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2020 | 30 | 4 | 39-56

Article title

From expected utility theory to prospect theory: tracking down the experimental path after forty years

Content

Title variants

Languages of publication

EN

Abstracts

EN
The expected utility theory axioms have been studied experimentally. Three of the experiments are a repetition of an earlier test in slightly changed circumstances, while the other two are original. The participants were incentivised with rewards, which did not happen in the replicated tests. The results confirmed the degeneration of the expected utility theory as a scientific research program. The evidence that resulted from the tests supported the hypothesis on the cumulative prospect theory predicting facts not forecasted by the EUT.

Year

Volume

30

Issue

4

Pages

39-56

Physical description

Contributors

  • Department of Microeconomics, Poznań University of Economics and Business, al. Niepodległości 10, 61-875 Poznań, Poland

References

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Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.desklight-1cb8a9a4-1ad2-43f6-80ba-da92b89821e8
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