Capital structure and managerial ownership: Evidence from Pakistan

• Authors: Khan Shoaib , Suzuki Yasushi
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This paper aims to investigate how managerial equity ownership affects the capital structure choice (debt-equity ratio) of non-financial firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange in Pakistan between 2008 and 2012. Earlier studies on Pakistan have explored the impact of ownership structure on firm performance. This study extends the literature by exploring the relationship of ownership structure, especially managerial ownership, on capital structure. Our results show an inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial equity ownership and leveraging. At a low level of managerial ownership, it is positively related to debt-equity ratio, assuming that managers use more debt, possibly seeking for higher returns on equity or higher stock price by leveraging. An inverted U-shaped relationship suggests that leveraging would be diminished after the point where managers become major residual claimants by owning a certain amount of equity ownership. Managerial opportunism may explain this tendency, though the causal relationship requires further discussion.

Keywords

EN

Capital structure, managerial ownership, leverage, Pakistan

• Publisher: Prague Development Center, Czech Republic
• Journal: Business and Economic Horizons
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 11
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 131-142

Dates

published

2015-07-10

Contributors

author

Khan Shoaib

author

Suzuki Yasushi

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Identifiers

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.15208/beh.2015.10