PL EN


2005 | 53 | 10 | 1038-1050
Article title

CONSEQUENCES OF CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING IN PRICE AGREEMENTS' STABILITY

Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
The present article aims to show that price agreements are more unstable if their companies use debt as a financing instrument. Moreover, the higher the number of companies (that use debt) in a price agreement, the more instable the price agreement will be. Even when companies compete a la Bertrand and if debt financing is high, the duopoly of price agreement will be instable. When debt financing is present, we found there is a higher number of sub-game perfect equilibrium, in a posteriorly a la Cournot competition, then when debt financing is not present and that this (possible) existence of sub-game perfect equilibrium increases as the debt level of financing increases.
Year
Volume
53
Issue
10
Pages
1038-1050
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
  • P. Macas, Ústav slovenskej a svetovej ekonomiky SAV, Sancová 56, 811 05 Bratislava 1, Slovak Republic
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
06SKAAAA01152661
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.de1029f1-87ea-3494-9114-15179ac5f279
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