2012 | 152 | 51-68
Article title

Interlocking directorates jako instytucja nieformalna zwiększająca efektywność działań korporacyjnych

Title variants
Interlocking Directorates as an Informal Institution that Boosts Corporate Efficiency
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The aim of this article is to present interlocking directorates from praxeology’s perspective – that is, as a kind of specific social mechanism with potential for boosting efficiency in business practice. The main hypothesis of the article is that interlocking directorates are an informal institution created, enforced and communicated by groups of interests in order to reinforce their control over accumulation of capital and protection of different kinds of benefits. The author concentrates rather on a typology of theoretical problems of analyzing interlocking directorates; empirical examples are taken from the author’s preliminary research of the pharmaceutical sector in Poland.
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