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2012 | 2.3(20.3) | 101-107
Article title

Public Sector’s Principal-Agent Theory in a Global World

Authors
Selected contents from this journal
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EN
Abstracts
EN
The problem of institutionalization and the impact of institutions on individual and collective action is discussed by Attila György in his article. The author focuses on communication processes that take place at various levels of the state and society. Participants’ behaviour (public and private actors), administrative and legal regulations influence the quality and effectiveness of communication. The article examines the factors determining the model of power distribution and how it shapes interaction between individuals and institutions.
Keywords
Contributors
  • Bucharest University of Economics (Bucharest, Romania)
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-05cc0ec5-57f6-4aa5-9042-7d1f5c9b9068
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