A Critique of Turri's Experimental Research on Selfless Assertions

• Authors: Gaszczyk Grzegorz
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this paper, I show that Turri’s (2015a) experimental study concerning selfless assertions is defective and should therefore be rejected. One performs a selfless assertion when one states something that one does not believe, and hence does not know, despite possessing well supported evidence to the contrary. Following his experimental study, Turri argues that agents in fact both believe and know the content of their selfless assertions. In response to this claim, I demonstrate that the conclusions he draws are premature in this regard. More specifically, I criticize his methodology, showing that his study is not only incomplete but also yields contradictory results. In closing, I propose how such a study should be conducted in order to receive comprehensive results.

Keywords

EN

assertion; selfless assertion; knowledge; belief; norms; experimental philosophy; John Turri

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 59
• Pages: 23-34

Dates

published

2019-03-31

Contributors

author

Gaszczyk Grzegorz

• University of Groningen Faculty of Philosophy Oude Boteringestraat 52 9712 GL Groningen, Netherlands

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Identifiers

DOI

doi: 10.33392/diam.1051