Two Concepts of Social Contract and Specifics Morality of Law
Дві концепції суспільного договору і специфіка правової моралі
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Two different approaches to the problem of social contract represented in modern philosophy are being investigated in this article. First approach based on theory of mutual advantage and rooted from Hobbes philosophy. Second approach based on fundamental moral intuition of equal respect to each person as moral entity and connected with tradition of moral philosophy rooted from Kant. The influence of this tradition was increased after “The Theory of Justice” by Jon Rawls was published. In this work post-metaphysical version of Kantian procedure universalism was developed. From Kantian point of view understanding of social contract as mutual advantage based on extra-moral ground hence it is beyond normative political philosophy and philosophy of law. The author argues that both directions of contractarianism reveal the similarity in using definite type of moral argumentation. The last one is connected with specific morality of law which starts from priority of the rights under obligations. This morality based on ontological understanding of human being as fundamental indefinite, so be able to bear threat.
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