2014 | 180 cz 2 | 141-151
Article title

Pomiar krótko- i długookresowej efektywności mechanizmów aukcyjnych. Wyniki badań eksperymentalnych

Title variants
Measurement of the Short and Long Run Efficiency of Auction Mechanisms. The Experimental Research
Languages of publication
The optimality and the efficiency are the main criteria used in the evaluation process of auction mechanisms. The optimal auction maximizes auctioneer's surplus, whereas an efficient mechanism efficiently allocates the commodity traded in the auction. Quite often there is a tradeoff between the two criteria: an auction which is optimal has a limited efficiency, and the opposite, an auction that is efficient might lead to a lower auctioneer's surplus. In a short run it's the optimality that would be more crucial for the auctioneer, but in the long run the efficiency would become more and more important, promoting competition and innovations. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that experiments can serve as a useful tool in evaluating the auctions' efficiency. The paper presents the results of the experiments, aimed at analyzing the optimality and efficiency of the chosen reverse auction mechanisms, in case of the asymmetrical market with an entry cost. The mechanisms studied included the English auction, the first-price sealed-bid auction, the Japanese auction, and the Amsterdam auction. Out of them the highest value of auctioneer's surplus was reached in case of the first-price sealed-bid auction, and the most efficient mechanism was the English auction. Apart from that, the paper provides the results of the long run simulations, showing the positive effect of efficiency on the discounted sum of the auctioneer's surplus.(
Physical description
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Document Type
Publication order reference
YADDA identifier
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