The First Year of the Conflict in Ukraine: Political and Military Consequences for Central and Eastern Europe

• Authors: Rublovskis Raimonds

Title variants

PL

Pierwszy rok konfliktu na Ukrainie: konsekwencje polityczne i wojskowe dla Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The outcome of the conflict in Ukraine will bring fundamental political, military, economic, and social consequences define global and regional balance of a power and fate of number of international organizations, including the European Union and NATO. The aim of this paper is to analyze political and military consequences of the first year of the conflict in Ukraine for countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States and the further development of the trans-Atlantic link for European security, including the development of NATO Alliance until 2030. Fundamentally different perceptions of threats in the Russian Federation and in NATO, EU countries, and Ukraine led to the beginning of the Russian Federation’s military action against Ukraine in February 24, 2022. Since then, military conflict in Ukraine has evolved into full-scale war on terrain of Ukraine and increasingly negative escalation of political, military, and economic relationships between Russian Federation and NATO, EU and other actors, bringing parties to nuclear standoff. War in Ukraine has brought a substantial political and military endurance test for NATO and the European Union. It is obvious that there are several scenarios of development of war in Ukraine ranging from complete military victory for Ukraine and, subsequently, for the West to complete military victory of the Russian Federation in Ukraine via long-term warfare of attrition.

PL

Wynik konfliktu na Ukrainie przyniesie fundamentalne konsekwencje polityczne, militarne, gospodarcze i społeczne, określając globalną i regionalną równowagę sił oraz losy szeregu organizacji międzynarodowych, w tym Unii Europejskiej i NATO. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza politycznych i militarnych konsekwencji pierwszego roku konfliktu na Ukrainie dla krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, w tym państw bałtyckich oraz dalszego rozwoju więzi transatlantyckiego, w tym rozwoju NATO do 2030 roku. Zasadniczo odmienne postrzeganie zagrożeń w Federacji Rosyjskiej oraz w NATO, krajach UE i w Ukrainie doprowadziło do rozpoczęcia działań wojskowych Federacji Rosyjskiej przeciwko Ukrainie 24 lutego 2022 roku. Od tego czasu konflikt zbrojny w Ukrainie przekształcił się w wojnę i przekłada się na coraz bardziej negatywną eskalację stosunków politycznych, wojskowych i gospodarczych pomiędzy Federacją Rosyjską a NATO, UE i innymi aktorami, doprowadzając strony do nuklearnego impasu. Wojna w Ukrainie jest zatem poważnym sprawdzianem wytrzymałości politycznej i militarnej dla NATO i Unii Europejskiej. Oczywistym jest, że istnieje kilka scenariuszy rozwoju wojny w Ukrainie, począwszy od całkowitego zwycięstwa militarnego Ukrainy, a tym samym Zachodu, po całkowite zwycięstwo militarne Federacji Rosyjskiej w konsekwencji długotrwałej wojny na wyniszczenie.

Keywords

EN

Ukraine; war; NATO; European Union; Central and Eastern Europe

PL

Ukraina; wojna; NATO; Unia Europejska; Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia

• Publisher: Instytut Nauk Społecznych i Bezpieczeństwa Uniwersytetu Przyrodniczo-Humanistycznego w Siedlcach
• Journal: De Securitate et Defensione. O Bezpieczeństwie i Obronności
• Year: 2023
• Issue: 1(9)
• Pages: 7-20

Dates

published

2023-09-28

Contributors

author

Rublovskis Raimonds

• H.S. Skovoroda Kharkiv National Pedagogical University, Ukraine

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Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.34739/dsd.2023.01.01