpretation of the private language argument is misleading.

Keywords

EN

KRIPKE SAUL; LANGUAGE ARGUMENT; RULE FOLLOWING; SCEPTICISM; WITTGENSTEIN LUDWIG

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2006
• Volume: 13
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 349-360
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Cana T.

• T. Cana, Katedra filozofie, Univerzita sv. Cyrila a Metoda, Namestie J. Herdu 2, 917 01 Trnava, Slovak Republic

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

07SKAAAA02244709