The impact of Brexit on the voting power in the Council of the European Union

• Authors: Kleinowski Marcin

Title variants

PL

Wpływ Brexitu na siłę głosu w Radzie Unii Europejskiej

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The article analyses the potential impact of Brexit on the voting power of member states and indirect voting power of EU residents in the Council, in the case of adopting decisions by the qualified majority of votes. The leading hypothesis of the paper assumes that the fact of leaving the EU by Great Britain leads to another transfer of voting power to the benefit of five countries with the largest populations. The aim of the paper is also to determine to what extent the indirect voting power of residents from individual member states is equal. The obtained results indicate that a flow of voting power towards the five member states with the largest populations will be a consequence of Brexit.

PL

Artykuł analizuje potencjalny wpływ Brexitu na siłę głosu państw członkowskich oraz pośrednią siłę głosu rezydentów w Radzie, w przypadku przyjmowania decyzji kwalifikowaną większością głosów. Hipoteza główna zakłada, że wystąpienie Wielkiej Brytanii z Unii Europejskiej doprowadzi do kolejnego transferu siły głosu na korzyść pięciu państw o największej populacji. Celem artykułu jest również określenie w jakim stopniu pośrednia siła głosu rezydentów z poszczególnych państw członkowskich jest równa. Uzyskane rezultaty wskazują, że konsekwencją Brexitu będzie przepływ siły głosu w stronę pięciu państw Unii Europejskiej o największej populacji.

Keywords

EN

voting power; Brexit; Council of the European Union

PL

siła głosu; Brexit; Rada Unii Europejskiej

• Publisher: Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Międzynarodowych, Uniwersytet Warszawski
• Journal: Przegląd Europejski
• Year: 2018
• Issue: 4(50)
• Pages: 95-117

Dates

published

2018

Contributors

author

Kleinowski Marcin

• Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

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