Konkurencyjność instytucjonalna państw OECD

• Authors: Jakubów Elżbieta

Title variants

EN

Institutional competitiveness of the OECD countries

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Motywacja: W artykule podjęto próbę sprawdzenia, czy oprócz zmiennych o charakterze czysto ekonomicznym, znaczenie dla wzrostu gospodarczego i nierówności dochodowych w państwach OECD mają również czynniki instytucjonalne. Cel: Celem artykułu jest empiryczna analiza wpływu instytucji powiązanych z sektorem publicznym: korupcji, ochrony praw własności, restrykcyjności polityki ekologicznej i niezależności sądownictwa na sukces socjoekonomiczny społeczeństw państw OECD. Materiały i metody: W analizie empirycznej wykorzystano dane panelowe dla jednorodnej grupy dziewiętnastu państw OECD o wysokim dochodzie w latach 2005–2012. Sukces socjoekonomiczny zoperacjonalizowano przy pomocy dwóch zmiennych: wzrostu gospodarczego oraz nierówności dochodowych. Ekonometryczny model wzrostu gospodarczego, oparty na modelu Solowa rozszerzonym o instytucje i kapitał ludzki, oszacowano ważoną metodą najmniejszych kwadratów, zaś w przypadku nierówności dochodowych zastosowano model efektów stałych uwzględniający, podobnie jak model wzrostu, zarówno zmienne instytucjonalne, jak i kontrolne. Wyniki: Na podstawie wyników estymacji modeli ekonometrycznych wykazano istotny statystycznie wpływ restrykcyjności polityki ekologicznej na wzrost gospodarczy oraz ochrony praw własności na nierówności dochodowe. W obu modelach nieistotna statystycznie okazała się korupcja, zaś w modelu wzrostu — niezależność sądownictwa i ochrona praw własności.

EN

Motivation: The paper attempts to investigate, whether or not institutional factors beyond those of solely economic nature can influence economic growth and income inequality in the OECD countries. Aim: The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of institutional infrastructure connected with the public sector, proxied for by a set of institutional variables: corruption, protection of property rights, environmental policy stringency and judicial independence, on socioeconomic success of the OECD countries’ societies. Materials and methods: The paper introduces two econometric models estimated on annual panel data from 2005 to 2012 for a homogenous group of nineteen high income OECD countries. Two variables — economic growth and income inequality — were used in order to operationalise the socioeconomic success. The econometric model of economic growth, based on an institutions-augmented Solow model with human capital, was estimated by OLS mtehod. As for the problem of income inequalities, a fixed-effects model has been employed, which, like the growth model, takes both institutional and control variables into account. Results: Results from the empirical analysis suggest that environmental policy stringency explains to a significant extent the variation in growth rates across nations. The only institutional variable being a significant source of differences in income inequality is protection of property rights. No significant effect of corruption on any of the explained variables was find, as well as judicial independence and protection of property rights on economic growth.

Keywords

PL

konkurencyjność instytucjonalna; nowa ekonomia instytucjonalna; sektor publiczny; wzrost gospodarczy; indeks Giniego

EN

institutional competitiveness; new institutional economics; public sector; economic growth; Gini coefficient

• Journal: Catallaxy
• Year: 2018
• Volume: Volume 3
• Issue: Issue 1 June 2018
• Pages: 5-15

Dates

published

2018-06-50

Contributors

author

Jakubów Elżbieta

• Szkoła Głowna Handlowa w Warszawie

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Identifiers

DOI

10.24136/cxy.2018.003