Orders of criticality in voting games

• Authors: DALL’AGLIO Marco , FRAGNELLI Vito , MORETTI Stefano
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The authors focus on the problem of investigating the blackmail power of players in simple games, which is the possibility of players of threatening coalitions to cause them loss using arguments that are (apparently) unjustified. To this purpose, the classical notion of the criticality of players has been ex-tended, in order to characterize situations where players may gain more power over the members of a coalition thanks to collusion with other players.

Keywords

EN

voting game; blackmailing power; semivalue

• Publisher: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Journal: Operations Research and Decisions
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 53-67

Contributors

author

DALL’AGLIO Marco

• 1LUISS University, Department of Economics and Finance, Viale Romania 32, 00197 Roma, Italy

author

FRAGNELLI Vito

• University of Eastern Piedmont, Department of Sciences and Innovative Technologies (DISIT), Viale T. Michel 11, 15121 Alessandria, Italy

author

MORETTI Stefano

• Université Paris-Dauphine, UMR7243 LAMSADE, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France

References

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• BANZHAF J.F., Weighted voting doesn’t work. A mathematical analysis, Rutgers Law Review, 1965, 19, 317.
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• FRAGNELLI V., OTTONE S., SATTANINO R., A new family of power indices for voting games, Homo Oeconomicus, 2009, 26, 381.
• SHAPLEY L.S., A value for n-person games, [in:] H.W. Kuhn, A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games II, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1953, 307.
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Identifiers

DOI

10.5277/ord160204