Gottlob Frege has already distinguished sense (Sinn) from reference (Bedeutung) because expressions can possess the same referent and different senses. G. Frege also argued that some words have a sense, but it is very doubtful if they have a reference. Moreover, for example, the words “the least rapidly convergent series” have sense but no referent. According to this distinction, we can notice that the expression “indexing” has many different senses, but it is hard to say if the meaning of this expression exists. We can index the Latin word index and list: an informer, a traitor, a spy, a demonstrative finger, a title or an inscription etc. But how to index the word “indexing”? Should we rather say perhaps an indexing grammar, according to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s undenotational theory of meaning as use of expression? Though in postmodernism this anti-essential impulse was strengthened (Derrida, Rorty, Welsch), however we have to cope with this – a true or false, good or oppressive – indexing game and at the same time with the game against the discipline of indexing. An indexing is proper both for the doctrines which have an absolutistic (Arystoteles) or publicly religious pronunciation (Pascal), also for relativism and contextualism or – only vestigially – (con)textualism.