Indirect control and power

• Authors: BERTINI Cesarino , MERCIK Jacek , STACH Izabella
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex prob-lem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure.

Keywords

game theory; indirect control; corporations; power indices

• Publisher: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Journal: Operations Research and Decisions
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 7-30

Contributors

author

BERTINI Cesarino

• University of Bergamo, Department of Management, Economics and Quantitative Methods, Italy

author

MERCIK Jacek

• WSB University in Wrocław, Poland

author

STACH Izabella

• AGH University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, Poland

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Identifiers

DOI

10.5277/ord160202