2014 | 22 | 2(86) | 73-96
Article title

Rozwiązanie problemu Butlera i wyjaśnienie efektu Knobe’a

Title variants
A Solution to Butler’s Problem and an Explanation of the Knobe Effect
Languages of publication
Butler’s and Knobe’s cases appear to show that our attributions of intentional actions are sensitive to moral considerations. The puzzles can be solved if (a) we reject the assumption that the puzzling attributions of intentionality are attributions of intentional actions, (b) we further reject the assumption that the concepts of intentional action and of intentional omission have a common genus, (c) we adopt certain (not unprecedented) assumptions about each concept, in particular about the relation to the notions of intention and of ability. The presented solution makes use of a reconstruction of the notion of what is within the agent’s power to do. I argue that the characteristic asymmetry in attributions of intentionality in Butler’s and Knobe’s cases is derivative from the asymmetry in intentional omissions. Since the intentional omissions in question are omissions to fulfill negative duties, they are easily mistaken for intentional actions.
Physical description
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