PL EN


2015 | 3 | 107-118
Article title

TTIP’s Monetary Clause Muddle

Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
We argue that TTIP negotiations, which are focused on improving conditions for mutual trade and investments between the U.S. and the EU, have overlooked the issue of the influence of monetary and exchange rate policies of both sides on the potential results of a prospective agreement. Thus we demonstrate that the agreement should have been supplemented by a monetary clause (MC) in order to avoid a possible mismatch between U.S. and EU currencies. Such a clause, and no other possible currency related legal instruments, should be broad, and aim to regulate the bond between the dollar and the euro. It can work as a convenient springboard to invigorate the multilateral trade system via the institutional nexus of the IMF, WTO, OECD or G-20. The clause can make the agreement as important for strategic relations between the U.S. and the EU as the Treaty of Rome was for the rise of European integration.
Keywords
EN
MC (Monetary Cause)   U.S.   IMF   WTO   OECD   TTIP  
Year
Issue
3
Pages
107-118
Physical description
Contributors
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-1ec37011-32a8-4388-88bf-648af04b6872
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