On types of responsiveness in the theory of voting

• Authors: HOLLER Manfred J. , NURMI Hannu
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In mathematics, monotonicity is used to denote the nature of the connection between variables. Hence for example, a variable is said to be a monotonically increasing function of another variable if an increase in the value of the latter is always associated with an increase in the other variable. In the theory of voting and the measurement of a priori voting power one encounters, not one, but several concepts that are closely related to the mathematical notion of monotonicity. We deal with such notions focusing particularly on their role in capturing key aspects of plausible opinion aggregation. Further, we outline approaches to analyzing the relationship of opinion aggregation and voting power and thereby contribute to our understanding of major components that determine the outcome of voting.

Keywords

EN

plausible opinion aggregation; monotonicity; no-show paradox

• Publisher: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Journal: Operations Research and Decisions
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 87-106

Contributors

author

HOLLER Manfred J.

• University of Hamburg, Center of Conflict Resolution (CCR), Mittelweg 177, 20148 Hamburg, Germany.
• Public Choice Research Center (PCRC), University of Turku, Publicum (Assistentinkatu 7) 20014 Turun yliopisto, Finland

author

NURMI Hannu

• Public Choice Research Centre and Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science, University of Turku, Assistentinkatu 7, 20500 Turku, Finland

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Identifiers

DOI

10.5277/ord160206